Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.
Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc., a securities firm, and Philip Wagenheim, an executive at the firm, appeal the district court’s confirmation of an arbitration award. The arbitrators required the appellants to pay compensatory damages to David S. Kurke, a former Oscar Gruss customer, for subjecting his account to unauthorized trading and churning. The appellants maintain that the arbitrators awarded Kurke damages in manifest disregard of the law. We disagree.
I
David Kurke opened a securities account with Oscar Gruss in 1997. Upon opening the account, Kurke signed a margin agreement providing that “statements of my account shall be conclusive if not objected to in writing” within a specified period after transmittal. J.A. 396. Kurke invested a total of $520,000 in the account, and he received monthly statements. Kurke’s account was profitable for the first two and a half years of its existence. Indeed, the statement for the month ending December 31, 1999, revealed a balance of approximately $1,007,000. By the time Kurke closed the account on April 30, 2000, however, the balance had dwindled to $39,000.
In January 2003, Kurke filed a National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) arbitration claim against the Oscar Gruss firm and Philip Wagenheim, alleging the following causes of actions: “unauthorized trading, churning, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, breach of contract, NASD Conduct Rule violations, negligence, negligent supervision, respondeat superior, and Securities Exchange Act violations.”
In re Arbitration Between David S. Kurke and Oscar Gruss & Sons, Inc.,
No. 03-00749,
The arbitration panel heard testimony in April and May of 2004. Kurke testified that he and his wife were co-owners of a *353 small executive search firm. Although he had fifteen years of investing experience, Kurke testified that he did not fully comprehend the account statements that came from Oscar Gruss. Some of the options trading information on Kurke’s statements, he stated, “was way beyond what [he] could understand.” Arbitration Hr’g Tr. at 702 (April 28, 2004). Kurke could, however, decipher the monthly statements well enough to notice that they revealed a high volume of unauthorized transactions during the fall of 1999; Kurke’s broker had never sought, and Kurke had never granted, permission for discretionary trading.
Kurke began calling the broker, Christopher Fong, to complain about the unauthorized trades. Kurke testified that, during them conversation, Fong said “he absolutely could not rescind trades.” Id. at 692. Kurke also testified that Fong told him:
[H]e couldn’t undo buys because they were already there, and “there's nothing [he could] do with them except sell them at the right time.” And he assured me they’d make money.... [H]e couldn’t undo sales because they were no longer in the possession of the company. He couldn’t put them back in my account.
Id. According to Kurke, Fong “kept promising me he’d fix it, to trust him, that he could ... turn this around.” Id. at 766.
Kurke further testified that he “tried calling [Fong’s] manager,” but that “nobody seemed to want to deal with it at all.” Id. In April 2000, Kurke finally spoke with Wagenheim, who represented that he was Fong’s superior and an owner of Oscar Gruss. See id. at 771-72. Like Fong, Wagenheim told Kurke “that none of the transactions could be undone.” Id. at 769. Wagenheim also “kept reiterating, ‘You really should not ... liquidate this stuff right now because it’s going to come back,’ ” and “ ‘I can see this account ... tripling in no time.’ ” Id. at 782.
Geraldine Genco, an expert on securities industry standards, also appeared before the arbitration panel. She testified that, during October and November of 1999, Kurke’s account had a turnover rate of over 65 — more than 10 times the industry standard for unlawful churning of an account. See id. at 1156-57 (April 30, 2004); see also Genco Aff. ¶ 3 (June 30, 2004). 1 Genco stated that this was “one of the highest excessive trading cases” she had ever seen. Genco Aff. ¶ 3. She further opined that there was unauthorized trading and that “the lack of supervision over Mr. Kurke’s account was ‘intentional’ and ‘reckless.’ ” Id. ¶ 4. 2
On May 21, 2004, the arbitration panel awarded Kurke compensatory damages from both Oscar Gruss and Wagenheim.
See Arbitration,
On May 28, 2004, Kurke petitioned the district court for enforcement of the arbitration award; the defendants subsequently filed cross-motions to vacate it. On January 19, 2005, the district court grant *354 ed Kurke’s petition and entered judgment against the defendants for the full amount of the award. See Kurke v. Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc., No. 04-0870, Mem. Op. at 11 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2005). This appeal followed.
II
As we have repeatedly recognized, “ ‘judicial review of arbitral awards is extremely limited,’ ” and we “ ‘do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as [we would] in reviewing decisions of lower courts.’ ”
Teamsters Local Union No. 61 v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
In addition to the statutory grounds, “arbitration awards can be vacated ... if they are in manifest disregard of the law.”
LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc.,
Moreover, when the arbitrators give no explanation for their decision, as commonly occurs in arbitration and as occurred in this case, we must confirm the award “if any justification can be gleaned from the record.”
