Kwass v. Kersey

Sidney J. Kwass Kersey

J. L. (No. 10622) Submitted February 1954. Decided March 1954. J. Maxwell, W. appellant. Sanders, for

Joseph M. appellee. Judge:

Lovins, brought Sidney This is a J. J. L. by against suit Kwass Kersey the Circuit Court of County. Miercer is an suit Essentially, seeking enjoin it the defendant There are defaming plaintiff. special touching alleged threats of assault prayers against intimidation the defendant attempted plaintiff, concerning damages allegedly also suf- defamatory allegedly from the words fered the defendant. published by a the of the verified bill of

Upon filing complaint a court'granted a the injunction, motion for temporary without notice. temporary servants, defendant, agents, employees The his (1) or circulating from enjoined: were representatives Burton, letter to G. certain addressed Walter publishing or printed from or written (2) circulating publishing any or expressly impliedly, matter the charging plaintiff, deceit, or unethical conduct fraud, dishonesty conspiracy; circulating (3) orally from any wrong-doing”, “or other fraud, dis- conspiracy, charges deception, or publishing conduct, wrong-doing, or other any unethical honesty, mails, or cir- United States (4) sending through from the any manner whatsoever any or culating publishing letters, or docu- written, papers or printed mimeographed persons to or verbally making any person ments, or from conduct, fraud, dishon- whatsoever, of unethical charges wrong-doing, or other any esty, corruption, deception, or any libelous (5) circulating making public from kind, or descrip- character slanderous statements (6) interfering the concerning plaintiff, tion to attempting with, threatening, assaulting molesting, plaintiff. intimidate trial injunction, of a temporary the award

After give defendant to requiring entered a decree court copies to whom persons names and addresses list of to and addressed Walter letter, the defendant signed or exhibited. Burton, was delivered G. of the de- troubles of the domestic out grew

This suit with her Kersey Campbell, daughter, Josephine fendant’s an signed D. who had Campbell, husband, Alexander and marital rights their concerning property agreement difficulties.

The plaintiff drafted an agreement supplemental revising agreement, according theory first to the defendant, induced Mrs. daughter, sign Campbell, same. The defendant seems to think that Mrs. Campbell deprived was substantial property rights, and to have infant custody of her three children. denies that he Mrs. represented Campbell. defendant, with equal vigor, asserts that the plaintiff regarded

was Campbell’s as Mrs. In the representative. course negotiations, according to made charges against he plaintiff, Campbell go advised Mrs. divorce, Florida the purpose obtaining and it seems that such effort was unsuccessful.

The instant suit was heard on the amended and supple- mental bill defendant, of complaint, demurrer of bill, Kersey, overruled and the sworn of answer the defendant to such bill. defendant there- moved the to upon court dissolve the which injunction, motion was overruled. This appeal followed.

A short synopsis of the salient in the alleged facts amended supplemental and bill of that complaint discloses law, Bluefield; the an attorney at residing he that has a good reputation for and honesty, integrity conduct; ethical that he is wholly a liveli- dependent upon hood the of practice attorney his as an profession law; at that is a he merhber of the Bar of his Association and county organizations other connected with prac- profession. tice of the legal

The plaintiff alleges represented that he D. Alexander Campbell and was corporation Campbell which connected for of many years, the institution prior suit; that at the of D. request Campbell,.- said Alexander he contract his prepared Campbell written between July By Camp- wife under date of 1950. that agreement, furniture, all agreed bell transfer his wife of by Campbell fixtures and household then owned goods Bluefield, home family Virginia,, located West Mrs. that by Campbell; then owned and. an automobile children, sub- the three of custody have Campbell should of competent of court ject to “order Campbell that Campbell”; Mr. of visitation for the month of per to his wife the sum pay $75.00 should reached children children until said of each-of said support the sum he his wife pay that would age years; continue to month; would Campbell per $125.00 mortgage covering on the monthly payments pay $13,000.00, until home, to about amounting family insurance satisfied; that he would maintain was mortgage and children wife life for the his protection on his ability. limit of financial him that advised alleges Campbell Plaintiff further the provisions was dissatisfied with Campbell’s wife house- tired of her duties as agreement; that she was duties mother desired to transfer those keeper and to leave Blue- husband; it her wish to her and that was of her at a distant field, place “and make a life own Biuefield”. him that advised alleges Campbell

The plaintiff had to the revision Kersey Campbell agreed Josephine in certain July particulars, the contract made accordingly plaintiff. was revision was agreement, Campbell Under the revised Mrs. Biuefield to her City home in the convey Campbell home wás worth Campbell approximately husband. aby mortgage encumbered $16,500.00at that time $12,750.00. agree- in the revised Campbell, in the sum of and ment, wife for six months if pay was to his $200.00 continue was to gainfully employed, payment she was Thereafter, year. for a of one the revised period of $200.00 Campbell pay that was to his wife agreement provided re- month, she lived or until long as per she. $125.00 remarried, married, if he was to her pay and she $500.00 on his maintain life insurance a and that he would year, and three children. for the of his wife life benefit that alleged Campbell requested The further him to a the prepare supplemental agreement embodying and agreement terms set forth above. prepared was consultations, the Campbell signed after two agreement and informed the plaintiff that Josephine Kersey Camp- bell and her two brothers had and inspected approved agreement. revised

On December, 1951, or about the 27th day Campbell’s to wife went the office plaintiff signed acknowl- agreement, with full edged supplemental knowledge appreciation its terms and conditions. plaintiff alleged bill that he read the agree- his her ment to and fully agreement discussed the revised alleged with her. Plaintiff that he had to be- good cause lieve -from what Mrs. that the re- Campbell said him agreement her; vised was acceptable to that at that time he suggested Mrs. Campbell she was free to discuss agreement counsel; other if she did select such counsel that he would her pay cause husband to consultations; counsel fees involved in such but that Mrs. Campbell declined consult attorney another there- upon signed acknowledged agreement. the revised Plaintiff alleges that after the execution of the agree- ment, defendant, Mrs. Campbell father, and her be- came dissatisfied with the revised agreement without any justification, very became angry with the plaintiff and formulated a widely scheme circulate as as possible friends, among plaintiff’s associates and public gen- eral, reports false which were substance that the plain- “dishonest, unethical, tiff was unscrupulous, a ‘shyster’, clients”, deceiver and betrayer and that should be disbarred as an attorney. defendant,

Plaintiff charges Mrs. Campbell and father, her entered into for its conspiracy, having pur- reports the circulation of false pose plain- concerning tiff as practicing attorney, object and purpose destroying reputation lawyer, and to cause prospective clients to believe that he dishonest and prevent him from being employed.

