delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Alicia Kuykendall, sought a declaratory judgment that she had entered upon contractual continued service within the meaning of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 122, par. 24—11), and a writ of mandamus directing defendant, the Board of Education of Evanston Township High School District No. 202, to reinstate her to a teaching position. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, denied defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment and ordered the relief plaintiff requested. We reverse and enter summary judgment in favor of defendant.
The material facts are undisputed. On August 22, 1977, defendant appointеd plaintiff to teach business education for nine weeks to replace a teacher on leave. On November 14, 1977, defendant appointed plaintiff to a part-time position as a business education teacher, which she held from November 15, 1977, until April 6, 1978. On November 28, 1977, defendant ratified plaintiff’s appointment to a full-time position beginning November 7, 1977, and ending July 21, 1978, as a business education teacher in Project Employment No. 202, an adult education training program wholly Federally funded under title I of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA) (29 U.S.C. sec. 801 et seq. (1976)). For the 1978-79 school term, plaintiff taught vocational experience in defendant’s high school program. Defendant re-employed plaintiff in that position, with a salary increase, for the 1979-80 school term. On March 17, 1980, defendant notified plaintiff, in accordance with the statutory requirements for teachers who have not entered into contractual continued service, that she would be dismissed at the еnd of the 1979-80 school term.
The teacher tenure statute which is applicable to school districts having less than 500,000 inhabitants (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 122, par. 24—11) provides:
“Any teacher who has been employed in any district as a full-time teacher for a probationary period of 2 consecutive school terms shall enter upon contractual continued service unless given written notice оf dismissal stating the specific reason therefor, by registered mail by the employing board at least 60 days before the end of such period.”
The statute defines “teacher” as “any or all school district employees regularly required to be certified under laws relating to the certification of teachers ***.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 122, par. 24—11.) The statute does not define “full-time.” Nor does it specifically provide for teachers whose positions are wholly Federally funded.
In this case, the parties disagree on whether the 1977-78 school term was plaintiff’s first probationary year. We bеlieve that there is no question that defendant employed plaintiff during the 1977-78 school term. 1 The issue is whether defendant employed plaintiff as a full-time teacher within the meaning of the teacher tenure statute for the purpose of determining contractual continued service.
Plaintiff maintains that her initial nine-week appointment in the high school to replace a teaсher on leave was properly included as part of her first probationary year. We disagree. Although the position was full-time in terms of hours per day and teaching load, it was merely temрorary. Temporary employees cannot be permitted to nullify the purposes of tenure laws by gradually acquiring tenure rights. (People ex rel. Thomas v. Board of Education (1963),
Although plaintiff does not argue that her other 1977-78 position in defendant’s high school program, a part-time business education appointment, was full-time, she maintains that this appointment confirms her status as a regular member of the high school faculty. We disagree. Since a nontenured teacher cannot rely upon part-time teaching to establish tenure (Johnson v. Board of Education (1981),
Central to plaintiff’s argument that 1977-78 was her first probationary year is her contention that her teaching in a Federally funded program was properly included as part of her first probationary year. During the 1977-78 school term, plaintiff’s longest teaching assignment was her position as a business education teacher in the adult education program funded under CETA. As a CETA teacher, plaintiff’s salary and benefits were paid by defendant, which was reimbursed by the Federal government via the Cook County Office of Manpower Services. Also, plaintiff’s students were not high school students, but specially selected unemployed, underemployed or economically disadvantaged trainees who were paid to attend classes. Under these circumstances, we believe that plaintiff’s CETA teaching cannot be included as part of her first probationary year.
One purpose of the tenure system is to provide teachers of ability and experience some degree of job security. (Johnson v. Board of Education (1981),
Our conсlusion is supported by the well-established principle that the teacher tenure statute must be strictly construed in order not to interfere unduly with the responsibility of local boards to operatе the educational systems efficiently. (See Johnson v. Board of Education (1981),
We find further support for our conclusion in the nature of the probationary period itself. The probationary period is a testing period that begins with the date of the appointment which will ripen into a permanent position. (Strejcek v. Board of Education (1979),
Since nonе of the three positions which plaintiff held during the 1977-78 school term could be counted as part of a probationary period within the meaning of the teacher tenure statute, we conclude that the 1977-78 term was not plaintiff’s first probationary year. Accordingly, the summary judgment for plaintiff is reversed, and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted.
Reversed. Summary judgment is entered in favor of defendant.
McNAMARA and McGILLICUDDY, JJ., concur.
Notes
We decline to find that plaintiff was merely a Federal employee assigned to the school district under the provisions of the CETA program. Contra, McLain v. Board of Education (1978),
Our deсision does not affect the tenure status of school district employees who entered upon contractual continued service prior to teaching in a wholly Federally funded prоgram. Cf. Johnson v. Board of Education (1981),
