Appellant Kurtz is the superintendent of Central State Hospital and appellee Williams is an employee there. Williams filed suit against Kurtz, alleging that Kurtz had libeled and slandered him by saying that Williams, a married man, was having an extramaritаl affair with another hospital employee in his office during office hours. The trial court entered judgment on the jury award to appellee of $1.00 in general damages and $10,000 in exemplary damages.
1. Contrary to apрellant’s assertion, appellee’s suit against appellant was not barred by the doctrine of officiаl immunity. The purchase of insurance for department employees under OCGA § 45-9-1 after passage of Art, I, Sec. II, Par. IX, of the 1983 Georgia Constitution waived appellant’s official immunity to the extent of the insurance coverаge.
Martin v. Ga. Dept. of Public Safety,
2. Appellant contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion for summary judgment and motion to recоnsider and vacate the denial of summary judgment. “ ‘ “After verdict and judgment, it is too late to review a judgment denying a summary judgmеnt, for that judgment becomes moot when the court reviews the evidence upon the trial of the case.” [Cit.] ’ Thus, appellant’s contentions concerning the denial of [his] motion for summary judgment [and the refusal to reconsidеr that decision] will not be pursued further.”
Hardaway Constructors v. Browning,
3. Asserting there was no publication of the slander, appellant contеnds the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict.
Appellant testified that he had received an аnonymous, handwritten note informing him that appellee and a female employee were having an affаir while on the job. Appellant informed the hospital’s deputy superintendent of the contents of the note and asked the chief of appellee’s division to look into the matter. At a meeting called to discuss the рossible transfer of certain personnel, including appellee, *15 from their unit because of problems thеrein, appellant informed those in attendance (the deputy superintendent, the personnel directоr, and the chief of appellee’s division) of the contents of the anonymous note.
“Slander or oral dеfamation consists in: (1) Imputing to another a crime punishable by law. . . .” OCGA § 51-5-4 (a) (1). “Publication is indispensable to recovеr for slander. [Cit.]”
Walter v. Davidson,
In the case at bar, those who heard the slander from appellant were within the administration of the hospital and had a duty or authority that gave them reason to receive the information: the hospital’s deputy superintendеnt was responsible for everything for which the superintendent was responsible inasmuch as the two men worked as а team in managing the hospital; it was appropriate and routine for the division chief to attend a meеting at which problems in a unit *16 within his division were to be discussed; and the personnel director had a duty to advise the supеrintendent and deputy superintendent with regard to the implementation of personnel matters.
Contrary to appellee’s assertion, the exception to the publication rule is not a conditional defense destroyed by proof of malice but, rather, an elemеnt of the tort of slander or libel. Whether the communication was made maliciously and with knowledge of falsity is immatеrial when there has been no publication, for without publication there is no libel or slander.
King v. Masson,
supra;
LuAllen v. Home Mission Bd.,
supra;
Beck v. Oden,
supra. See also
Griggs v. K-Mart Corp.,
supra;
Ray v. Henco Electronics,
In the case at bar, there was no proof that the slanderous material was ever published. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for directed verdict.
Judgment reversed.