The pursuant that plaintiff charges arrangement such between the defendant that did daughter, they and his circulate Mercer throughout County false as above reports, noted. charges

Plaintiff that the and his acts the defendant daughter in the circulation of such have done him reports irreparable damage. Plaintiff also that the de- alleges fendant sent letter to the malicious plaintiff containing falsehoods and statements of a scurrilous defamatory nature. alleges that the defendant has ex- plaintiff hibited of such copies letter to various and that persons doubt has been cast on honesty his that a integrity; letter containing accusations, similar was sent to the Chair- Committee, man of the Grievance Virginia West State Bar, District; Tenth that defendant seventy- has caused five copies letter addressed to such chairman to be mimeographed; writing and that the letter and sending it to chairman, the defendant was actuated malice.

Plaintiff charges the defendant has threatened bodily to him and injury also have him disbarred from practice law. The that the defend- plaintiff alleged insolvent, ant is not but avers that he been em- ployed many years;.that his financial are resources limited; that defendant would be pay any unable to sub- him; stantial if judgment any should rendered against be that some of his prospective clients friends believe the charges true; of defendant and are daughter if the defendant is not restrained from out carrying scheme, his libelous and he defamatory great will suffer damages. bill the defendant prays be required to furnish the names and addresses of all persons whom the letter sent to the Chair- Grievance Committee sent; man enjoined has been that he be from further letter, circulation of such as well as further circulation of direct; letter sent to the that defendant en- be joined any matter, written publishing or printed impliedly “fraud, expressly charging unethical deception, conspiracy, conduct or other in connection with the wrong-doing” affairs Josephine Kersey that defendant be Campbell; enjoined from mak- ing above; oral charges the nature noted that he be from enjoined any such sending or printed written,matter mail; through the that the defendant enjoined be from making or pubic circulating any or libelous slanderous of any statements and kind the concerning plaintiff; and that enjoined defendant be from or threatening assault- ing the plaintiff. Plaintiff also that the prays defendant be required pay he, as damages the plaintiff incurred or will incur from the and libelous slanderous statements.

Plaintiff’s Exhibit is copy of letter dated March 1952, and addressed plaintiff to the and mailed evidently by the defendant. In this letter the defendant the accuses Kwass, plaintiff, of faith in agrees bad the revised drafting ment the of denounces conduct in plaintiff emphatic terms. Plaintiff is the by advised defendant that letter that the Bar or Association Court would be requested to examine letter, his conduct. A similar addressed to Walter Burton, G. Chairman of the of Grievance Committee the Bar, Virginia West State District, Tenth dated February 14, 1953, in detailed, which the accusations hereinbefore repeated, were with a ending request that an be inquiry the public made that general protected be unscrupulous practitioners.

The defendant demurred to the bill six plaintiff’s grounds, (1) the substance of is That a as follows: court of has no since the equity jurisdiction, plaintiff has law, a plain, (2) at that adequate complete remedy there is no of contractual or trust allegation relationship plaintiff, as between the defendant and the and that jurisdiction enjoin has no the libelous or slan- alleged statements, particularly derous that has no “enjoin language the utterance of words (3) tending to insults or violence or of peace”, breach alleged only; or intimidation conspiracy the are colorable (4) Article 7 and 8 of the Constitu- that under Sections Code, 55-7-2, Virginia, tion of West the trial and vindi- of defamatory cation utterances is limited to rights the jury, (5) and trial granting

actions III, an is in Article Section violation Constitution, of the as first amendment well of the United States for the reason it deprives Constitution speech, (6) defendant freedom charges matter allegedly libelous contained of the Bar Com- made to the Chairman State Grievance mittee is privileged. demurrer overruled. the defendant Thereupon, it,

filed knowl- his answer. In the defendant denies community. to the edge standing con- fully that he informed alleges defendant is of Alexander D. cerning representation Campbell in- in which corporation Campbell terested. D. now Campbell

The answer that Alexander is avers the that Jose- Kersey Campbell husband and Josephine of this phine daughter is the defendant. Kersey Campbell It and daughter the defendant that his son- admitted difficulties; that a written in-iaw were domestic having 1950, be- January, igreement had been about prepared signed July and agreement them that said was tween the Kersey employed plain- that Josephine Campbell husband. tiff her in her difficulties with her represent and that information belief upon The defendant avers her plaintiff the as Kersey upon relied Josephine Campbell counsel, plain- took his and that her employment advice at-, tiff a continuance of the contemplated relationship client. and torney that he is informed as to whether says

The defendant D. the that Jose- Alexander advised Campbell plaintiff was dissatisfied with the Kersey Campbell pro- phine July of the first contract visions Josephine Kersey desired to make Campbell said changes however, that if such says first Defendant the contract. Campbell, were made Alexander D. representations and The defendant further answers they that were false. the notwithstanding attorney says relationship that

o Kersey Campbell existing Josephine client between informed suit, the never plaintiff that plaintiff husband, and that her that he her representing him represent relying upon knew that she was plaintiff her. further that without says plaintiff, defendant repre- that he was

informing Josephine Kersey Campbell re- negotiating drafting her husband senting wife, and his agreement Campbell per- vised between the revised sign sisted in Mrs. requesting Campbell go did not daughter Defendant avers that his agreement. upon to the office of the went voluntarily plaintiff, but the revised signed persistent requests plaintiff so by to do being urged importuned after agreement the plaintiff. plaintiff suggested defendant denies counsel, on the con- confer with other but daughter insisted agreement,

trary, executing plaintiff after said of Blue- City leave the Kersey Campbell that Josephine Florida, consult an there to go field 'and to the State of her concerning recovery custody attorney of her children, recovery property. well as knew, should' The defendant avers jurisdiction. had no that the Courts of Florida have known this, for Jose- But, arranged notwithstanding him in the State of to meet with Kersey Campbell phine plaintiff’s counsel of selection. employ Florida and there daughter that he and were dissatis- says Defendant his the revised contract and that fied provisions with conceal from her Campbell Mrs. to urged the plaintiff during contract its preparation father the existence of this execution; that of this defendant com- daughter her and did attorney plaintiff relied upon pletely of the revised agreement. the contents so conceal he the con- alleged angered by that The defendant into a entering but denies duct of the scheme plaintiff, matter. The defamatory to circulate daughter his did, learning defendant avers that he upon however to facts, petition the idea of presenting conceive into the pro- to lawfully inquire constituted authorities prepare and that he did fessional conduct plaintiff, to file the same. endeavor or con-

