This is an employment contract dispute in which plaintiff, Lewis Kurtzman, brought several claims against defendant, Applied Analytical Industries, Inc. (AAI) including his claim for breach of employment contract. AAI is a company based in Wilmington, North Carolina that provides scientific services to assist clients in securing FDA approval of pharmaceutical products. Although there was conflicting testimony at trial, there was evidence of the follоwing employment arrangement between plaintiff and defendant. In late 1991, AAI contacted plaintiff about leaving his position as national sales manager of E.M. Separations Technology, a Rhode Island cоmpany. After some initial reluctance and extensive negotiations which included job security assurances from AAI, plaintiff accepted a position as director of sales for AAI with a minimum yearly salary of $125,000.
Plaintiff found temporary housing in Wilmington and began his employment with AAI on 30 March 1992. A few months later, he and his wife sold their home in Massachusetts and made a permanent move to Wilmington. Eight days after beginning his employment with AAI, plaintiff was asked to complete an employment application which included language that employees could be terminated for any reason deemed sufficient by AAI. Plaintiff signed the application, but considered it a simрle formality since he had (1) already engaged in extensive negotiations which included assurances as to job security; (2) already accepted a position with AAI; (3) resigned from his employment with E.M. Separations Tеchnology; and (4) relocated from Massachusetts to Wilmington.
On 2 November 1992, AAI terminated plaintiff. Despite extensive efforts, plaintiff was unable to secure different employment, so he started a consulting business which paid substantially less than the salary he received while working at AAI. On 2 February 1993, plaintiff filed suit against AAI alleging breach of employment contract, tor-tious interference with contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress and by amendment, negligent misrepresentation. All claims except the breach of contract action were dismissed either voluntarily or by summary judgment. The remaining claim for breach of contract proceeded to a jury trial. On 1 June 1995, the jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs favor and awarded him $350,000.00 in damages.
The trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict on 26 June 1995 and subsequently amended judgment on 3 August 1995 to
I. Denial of the Directed, Verdict
The question this Court must consider with a motion for directed verdict is whether the evidence was sufficient to entitle plaintiff to have a jury pass on the matter. Smith v. Price,
In arguing the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict, AAI contends North Carolina is an employment-at-will state with relatively few exceptions. AAI argues plaintiffs heavy reliance on Sides v. Duke University,
North Carolina is an employment-at-will state. An employee who is not offered employment for a definite term is considered “an employee at will and may be discharged without reason.” Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co.,
The providing of additional consideration by the employee does not convert every employment-at-will agreement into an enforceable contract. If, however, the employment agreement expressly or impliedly provides that the employment will be permanent, for life or terminable only for cause and the employee gives an independent valuable consideration other than his services for the position, see Sides v. Duke University,74 N.C. App. 331 , 345,328 S.E.2d 818 , 828, disc. rev. denied,314 N.C. 331 ,335 S.E.2d 13 (1985); Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc.,104 N.C. App. 652 , 658-59,412 S.E.2d 97 , 101 (1991), cert. denied,331 N.C. 119 ,415 S.E.2d 200 (1992); Tuttle v. Lumber Co.,263 N.C. 216 , 219,139 S.E.2d 249 , 251 (1964); John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 2-9 at 60-63 (3d ed. 1987); see also 30 C.J.S. Employer-Employee § 43, at 83 (1992), the employment can be terminated only for cause until the passage of a reasоnable time. See 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 684 (1960 & Supp. 1994); Tuttle,263 N.C. at 219 ,139 S.E.2d at 251 ; 30 C.J.S. Employer-Employee § 43, at 83 (1992). After the passage of a reasonable time the employment relationship can be terminated without cause.
Id. at 488-89,
In this case, there was evidence that plaintiff, who had a secure positiоn with another company, was actively recruited by AAI and eventually was persuaded to relocate from New England to North Carolina to accept the sales director position with AAI. Negotiations betwеen plaintiff and AAI were extensive and plaintiff testified he received numerous verbal assurances of job security from top management at AAI. Plaintiff was told the job was a career position with tremendous, long-term growth potential for him and that “[a]s long as I did my job, I had a job.” Other assurances included almost a dozen
AAI’s argument that plaintiff’s recovery is barred because the employment application which he signed eight days after beginning work for AAI contained language that “employment сan be terminated for any reason deemed sufficient by AAI” is without merit. Plaintiff testified he never saw the employment application prior to beginning work for AAI and that when he was asked to sign the form eight days after he became employed, he did not consider the language applicable to him because of the numerous assurances he had already received from top management at AAI. Additionally, by the time plaintiff signеd the application, he had already resigned from E.M. Separations and temporarily relocated to Wilmington while his wife was trying to sell their home in New England. Furthermore, AAI’s Director of Personnel testified that during his interviews with plaintiff, he never asked him to complete a job application. He explained that management employees generally used resumes as the method of conveying their prior work experienсe and employment applications for these people were typically completed after employment and were kept on file for personnel record purposes.
II. Damage Award
AAI contends the jury’s award of $350,000.00 cannot stand because the calculation of damages was too speculative as to plaintiff’s future income. We disagree.
In calculating the damages for this breach of contract claim, plaintiff was entitled to recover the difference between his salary as opposed to his total earnings during the contract period. Thomas v. College,
As plaintiff noted in his brief, a determination of damages in this case is no more speculative than is an award for loss of future earnings in a personal injury claim. We conclude there was sufficient cоncrete evidence upon which the jury could calculate plaintiffs damages with a reasonable degree of certainty.
III. Prejudgment Interest
In plaintiffs cross appeal, he argues the trial court erred in denying his petitiоn for prejudgment interest from the date of AAI’s breach of contract. We agree.
In Metromont Material Corp. v. R.B.R. & S.T.,
The legislature amended G.S. § 24-5(a) in 1985 to provide that “[i]n an action for breach of contract, . . . the amount awarded on the сontract bears interest from the date of the breach.” Subsequently, in Steelcase, Incorporated v. The Lilly Company, this Court noted that, as amended, G.S. § 24-5(a) “clearly provides for interest from the date of breach in breach of contract actions.” Steelcase, Inc. v. The Lilly Co.,93 N.C. App. 697 , 703,379 S.E.2d 40 , 44, disc. review denied,325 N.C. 276 ,384 S.E.2d 530 (1989).
Here, both parties tailor their arguments to the case law developed prior to the 1985 amendment and the rule quoted from General Metals. However, it is clear to this Court that resort to that rule, developed only to determine the date from which to apply interest, is no longer necessary. When the legislature amended the statute, and provided a time from which to apply interest, it obviated any need for the rule. In doing so, it removed the cоnfusing questions of ascertainment and certainty that so often muddled the statute’s application. Because this case falls under the amended version of the statute, plaintiff’s arguments do not apply, and the trial сourt did not err in awarding prejudgment interest.
Id. at 618,
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.