Kurtas v. KurtasKurtas v. Kurtas
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Lead Opinion
OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
ZAPPALA, Justice.In this appeal, we are requested to review the order and memorandum opinion of the Superior Court, 368 Pa.Super. 648, 531 A.2d 39, affirming the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County which had denied the appellant’s post-trial motions. The basis of the Superior
The facts germane to this appeal are as follows: The parties were married in 1950, separated in 1972 and divorced in 1985 in response to a complaint filed by the appellee in 1982 under § 201(d) of the Divorce Code. A master’s hearing was held in March of 1985. Because of the appellant’s absence, no testimony was presented in support of her economic claims, resulting in the master recommending that all her economic claims be denied.
Exceptions were filed to this recommendation requiring a de novo hearing before the Court of Common Pleas. After taking testimony, the trial judge entered a decree and order on November 15, 1985 divorcing the parties and disposing of the economic claims.1 Appellant’s trial counsel filed post-trial motions on November 27, 1985. At some point prior to November 27, the appellant retained new counsel who filed exceptions to the adjudication on November 29, 1985.2 After appellate counsel received the appellant’s file from her trial counsel, appellate counsel filed supplemental post-trial motions on January 3, 1986, the date set for oral arguments on the post-trial motions. At the argument, neither the appellee nor the trial judge raised or objected to the timeliness of the filing of the post-trial motions or exceptions. After hearing the arguments on the merits, the trial judge entered an order dismissing the appellant’s post-trial motions. Appellant then filed a timely appeal to the Superior Court.
Relying upon its decision in Colagioia v. Colagioia, 362 Pa.Super. 213, 523 A.2d 1158 (1987), the Superior Court held
Article V, Section 10 of our Constitution vests in this Court the power “... to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts ... if such rules are consistent with the Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights of any litigant nor affect the right of the General Assembly to determine the jurisdiction of any court, ... nor suspend nor alter any statute of limitation or repose.” Regarding appellate jurisdiction, the legislature has prescribed that appeals from trial courts to appellate courts must be commenced within 30 days after the entry of a final order.
In implementing our authority to control the court system, this Court promulgated our Rules of Civil Procedure keeping in mind that we had no authority to usurp the legislative powers to establish jurisdictional limitations. As a method of administering a complex judicial scheme we promulgated rules to limit the issues raised on appeal. {See
With the volume and complexities of the matters coming to our judicial system for resolution, it has become imperative that the former paternalistic approach be disregarded and a high degree of professionalism be insisted upon. Our resources are not unlimited and must be utilized to provide the greatest good to the greatest number. To maximize our efficiency and to maintain and enhance the quality of our dispute resolution process, strict compliance with the procedure designed for issue preservation is essential.
We are cognizant that at times the rigid application of our rules does not serve the intended purpose of justice and fairness but rather results in a harsh or even unjust consequence. For this reason, we promulgated
In this instance, the trial court chose to ignore the untimely filing of the appellant’s post-trial motions and addressed the merits of her alleged errors. Since such consideration was permitted under Rule 126 and did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction, the Superior Court erred in not reviewing the merits of the appeal.
The Order of the Superior Court is reversed and the matter is remanded to that Court for disposition of the appeal on its merits.
STOUT, J., concurs in the result. LARSEN, J., files a dissenting opinion in which FLAHERTY and PAPADAKOS, JJ., join.Notes
. Confusion seems to have occurred because the trial court filed an Adjudication and Finding of Facts dated November 7, 1985 but not entered until November 19, 1985. Even the order from which post-trial relief was sought was dated November 12, 1985, although not docketed until November 15, 1985.
. The record is unclear as to why the change in counsel occurred. In any event, both prior counsel and present counsel filed post-trial pleadings.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
On August 6, 1982, the appellee, John J. Kurtas (Husband), filed a complaint for divorce against the appellant Wife. The Wife responded with a multi-count answer to the complaint, raising claims for equitable distribution, alimony, counsel fees and expenses. On August 14, 1985, a de novo
On January 3, 1986, the Wife’s post-trial motions came up for argument and were heard by Judge Smyth. In opposing her motions, the Husband did not raise the question of their timeliness. Instead, he argued the Wife’s motions on the merits. Similarly, the lower court did not raise the late filing of the Wife’s motions when they came before it for argument. The court considered the Wife’s post trial motions on their merits and, by order dated January 3, 1986, denied relief. The Wife proceeded to file a timely Notice of Appeal from that order.
On appeal in the Superior Court, the Husband and Wife submitted briefs and presented oral arguments on the merits. At no time during the briefing process or at oral argument did the Husband raise any question concerning the timeliness of the post trial motions in the lower court. The late filing of the motions was raised for the first time in the Superior Court’s memorandum opinion deciding the case. In its unpublished memorandum opinion the Superior Court said: “Because the post-trial motions were not filed within ten days of the date of entry of the final decree and
Since in this case a de novo hearing was held before Judge Smyth following appellant’s exception to the Master’s report,
The majority concludes that under the provisions of
In a recent line of cases, the Superior Court has consistently affirmed that before the merits of an appeal are addressed, it is incumbent upon the appellate court to determine whether the case is properly before it. Sipowicz v. Sipowicz, 358 Pa.Super 319, 517 A.2d 960 (1986); Wertz v. Anderson, 352 Pa.Super 572, 508 A.2d 1218 (1986); Huber v. Huber, 323 Pa.Super 530, 470 A.2d 1385 (1984). Although the question is not raised by any party to the proceeding, an appellate court may address the issue of appealability sua sponte. Sipowicz v. Sipowicz, Supra. 358 Pa.Super. at 322, 517 A.2d at 962. I believe this line of cases correctly interpret and applies applicable law.
The failure to comply with the time limitation of Rule 227.1 which requires that all post-trial motions be filed within ten days can be raised sua sponte by the appellate court. Rule 227.1 requires that post-trial motions be filed within ten days after the filing of a decision by the lower court or the issues raised with respect to that decision are waived. Taylor v. Taylor, 345 Pa.Super. 184, 497 A.2d 1365 (1985), Szakmeister v. Szakmeister, 344 Pa.Super. 465, 496 A.2d 1199 (1985). Thus, where an appellate court determines from the record that post trial motions were not filed within the ten day period prescribed by Rule 227.1, it is incumbent upon that court to declare that all matters raised in the appeal have been waived.
The post-trial practice ordained by the Rules establish a mandatory procedure for preserving issues for appeal. Part of that procedure is that exceptions must be filed within ten days as set forth in Rule 227.1 otherwise all issues are waived. In Tagnani v. Lew, 493 Pa. 371, 426 A.2d 595 (1981), we observed:
With the volume and complexities of the matters coming to our judicial system for resolution, it has become imperative that the former paternalistic approach be discarded and a high degree of professionalism be insisted upon. Our resources are not unlimited and must beutilized to provide the greatest good to the greatest number. To maximize our efficiency and to maintain and enhance the quality of our dispute resolution process, strict compliance with the procedure designed for issue preservation is essential.
Id., 493 Pa. at 376, 426 A.2d at 597. An appellate court always has the right to determine if the appeal is properly before it and if the issues raised have been properly preserved.
I would affirm the order of the Superior Court.
FLAHERTY and PAPADAKOS, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.