Defendant unlawful combination any denies He avers daughter. between him and his spiracy existing his feelings that he from his natural toward simply acted unfairly. whom, he had been treated daughter, considered her, to he endeavored to have Because of his devotion into. to plaintiff’s practice inquired fitness any false widely Defendant denies that he circulated plaintiff, alleged untrue statements but concerning them. He he has the facts as he understood assembled in the to admits a letter to the adverted sending plaintiff, he informa- charges, upon bill of but plaintiff’s complaint, belief, contained in such tion and the statements he a letter letter are true. He also admits that wrote Committee, Virginia of the Grievance West the Chairman Bar, District; No. 2 is State Tenth exhibit plaintiff’s of that true letter. copy bodily that he to inflict Defendant denies has threatened person plaintiff, or make assault of the injury upon intention con-* says present but that it was his the facts tained in the letter to the Grievance Committee of State Bar. Virginia West that he says

Defendant is advised as whether has sustained or otherwise. damages, irreparable that he responsible any injury Defendant denies because of his conduct as an attorney handling the domestic difficulties between wife. Campbell interlocutory to an decree of the Circuit Court

Pursuant of Mercer the defendant County, furnished list of the names and addresses of the he persons whom had sent court, letters mentioned above. The trial copies 8, 1953, overruled a motion to July dissolve the tem- injunction. porary

507 The threshold question is: Does a court of have jurisdiction to enjoin of defamatory state- ments, oral or written?

Other subsidiary (a) questions are: Does the have an adequate and complete remedy (b) at law? Should the alleged defamation of the plaintiff’s profes- sional standing be enjoined?

This suit presents question which is of first impression in this jurisdiction. fact, In we have found no de- cases cided by this Court or the Court of Supreme Virginia, prior to 1863. “Equity there no when is a full, complete remedy law.” Stevens, McGhee v. 121 430, W. Va. 615; 3 S. E. 2d Hall, Lewis v. 147, 64 W. Va. 317; 61 S. E. Shisler, Coombs v. 373, 763; 47 W. 34 Va. S. E. Michael v. Workman, 5 W. Va. 391.

“Bearing mind the history infamous of the Star Cham- ber, it must be remembered that the subject matter of equity jurisdiction is the protection of civil rights and private and not property prevention crime or im- moral acts when not in connection with violation of pri- vate An rights. injunction will lie for the prevention of a crime or illegal or immoral act merely because of its illegality. One reason for noninterference such case is the fundamental of jurisdiction; want another ex- is the istence of an adequate remedy at J., law.” 10 M. Injunc- tions, See Crossland Crossland, v. 53 W. Va. §10. 424; Ehrlick, E.

S. State v. 65 W. Va. 64 S. E. Ocean City Schurch, Association v. 57 N. J. Equity Reports, 268.

Jurisdiction of actions to award damages for defama- tion, written or spoken, is well known function of courts jurisdiction. Sweeney al., this v. Baker et W. 158. Va.

It ais crime to use on insulting words while the en- closed lands of another to one lawfully such lands. Code, 61-3-33.

The common law crime of defamation recognized is still jurisdiction. Payne, State 87 W. Va. 104S. E. 864; State 52 S. E. 58 Va. Clifford, State v. W. 549, 20 S.

Aler, E. 585. 39 W. Va. at law: remedy adequate in this suit has an The plaintiff deterrent, a prose an added and as damages, action for By Citi prosecution. criminal by defamation cution the Co., P. & W. Montgomery Light Co. v. Light, H. & P. zens’ 171 Fed. 553. the merits not, however, any opinion do express

We in aspect. of a at law either proceeding States It is a of the United general rule application defamatory of enjoin the publication will of contractual trust relation. matter absence a or the Brandreth v. early principle An case announcing Lance, decided Chancery Reports, Paige, York New “The court in 1839. of that case are as follows: Headnotes publication of has not to restrain the chancery libel, a the injunction, party of a bill filed upon the injured by publi- whose character or business will be only a can publication cation. An restrain injunction interfere granted be in cases where the will publication other literary of of complainant’s with either subject publication.” in the matter of property Lance, supra, opinion In the of the in Brandreth v. course court following language: uses the “This bill presents chancery case of an court of simple application a publication pamphlet purports restrain the of which work, fiction, a a tale on the literary undoubtedly to be of upon complainant. that it is intended as libel ground England, The court of star chamber in once exercised the ears, foreheads, of off the power cutting branding the of the slitting important personages. the noses libellers (Hudson’s Chamber, 224.) And, Star 2 Collect. Jurid. as jurisdiction, an incident to such court was undoubt- edly restraining publication the habit of such abolished, by injunction. libels Since that court how- ever, I there is believe but one case record in which upon court, in this country either or in has at- England, court, an or order of the tempted, by prohibit libel, such, in anticipa- as restrain the publication Scroggs, I allude the notorious tion. In the case which asso- bench, and his king’s chief justice court safely be entrusted ciates, that they might decided publica- suppressing power prohibiting The House might tions deem to be libellous.” they impeached Parliament of Britain Commons of the Great power. of such Scroggs for exercise “* * * appears, no or of contract breach of trust where enjoin bill will not lie to business, plaintiff’s to the injurious libelous statements of his trade or a slander operate profession, Sovittaja Temperance Society title Finish property.” Raymond al., 561; v. Co. et 106N. E. Riavaaja (Mass.) Pub. Logan, Russell, See Choate v. (Mass.) Rep. v. 58 Am. 137. 582; Trust v. Sun-Ameri (Mass.) 133 N. E. Lawrence Co. 655; Diatite Com Co., (Mass.) can E. Boston Pub. 139 N. 19 Company, (Mass.) pany Manufacturing v. Florence 310. Rep. Am. has re Court of Massachusetts Supreme

The Judicial stated immediately ceded from the doctrine somewhat Houle, (Mass.) 11 N. E. the case of v. above. See Menard continuing 2d it a 436, was held: “Where there is wherein on a business unjustified wrongful attack cause damage malice and by causing man motivated actual the per distinguished injury as property rights honor, sensibility, sonality affecting feelings, though take even false statements jurisdiction, will are and conspiracy the means employed, announcements not there is no appear, does since competition unfair remedy law.” adequate Lance, Finish supra, Brandreth v. cases al., Riavaaja Pub. Co. et Society Sovittaja v.