GMS Group, LLC v. Benderson,
We review a district court’s confirmation of an arbitration award for clear error with respect to questions of fact and de novo with respect to questions of law.
See LaPrade,
III
For purposes of this appeal, Oscar Grass does not dispute that Kurke’s account “was churned,” that “unauthorized trades occurred” in the account, or that Oscar Grass and its employees “acted wrongfully.” Appellant Oscar Grass Br. 4. It nonetheless contends that Kurke is barred from recovering the arbitrators’ award “as a matter of law.” Id.
Oscar Grass proffers two arguments in support of its claim that the arbitration panel’s award to Kurke was made in manifest disregard of the law. First, the company contends that, under the terms of his margin agreement, Kurke’s failure to object to the unauthorized trades in writing within the stipulated time frame effectively ratified those trades. Second, Oscar Grass asserts that Kurke’s failure to mitigate his damages after he became aware of the unauthorized trading relieves the company of some or all of its liability for Kurke’s losses.
A
Kurke’s margin agreement with Oscar Grass provided as follows: “Reports of the execution of orders and statements of my account shall be conclusive if not objected to in writing addressed to the branch manager of the office servicing such account(s) within five days and ten days, respectively, after transmittal to me by mail or otherwise.” J.A. 396. Kurke concedes that he realized there was unauthorized trading in his account by the fall of 1999 and that he did not object in writing. Oscar Grass contends that, by this failure to object, Kurke ratified the transactions in his account.
There is, to be sure, substantial authority supporting Oscar Grass’ ratification theory. As the Second Circuit explained in
Modern Settings, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.,
a case repeatedly cited by Oscar Grass, “[t]he purpose” of a written notification clause like that at issue here “is to require the customer to memorialize his or her complaint soon after receipt of the account statement rather than waiting to see if the trade is profitable.”
But as the Second Circuit’s use of the word “generally” suggests, there are ex
*356
ceptions to the rule that ratification agreements will be enforced.
Modern Settings,
itself, listed two. First, “[t]here will be instances where a disparity in sophistication between a brokerage firm and its customer will warrant a flexible application of such written notice clauses.”
Id.; see Karlen v. Ray E. Friedman & Co. Commodities,
This circuit has suggested a third exception, albeit in a case in which it is unclear whether there was a written notice agreement. In
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cheng,
we held that “[r]atification occurs only when the customer, with full knowledge of the facts, manifests his intention to adopt the unauthorized transaction.”
Evidence supporting all three of these exceptions was before the arbitrators in this case. Although Kurke was not an inexperienced investor, the arbitrators could have credited his testimony that he did not comprehend the highly complicated options trades contained in his monthly account statements. The district court found that “many of Mr. Fong’s transactions were ‘way beyond what [Kurke] could understand,’ ”
Kurke,
Mem. Op. at 2-3 (quoting Arbitration Hr’g Tr. at 702 (April 28, 2004)), and we cannot say that this finding was “clear error,”
LaPrade,
The arbitrators could also have found “assurances or deceptive acts” that “forestalled] the customer’s filing of the required written complaint.”
Modern Settings,
B
Oscar Grass’ second argument is that Kurke failed to mitigate or minimize his *357 damages. According to Oscar Gruss, once Kurke learned of Fong’s unauthorized trading and churning in the fall of 1999, he should have immediately “minimize[d] his alleged damages by liquidating the allegedly unauthorized or improper purchase transactions.” Appellant Oscar Gruss Br. 28. Kurke’s failure to liquidate his account until its value fell to $39,000 should, the company argues, relieve it of some, if not all, financial responsibility.
Although “New York’s
6
courts adhere to the universally accepted principle that a harmed plaintiff must mitigate damages,”
Air Et Chaleur, S.A. v. Janeway,
The arbitrators did not manifestly disregard the law by rejecting Oscar Grass’ mitigation argument. 7 When Kurke became aware of Fong’s unauthorized trading, he repeatedly called Fong to complain. Kurke testified that Fong told him he could not rescind the trades and lulled him into believing that the problem would be remedied. Fong told Kurke that there was “ ‘nothing [he could] do with [the shares in the account] except sell them at the right time,’ ” and he “assured [Kurke] they’d make money.” Arbitration Hr’g Tr. at 692 (April 28, 2004). Fong “kept promising [Kurke] he’d fix it, to trust him, that he could ... turn this around.” Id. at 766. Under these circumstances, the arbitrators may well have concluded that it was reasonable for Kurke to believe that the churning and unauthorized trading would cease, and that the best way to mitigate his losses was to leave the account in Fong’s hands so that he could “turn this around.” Id.
C
In reviewing the decision of an arbitration panel, we do not decide whether we
*358
would have assessed either the facts or the law in the same manner as the panel.
