Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s June 14, 1988, order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant City of Southfield, pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10), on the ground that plaintiffs’ claim against the city was barred by governmental immunity. We affirm.
On December 30, 1985, an ambulance owned by defendant was sitting outside of the Southfield fire station at Nine Mile and Telegraph Roads. The motor had been left running to keep it from freezing, and the vehicle had been left unattended and unlocked. Codefendant, David Boretti, who was not employed by defendant, happened to lie walking by and entered the vehicle and drove off. A police chase involving Livonia and Plymouth police officers later ensued. Eventually, the ambulance collided with a vehicle carrying Janice and Robyn Kuzinski, and plaintiffs’ minor, Robyn Kuzinski, sustained serious injuries.
On March 26, 1987, plaintiffs filed the instant case, alleging, among other things, that defendant was negligent in leaving the ambulance unattended with the motor running. On May 3, 1988, defendant moved for summary disposition pursu *179 ant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8) and (10). The motion was granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10) on the ground that plaintiffs’ claim against defendant was barred by governmental immunity.
Governmental agencies are immune from tort liability for injuries arising out of the agency’s exercise or discharge of a nonproprietary, governmental function.
Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing),
Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the government agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner, as defined in Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, as amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. [Emphasis added.]
Plaintiffs ask us to apply a very broad definition to the term "operation,” contending that defendant’s employees’ actions in leaving the ambulance running, unattended and unlocked constitute sufficient control over the vehicle to be considered "operation.”
The term "operation” is not defined within the governmental immunity statutes. Therefore, we will look to the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.1
et seq.;
MSA 9.1801
et seq.,
in defining the term. See
Roy v Dep’t of Transportation,
While the term "negligent operation” is not limited to the actual driving of a vehicle upon a highway, see
Wells v Dep’t of
Corrections,
Plaintiffs also contend that there was not a factual basis presented to determine whether defendant’s operation of the ambulance service was a proprietary function. However, plaintiffs have not, in answer to the motion for summary disposition, brought forth specific facts or evidence to establish the existence of a material factual dispute, as required.
Grochowalski v DAIIE,
Affirmed.