Temperance enunciated supra, principle are in with the harmony In Francis v. Court of the United States. Supreme 385, 30 Law Ed. wherein Flinn, 30 Ct. 118 U. S. S. gist “The of the used: following language is whole do treat is that defendants complaint boat, and have pilot to use his vessel having 510 stated, so

publicly and that some of the parties mentioned subjected have been to suits for their acts in piloting. so, But if this be remedy full for his in the alleged wrongs courts no They law. furnish for the ground of a interposition court of equity.” decree of the lower court was reversed and the dis bill missed. A is similar rule other courts of enunciated the United In Kidd Horry, States. v. Rep. 28 Fed. it was held that the United States Courts are without restrain The fol libel. lowing language opinion used in the “But informative: neither the statute nor country, any well- courts, considered judgment has introduced this new branch of into our equity, There jurisprudence. may be case or two looking way, but none that we deem of sufficient authority justify us in assuming jurisdiction.” Edison, Jr., See Edison v. Thomas A. Chem Co., ical 957; 128 Fed. Black & Yates Mahogany Ass’n., v. 227;

129Fed. 2d Scale Co. Computing Computing Toledo (6 A.) Scale Co. C. C. American 919; Malting Fed. Co. (2 A.) v. Keitel C. 351; C. 209 Fed. Oil Conservation Co. v. Engineering (6 A.) Brooks E. Co. C. C. 52 Fed. 2d 783; Dayton v. McGranery (U. C. Col.) S. A. Dist. of Fed. 2d v. Warner Ct., Bros. Pictures (Dist. Kuhn S. Y.) D. N. Supp. Fed. 800.

A decision of the District Court of the Eastern District of Tennessee in the of case Starns v. Co., Success Portrait 28 Fed. is Supp. to the effect that no juris- has diction to enjoin the utterance of slander the writing libel, of if but the “slander or libel is in faith, bad for the sole purpose injuring defamed”,, trade the person an injunction may issue.

The case of Carter v. Motor Knarpp (Ala.) 11 Co., So. 2d embodies principle similar that announced by in Massachussetts Court v. Houle, supra. Menard In defendant, case, the Carter it was the conduct of the held was injurious and that an adequate remedy law did not exist and that was entitled to an injunction. cases,

There is a line of in principally the midwestern states which an deny injunction to restrain the publica tion of defamatory matter. See Assn. America Life v. Boogher, 173; Mo. v. Appeal Rep. (Mo.) Harris Wolf 184 S. 1139; W. Marx & Haas Jeans Clothing v.Co. Wat (Mo.) son S. 67 W. Howell v. Bee (Neb.) Pub. Co. 158 N. W. 358. See & Montgomery Ward Co. South v. Dakota R. M. & H. D. Ass’n. 150 Fed. 413.

The Supreme Courts Missouri and Nebraska rest their decisions upon constitutional provision, reading in “ substance as -Every may follows: person freely speak, write publish subjects, all being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; libel, all trials for both civil criminal, the truth published when good motives, and for justifiable ends, shall abe sufficient de- ” fense.’ Under a similar provision constitution, it was held the case New York Juvenile Guard- ian Society Roosevelt, 7 Daly’s Reports court equity was jurisdiction without to restrain publi- cation of libelous matter.

Other jurisdictions however, without on such relying constitutional provisions noted, above have that an held injunction to restrain of defamatory mat ter may not instance, issue. In one it was held that an function, performing by a trial awarded court, an absolute nullity. Liversey State ex rel. et al. v. Judge Court, Civil District 34 La. Annual Rep. 741. See McMorries (Texas) v. Hudson Corp. Sales 233 S. W. 2d 938. Marlin Firearms Shields, (N. Y.) Co. v. E. 64 N. 163, is for the authority proposition likewise that injunc tion does not lie even though manufacturer of a dis paraged article has no remedy at law. reasons as signed is that no special damages were shown. It is rule of general application statute, the absence of no to enjoin publication of de matter, if famatory no breach of trust or contract in Injunctions, volved. C. J. S. §134. rule, not a it

“Although universal is one frequently showing acceded to followed that the absence of a of of or of property right, violation some some breach

512 injunction prevent is not available contract,

trust char- publications defamatory actual or threatened of acter, at publications, the retraction of such compel Jur., In- if 28 Am. property infringed.” least no is junctions, §118. Edition, §1015, Fourth Injunctions,

In High of question pre- is used: following language “Upon in of libelous against publication relief equity ventive statements, of plain- character or business affecting American, tiff, authorities, indicate English both indeed, wholly are, uniformity, a noticeable want doctrine, and that English The earlier irreconcilable. govern- principles seems most accord with the by way ing injunction, limited to the jurisdiction being pro- that the preventive rights tection which are remediless property law, courts of would procedure usual course of a libelous not restrain the of libels or works nature, were calculated though publications even business, credit, person or character of the injure the pursue remedy and that he left to aggrieved, would be 1093, id. In at law.” See Section Newall Slander §198, Libel, Edition, language Fourth the following is, rule America general England found: “The Act of was, at the Common Law Procedure least before an could not be issued restrain Lance, Brandreth v. New Citing supra, a libel.” Roosevelt, supra. Society York Juvenile Guardian in the United States Indeed, authority have found no we enjoined. can be In that mere defamation which holds instances, stated, enjoined as herein Courts have some disparagement it connected with for the reason that was it or manufactured for sale tangible property generally Levine, (N. Chancery) Weiss v. J. See defendant. Gibbs, (Ark.) Art Gallaries v. 574; Esskay A. 2d Pomeroy’s Jurisprudence, Third Ed. Equity E.S. 2d Law, E. Libel and Encyclopaedia A. and §1358; XVIII Slander, seq. et. §XV the adop- but since

The same rule prevailed England, 513 tion of the Common Act Law Procedure of 1854 and the Judicature of by Act 1873 that country, jurisdiction to grant interlocutory injunctions enforcing libel and slander has been assumed.