See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc.,
IV
Philip Wagenheim appeals the arbitration award against him on three grounds. First, he adopts the Oscar Grass arguments that we have rejected above. Second, he argues that the arbitrators applied the wrong interest rate to the arbitration award, an argument that he did not make in the district court and that we therefore decline to hear. 8 Finally, he maintains that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law by holding him vicariously liable for Fong’s unauthorized trading on Kurke’s account. We address that contention here.
The premise of Wagenheim’s argument is that he cannot be held liable for Fong’s misdeeds under a respondeat superior theory because “there was no evidence sufficient to support a finding that [he] was an owner of the investment firm or supervisor of the broker involved.” Appellant Wagenheim Br. 1. That factual assertion is simply incorrect. It is certainly true that Wagenheim testified that he was never a branch manager or compliance officer, and that he had no ability to hire or fire Oscar Grass employees. See Arbitration Hr’g Tr. at 259-61, 429-30 (April 27, 2004). But Wagenheim’s was not the only testimony before the arbitrators.
Kurke testified that he spoke by telephone with Wagenheim, who represented that he was Fong’s superior and an owner of Oscar Grass. See id. at 771 (April 28, 2004). Kurke recounted Wagenheim as saying that he “owned the company,” id., that “he made the hiring decisions,” id. at 772, and that he had personally hired Fong despite knowing of a “blemish” on his record, id. Wagenheim also told Kurke that, if Kurke were to sue Fong, Wagenheim would “end up paying for it.” Id. at 774. “It’s going to come out of my pocket,” Wagenheim said. Id.
Wagenheim argues that Kurke’s testimony inaccurately characterized the telephone conversation between them, and that tape recordings of this and other calls — which were played for the arbitrators — “do not support” Kurke’s testimony. Appellant Wagenheim Br. 4. According to Wagenheim, “[w]hat the tape recordings show is that Mr. Wagenheim was referring to his branching off as of May 1, 2000, to set up his own company,” and not to his status at Oscar Grass. Id.
Although the tape of an April 19, 2000, call does contain some discussion of a future venture, it also records Wagenheim telling Kurke: “I founded the Private Client Group of Oscar Grass, where your account is being managed.” Arbitration Hr’g Tr at 274 (April 27, 2004). The tape of a call between the two men on the previous day records Wagenheim as say *359 ing: “[Y]ou know, I run the place.” Id. at 269. Referring to Oscar Gruss employees, including the firm’s compliance officer, Wagenheim said in that call: “These are all people that I employ. These are people that I pay their paycheck — or that Oscar Gruss pays their paychecks — but through funds that we give them.” Id. at 270. And in a telephone call recorded the week before, Amy Cernitz, the manager of the Oscar Gruss branch at which Kurke had his account, described Wagenheim to Kurke as follows: “[H]e’s one of the Senior Managing Partners here.... He’s Chris [Fongj’s boss. He’s fully aware of the situation with you and Chris.” Id. at 265.
The principal case that Wagenheim cites to dispute the arbitration panel’s finding of vicarious liability is
In re Irvine Sensors Corp.,
No. 02-159,
V
The “manifest disregard of the law” standard for overturning an arbitration award is manifestly difficult to satisfy. At best, the appellants have suggested that the arbitrators relied upon debatable points of law or disputable issues of fact. Neither is sufficient to establish manifest disregard.
See Kanuth,
Affirmed.
Notes
. “Churning occurs when an account has been excessively traded to generate commissions in contravention to the investor's expressed investment goals.” Caiola v. Citibank, N.A., New York, 295 F.3d 312, 324 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
. The arbitration panel also heard from four other witnesses who testified that Fong had defrauded them.
. The four grounds are as follows:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
. Arbitration awards can also be vacated "if they are contrary to some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant and ascertained by reference to the laws or legal precedents.”
LaPrade,
.The next sentence in
Kanuth
reads: " 'Manifest disregard’ may be found,
for example, if
the panel understood and correctly stated the law but then proceeded to ignore it.”
. Kurke’s margin agreement stipulated that "[t]his contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York,” J.A. 396, and the Oscar Gruss branch that handled Kurke’s account was located in New York. Although the parties' briefs moot the choice of law issue, and Oscar Gruss argues that New York law should apply, no party suggests that the outcome of the case depends upon which jurisdiction's law applies.
. Indeed, it is not even clear that they did reject the argument. Kurke sought $1,600,000 in compensatory damages, but the panel awarded him only $648,000. Although the panel did not explain how it arrived at that figure, it is possible that the amount the panel awarded — which was substantially less than the reduction in value of Kurke’s account from December 31, 1999 to April 30, 2000 — reflected the panel’s judgment that Kurke had at least partially failed to mitigate.
.
See United States v. Gartmon,