An excellent argues article which that courts eloquently of equity should have jurisdiction grant injunctions discussed, of the kind here Dean by written Roscoe Pound, found in will be 29 Harvard Review at page Law 640. Essentially, the article Dean is in part Pound by criticism of Lord in finding the Eldon the case Gee English Pritchard, v. 2 Swans. 402, Reports Reprint 670. argued It is that the of Lord in findings Eldon the case of Pritchard, dictum; Gee v. supra, is and that it should be the law that equity jurisdiction enjoin publica- tion of libel' and slander. the article Dean While Pound is very persuasive, agree we do not with the con- clusion expressed therein. far,

Thus we have cited authorities of general applica- (Ill. The of Gariepy Springer, tion. case 48 N. E. App.) 2d is in the case at In the point Gariepy bar. case, the and obtained an in plaintiff sought court, enjoining alleged defamatory trial matter allegedly published derrogation had been plaintiff’s as a court held that standing lawyer. as a equity, general proposition, enjoin would matter, publication injuring person’s of defamatory headnote standing. credit and second business “Equity reads as follows: is without Gariepy case except restrain libel jurisdiction intimidation, or coercion.” involving conspiracy, cases allegations in this record of the proof There no against of complaint charging conspiracy the bill against employed intimidation or coercion plaintiff, of are coercion True, him. intimidation and conspiracy, are the defendant’s allegations denied alleged, but such answer. Gariepy in the case will be holding

A similar to that Sta- Broadcasting v. Radio found in the case of Lietzman case, a 203. In the Lietzman App. tion C. F. L. 282 Ill. W. being corporation corporation plaintiff, dentistry. practitioner

' adoption to the prior If a of trial existed by jury legally cannot extend constitution, the legislature a liti deprive and thus jurisdiction such cases v. Grand Lawhead gant against trial his will. jury et 860; Cecil et al. v. Clark S. E. Lodge, 115 W. Va. if time at the al., But, 44 W. 30 S. E. 178. Va. of our the clause litigation, had in certain apply does jury trial guaranteeing constitution therein of jurisdiction, or litigation deprive such al., supra. Clark et Cecil et al. v. jury. to act without a inter- enjoining of question to the Adverting again that in are Sloan we aware property rights, ference with Mitchell, 506, 800, E. it was held v. 168 S. W. Va. property a valuable medicine was right practice Mit- by of medicine right practice and the unauthorized Similarly, it has been chell, defendant, enjoined. was right. is a property law right practice held J.) (N. Management Corporation Unger Landlords’ v. 910; 254 N. Taylor (Minn.) Fitchette W. 168 A. v. 924. (Pa.) 197 A. County Bar v. Montgomery Rinalducci is practice profession in the of property right connected with necessitate, property, an intangible ex profession. of practitioner of a personality continuing distinguished have between Many courts & Black of personality. “trade and defamation libel” seems Ass’n., Such Mahogany supra. Yates v. distinction v. in Menard for the decisions part to be reason Company, Knapp Carter v. Motor supra, and Houle, supra. defama- case, alleged the suit is

In the instant based lawyer. personality plain- tion of plaintiff cannot be lawyer standing tiff his professional on, there is no defama- a rational basis. Since separated or alleged shown property of tangible personal tion defama- any record, question do not think that this we tion or disparagement tangible can personal property be here considered.

Our attention has III, been directed to Article Section 7, Constitution of Virginia, West which reads as follows: “No abridging the freedom of or of the speech, press, shall be passed; Legislature may but by pen- suitable alties, books, restrain publication or sale obscene papers, pictures, provide or punishment libel, and character, recovery, defamation of and for the in civil actions, by aggrieved, dam- suitable party, ages libel, for such or defamation.”

In considering constitution, our it in part held in case of Mail ferentially Bailey Charleston Association, 837, 126W. 27 S. E. Va. 2d no special is conferred privilege thereby relative to the law of defamation, by that “No case has been provision. court, federal, found in any state or has held that the communication or or of dissemination of falsehoods malicious speech, statements press otherwise protected Dairy Blossom guaranty.” constitutional Etc., Co. Brotherhood, v. International 125 W. Va. Law, 23 S. E. 2d 650 See C. J. S. Constitutional . Section 215-e. But we no on the express opinion since merits of any, of cause if we should plaintiff’s action, of nor speech, discuss further the of freedom question the of the question whether the letter to the Chairman of Bar, Virginia Grievance Committee of the State West District, absolutely is privileged. Tenth qualifiedly Constitution, Section 8 of III of our as Article reads libel, and the prosecutions follows: “In civil suits evidence; it may given truth and if shall appear be libelous, true, charged the the as is and jury, that matter ends, motives, justifiable and for published good was with the This the verdict shall be for defendant.” provision Constitution, of our at least indicates by.implication, allegedly the of jury pass upon falsity a truth or should matter. defamatory 55-7-2, with

Code, insulting indicates dealing words, passing necessary is an jury intervention the truth- passing thereon. therefore refrain We set matter defamatory falsity allegedly fulness or complaint. plaintiff’s forth bill hold foregoing, In accordance we with if was action, possessed by plaintiff, cause any, insti- have been forum and should brought wrong of the court. tuted on law side of the Circuit the decree Agreeable foregoing, to the in- reversed, temporary County Court of is Mercer dismissed. complaint is dissolved and bill junction Reversed; dissolved; temporary complaint bill dismissed. President, GiveN, dissenting: grievous fallen into of the view that the Court has Being in this State error in of first treating impression case slander, I believe than libel or involving nothing more questions the- necessary, fully it in order to understand pertinent involved, some definitely out point of com- supplemental the amended and bill allegations of plaint. charges that allegations, certain

After formal any justification defendant “without daughter, and enraged and whatever, infuriated angry, excuse became conceived and formulated thereupon possible among plan widely circulate as scheme clients, friends, gen- and the plaintiff’s public associates County, Virginia,, false erally throughout Mercer West written, that plain- the effect reports, both verbal dishonest, attorney unscrupulous, as practicing tiff of clients unethical, betrayer a deceiver and ‘shyster’, * * * * * * intimidating object purpose he, plaintiff, to such an extent that coercing plaintiff a certain chancery a witness” in would not as appear in- daughter and were the defendant in which cause 1952, in Mercer February, terested; January that “* * * into entered defendant and his County, daughter combination, plan conspiracy, an unlawful and with they that combine understanding agreement and would their concerted efforts and with together through and circulate they common and that would purpose design said false at- reports concerning plaintiff practicing as torney for the and the intention object purpose with plaintiff’s reputation lawyer as destroying and intimi- destroying practice, coercing law plaintiff’s * * the de- dating the as aforesaid and that plaintiff daughter fendant and his threatened to continue “have circulate do indefinitely, they said and that will reports * * so unless that to the enjoined pursuant unlawful conspiracy, circulating defendant and his daughter “began as widely throughout County, Mercer West possible Virginia, false to the effect reports plaintiff ignorant, dishonest, unethical, ‘shyster’, a unscrupulous, * * * robber, a betrayer deceiver and of clients and have continued to circulate said false and have threat- report ened, expect, continue to circulate said false re- ports so; so long they are do that said permitted to reports false spread widely great rapidity have and with * * * incalcuable and causing plaintiff irreparable dam- * * age daughter and that defendant and his “have threatened and intend to continue said defamation with * * * the malicious purpose destroying plaintiff’s * * Plaintiff practice charges, further informa- belief, tion and are “that defendant’s financial resources very limited”, and “great suffered irreparable damage and continue to injury” will damages enjoined suffer unless defendant from fur- circulating reports. ther such false A filed and made part letter with the amended and bill, defendant, supplemental written to plaintiff by copies alleged of which are have been circulated widely County, charges plaintiff having Mercer with daughter induced defendant’s to execute cer- fraudulently documents; “Double-Cross”; “con- tain intent, ceived with fraudulent to deceive Josephine Camp- bell, up home, of which was to break her purpose de- home, and children, her her

prive deprive her of her friends”; lastly family to drive her from her away had cun- you on activity your part, and that “The next trained legally your conceiled the claws of ningly deadly to Florida and had lured her mind like a beast of prey, her”. you had done relief from the horrible crime seeking contained other statements are Numerous scurrilous believe, letter, pointed the but has been we enough out, accusations. The to indicate the nature of the general prayer injunctive damages. relief and for for amended and

Defendant demurred to and answered the malice, any denied the supplemental bill. The answer bodily threat to do any formation of conspiracy, number of material greater to As the injury plaintiff. no in- that he has allegations, alleges defendant simply truth thereof. formation, advised, as to the or is not are admitted allegations Some of the material of the bill are not denied. true. writing be his daughter in his alleges Defendant also answer diffi- in her domestic represent her employed plaintiff not- plaintiff accepted employment, culties and that the attorney as hus- withstanding acting he then was in the domestic difficulties. daughter band of the same re- attorney-client of the alleged It was the time during it, acts improper out of the lationship, growing have are defendant part alleged on the the trust relationship- occurred. Plaintiff contends that he, fact, existed; repre- attorney and client never defendant; daughter the only sented husband the daughter. fact at all times known to and that that decree, an interlocutory of was complained decree to the of defendant’s demurrer hearing entered upon bill, on motion to dis- supplemental amended and being appeal- the decree injunction, the temporary solve Code, a special virtue of only by statute, able to this Court produce proof has had no opportunity 58-5-1. Plaintiff demurrer, Upon cause. merits upon court, of the trial made opinion part out in pointed “must record, the bill be treated allegations true on this demurrer”. The trial court also out pointed in that opinion that “The defendant cannot be prejudiced by the continuance of until temporary injunction final hearing. However, suffer may irrepar able injury by injunction.” dissolution of the Of course, if bill, there is no in the has no jurisdiction, the dissolution of the temporary injunction should have been Coupled hearing decreed. with the on the demurrer was a hearing the motion to dissolve the injunction. in the temporary As opinion stated court, trial however, “In the instant case the answer does not all of the deny material allegations of the bill. fact, In writing answer admits the and the publica tion of letters, the alleged defamatory but in effect con avoids, fesses and and that in says the facts stated letters are true on information and this belief”. In situa tion, if jurisdiction suit, had of the the matter of dissolving temporary injunction within would be discretion the trial court. In v. Cohen, Kessel 104 W. 296, 15, Va. 140 S. E. this Court held: “2. The dissolution discretion, of an judicial is matter of sound and the appellate court will not disturb the decree of the lower dissolving dissolve, court or refusing to where'it appears exercised, that the discretion has been soundly or where the contrary does not in the record.” appear See Chedester, 126 73, 272; W. 27 E. 2d Va. S. Huffman City Huntington v. Greene Company, Line Terminal 463, 905; W. v. Navy, Va. 28 S. E. 2d State 123 W. Va. 17 S. E. 2d Roup, Grobe v. 46 W. 33 E. Va. S. 261. I am

Though should, of the that in opinion some circumstances at take for the least, purpose defamatory restraining “publication of statements re- conduct”, I lating personality to do professional not propose here, to to attempt discuss question view, simple that, my reason the facts of case this make something it than defamation of personality more professional my conduct. Some the reasons for belief dissent, will later appear the discussion of ques- tions relating plaintiff adequate to has an remedy whether and of however, is interest question, great law. in an considered fully

great importance, has been Pound, Relief Equitable Dean titled article Roscoe Har- Against Personality, and Injuries Defamation opinion. majority vard mentioned Law Review sup- Considering allegations of the amended true, must indeed we plemental complaint bill of de- demurrer, that, alleging it clear in addition seems the bill personality professional conduct, famation of business; plaintiff’s alleges destroy conspiracy an plaintiff effort on the of defendant to intimidate part proceeding as a in a in which defendant witness court coerce interested; defendant attempt by an pub- defendant has testify proceeding; in such over reports against plaintiff lished false and malicious has threat- time; that defendant period considerable of such indefinitely ened to continue made and that defendant has reports; false and malicious majority opinion threats to harm. The plaintiff bodily do are intimidation and coercion “conspiracy, admits Also, part the letters made considering alleged”. bill, charged it is clear that defendant ways in a trust created having numerous violated client, con- defendant relationship attorney of daughter. and defendant’s existed between tends exist, coupled charge charge A that it did with false false thereof, of if not objectionable, the breach would be It so, as a mere of that trust relationship. more breach supple- in mind that the amended and kept must be verified. duly mental bill was defamation, it of early development In the of usually courts denied equity preven- would seem of involved, on relief, property rights even were tive where adequate had an theory person injured theory. to that Some courts still adhere remedy law. the an- since abandoned English long Courts have the modern trend of courts Undoubtedly, doctrine. cient cases, in relief grant is to country preventive of charges if mere slander in addition to especially malice, of charges conspiracy, there are involved libel coercion, intimidation, of continued threats contract or trust, breach of statements, of false breach of S., J. The rule is stated in C. threats to do harm. bodily exceptions, to some Injunctions, “Subject Section 135: equity is that will according rule to most authorities against relief injunctive exercise its are rights or property slander or business libel where conspiracy, of acts of thereby, affected the absence of trust or coercion, no breach intimidation, or or where of exceptions conspiracy, of Notice the contract appears.” con- trust, intimidation, and breach breach coercion, 116, con- Jur., Section after Injunctions, tract. In 28 Am. “* * * rule, is made: sidering the this statement general other every interfere by But will equity result- wrongful acts prevent case it is necessary where trade, health, destruction ing loss loss * * * subsistence, ruin to permanent property means of property other business, trade, or or with occupation, * * 118, Jur., Section Injunctions, In 28 Am. rights “* * * if pub- found: the libelous Thus, this statement indefinitely, and continued repeated lication is to be a legal may ground inadequacy act on the remedy multiplicity suits.” prevent 2d Houle, 11 N. E. In Menard v. Mass. of un- continuing there is a cause

Court held: “2. Where man motivated attack on business wrongful justified rights damage property causing malice and by actual affecting the personality distinguished injury jurisdic- take honor, will sensibility, feelings, are announcements tion, though false statements even competi- or unfair and conspiracy employed, the means remedy adequate there is no since appear, tion does not Co., Inc., 243 Ala. Motor Knapp In Carter v. at law.” “1. The held: the Court 383, 1177, 2d 144 A. L. R. 11 So. inter- wrongful without conduct one’s business right of business good will name enjoy good ference and to by protected and will be rights’ are valuable ‘property employment, “2. One’s necessary.” if process injunctive 522 inter- wrongful right’, calling ‘property

trade or wrong.” an actionable ference which is with (Tex. App.), Civ. Corp. Hudson Sales In McMorries v. in- does not 938, Equity held: “1. S. 2d the Court 233 W. a mere of words restrain tervene to cases intervenes those falsity, only but showing of their preservation an essential where restraint becomes im- threatened with interest property or other business other tortuous or by combination pairment by illegal acts.” 114 Management Corporation,

In v. Landlords’ Unger Right held: “2. 229, Court 68, J. 168 A. Eq. N. virtue of by existing right’ is ‘property practice sovereign, which state as license, letters patent, encroachment, threaten- from unlawful may protected be by injunction.” ing irreparable damage, 523, E. 2d 48 N. App. Ill. Springer, In 318 Gariepy Court 572, heavily, relies upon majority which the de- by threat no proof held: “3. there was Where concerning libelous matter publish fendant to continue to done, attorney, allegedly previously as defendant had intimidation, coercion conspiracy, and there no lie to restrain continued involved, an would not to the exceptions publication.” particularly Notice out the Court. general pointed rule 335, A. Co., 1 J. 61 Super. In Cook v. John H. N. Mathis an individual to work 585, “1. Right 2d the Court held: right, is a profession property trade his chosen in- from unlawful protect court of will terference others.” holding

For in accord other authorities in- rights by protect property see circumstances, rights, and, personal some junction Mass. Pub. 245 Co., Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Co., Ry. Pub. 262, 655; England Davis v. New 139 N. E. Pitman, Pitman & Sons v. 565; E. J. C. Mass. 89 N. Queen City Co. v. 721; Burke Ch. 47 A. 2d Transit Del. E. 2d Vanderbilt N. C. 47 S. Company, Coach

523 v. Mitchell, 910, 97, A., S., 304; 72 N. J. A. 14 Eq. 67 L. R. N. Black & Yates v. Mahogany 227, 129 F. 2d 148 A. Ass’n., 841; Pearce, 918, L. 895; R. Pearce v. 37 2d Wash. 226 P. v. Co., 711; Starns Success Portrait 28 F. Supp. Lietzman v. Radio Broadcasting F. L., 203; Station W. C. 282 Ill. App. Equitable Relief Against Defamation Injuries and to Per sonality, 29 640; Harvard Law Review Restatement Torts, 942; Law of 860; Section Annotation 148 A. L. R. Injunctions, Medicine, Restraining Unlicensed Practice 40 W. Va. Law Review 87.

It seems clear to me that until the decision in the in case, stant this Court always moved toward the ad Thus, vanced view approaching question involved. in Buskirk v. Sanders, 363, Court 70 W. Va. 73 S. E. 937, held: “2. The remedy mere existence of a is not of legal itself sufficient ground relief in refusing injunction; nor does the existence or non-existence of a remedy at law afford a test as to right to-relief equity. It must appear practical also it is as and efficient to secure the ends of and its ad- justice prompt ministration as the Though “3. de- remedy equity.” fendant has and legal equitable right defenses he has the a general go rule to into a forum he have may where defenses, benefit of all his thereby be afforded complete protection against adversary.” claims of his See Consumers Utility Gas 130 Company Wright, W. Va. 508, 44 584; S. E. 2d Blossom Dairy Company v. Interna Teamsters, tional 165, Brotherhood 125 W. Va. 23 S. E. 645; 506, 800; 2d Mitchell, Sloan v. 168 E. W. Va. S. National Woolen v. Local Journeymen Mills No. Union, 627, 100 W. Va. 131 E. Parker Paint Tailors S. Paper Wall Co. v. Local Union No. 87 W. Va. 105 S. E. 911. In the Parketr Paint and Co. Paper Wall case, this Court person held: “2. Where combination of persons seeks to another’s or business destroy trade their actions influence or intimidate others with contracts, causing whom he has valuable said others such contracts then discharge employees break actual, same, and con- actually performing the the loss is tinuing irreparable, compel will lie to from such acts.” or combination of to desist

person persons to practice appears It now well settled law, of a law, the established clientele profession of cited, lawyer', meaning “prop within the the cases relief. In erty” may protected by preventive be Rinalducci, Montgomery Bar Ass’n v. 329 Pa. County 924, right practice A. held: “2. The to 197 Court attorney whether in dis ‘property respects is a right’ be right denied a substantive proceedings barment the court were not initiated proceedings cause did not hear all the evidence.” See judges personally supra; Fit Unger Management Corporation, v. Landlords’ 582, chette v. 254 910. Taylor, 191Minn. N. W. Mitchell, 800, v. 506, In Sloan 113 W. Va. 168 S. E. a Court held: “1. licensed and sur- physician franchise in practice is a valuable geon profession may a he the nature property right protect rof other physi- sue in the interest of himself and equity from similarly situated, enjoin a encroach- person cians said in the medi- ing upon right by engaging practice a A state license.” “2. court is surgery cine and without involving not an act powerless prevent doing of others rights encroachment valuable franchise upon public as a merely conduct is denounced because such A (Kan.) large State Pac. 207.” Lindsay, offense. v. 116 in the supporting number of cases are cited opinion Association Virginia See West State Medical v. holdings. Council, 2d Health 125 23 S. E. 609. Public W. Va. above, In addition to the facts discussed jurisdictional in the case grant should relief instant equity preventive for further has no adequate two reasons: law, at the relief remedy granting prayed and the I As under- multiplicity in the bill would avoid of suits. if it is to effect that either majority opinion, stand exists, may take grounds jurisdiction. of such Cit- especially further would be ing helpful, authorities out pointed view the above. holdings v. of the supra, sylla- In Buskirk Sanders, points

525 above, bus quoted Court held that to constitute an adequate a court of remedy preclude which would exercising jurisdiction, remedy must be legal practical “as and efficient to secure the of justice ends its as the prompt remedy administration In equity”. opinion, pointed Court out: one have a “Though law, yet doubtful, defense at if it he be also have defenses, equitable and his not be as legal defense would adequate and certain as in a court of he equity, may go once, into equity, awaiting at without the result of the lawsuit, or being even compelled judgment confess Co. v. Co., 266; law. Gas Window Glass 63 Eastern W. Va. Coulehan, Oil Co. v. 65 531. ‘If any W. Va. affirmative equitable relief is to a full necessary settlement controversy, complete protection and to of defendant’s rights, interfere, court of equity will entertain relief, suit for such the action at 4 Pom. enjoin law.’ Jur., Eq. 1363,page 2706; Cyc. 799, 801, section and cases cited; Seamands, 99, 105; Knott v. Dudley W. Va. Ex’or, Miner’s In 25 S. E. High Va. junctions, (4th Ed.) sections 66. mere existence legal remedy, says of a Mr. section ‘is not in itself High, sufficient for relief in ground refusing by injunc tion; nor a remedy does the existence or non-existence of * * * at law afford a test as to the to relief in equity. * * * practical It must also that it is as and efficient appear justice, proper secure the ends of its and prompt ” administration as is the in remedy equity.’ Court, ex- by

Under the view heretofore held as view, pressed any in the above or under other quotation, myself I can not force to believe that the remedy very has an In the present adequate suit law. nature of as indeed of profession, of business discovered, can not be or profession, damages other known may Plaintiff know that before the proved. much less matter he owned en- defamatory of the publication business, and that there- large and valuable joyed clients, and that old as away, that faded after business office, to his or seek his as- new, longer come well as no that the proof to establish begin by But can he sistance. or of clients resulted from the publica- loss of business tion? he could do can ever be Though so, proof pro- what of duced, as to the amount any degree accuracy, with of be respect public Can confidence and of the damages? so, If restored? Can the be reestablished? how business it take? To that in such circum- long plaintiff, will hold stances, remedy an which “afforded adequate legal adversary” protection the claims of his complete against of is, my view, unjustifiable. days It be that may or the time of when during “Scroggs”, “Star Chamber” defamatory necessarily publication of statements areas, among neighbors confined to small or probably only accused, damages of the that determination circumstances accuracy. could made fair Those be know, buried definitely they can not for are now we out of deep too Whatever facts were antiquity. arose, I do the rule contended the majority for end not should to a dead brought believe be day fit such a rule modern methods by trying to into should publication day Equity and modern conditions. growth, impotent. alive and of continuous be of actions another multiplicity is basis Avoidance relief, for the equity jurisdiction granting preventive entirely, universally recognized by if not courts. almost, established, Considering having been as we must demurrer, publications defamatory, defendant are to false and malicious statements made indefinitely, purpose destroying continued be business, plaintiff’s professional permitted an action to each to institute required publication, as to such made over some definite publications period an suppose successfully prosecutes time? Let us he obtained, action, judgment collects of the statements continues. Would defamatory he be to many entitled further actions? How actions prosecute necessary would be can be determined. In such cir- cumstances, I am to a forced believe that multiplicity certainly circumstances, actions is In such probable. only can a court of take command and afford relief in equity proceeding. one view,

In my the facts the instant it one case make for peculiarly equity. something The facts make it from different mere libel or slander. In to the addition falsity of the exists publications, maliciousness there a to conspiracy and an effort to coerce and intimi- destroy Moreover, date. such publications are be continued indefinitely, until plaintiff professional and his business are completely addition, In everlastingly destroyed. there is the direct charge against plaintiff by made de- fendant being “betrayer of clients”. Is it of no con- cern long court of that the may require State and expensive preparations to obtain a license to practice and, a profession individual, after an licensing permit the mean, destruction of all that such license under may theory of adequate remedy damages? Is the State it- self not vitally interested protecting licensee unjustifiable such malicious and permit attacks? To false and attacks indicated in the in this malicious record continue, case view, in my lowering invites the of the standard of the legal in the profession eyes public to that to all hope may we never return.

Though argued at some length brief, defendant’s I see herein no relating involvement of to free- questions dom speech. Neither is the of the State Con- provision stitution, III, Article Section impediment jurisdiction. That provision merely provides truth of alleged defamatory publications may given be in evi- dence, and constitutes truth a good defense in “civil suits” only “published motives, if- good and for justifiable ends”. Does not the language necessarily clearly imply of false and state- malicious protected? Code, 55-7-2, ments is not Neither has any ap- plication to this case. That statutory pro- facts vision makes merely any words “construed as insults tend to violence and of the peace” actionable, breach thereon. It has permits jury pass nothing do with remedy, or multi- protection property rights, adequate plicity actions. indicated, respectfully I I

Being of views dissent. affirm the action of the Circuit Court of Mercer would temporary refusing to dissolve

County on merits. for its disposition the cause and remand et al. Fultz, Rance et al. B. H. Connelly, (No. 10593) 16, 1954. March Decided 1954. February Submitted Flesher, Ducker, McCreight, H. Paul Maxwell W. L. W. for appellant. Wallace, Jr., Wallace, appellees S.

George George S. Judge: Browning, wife, re- Fultz, hereinafter

Rance Fultz and Ruth chancery plaintiffs, ferred to as instituted suit defendants, Kathryn Trow- Connelly B. H. against for the contract specific performance bridge, praying farm, in which each defendant owned for the sale of

Case Details

Case Name: Kwass v. Kersey

Court Name: West Virginia Supreme Court

Date Published: Mar 16, 1954

Citation: 81 S.E.2d 237

Docket Number: 10622

Court Abbreviation: W. Va.