MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On June 23, 1989,
The discussion of DOHSA in the previous Memorandum rested on the premise that DOHSA would apply only if admiralty jur
*634
isdiction was found under the tests laid out in
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland,
In finding that no independent test for the existence of admiralty jurisdiction is necessary where DOHSA applies on its face, the Court follows the reasoning of Judge Sprizzo in
Friedman v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int’l,
[T]he two-pronged test referred to in Executive Jet [which was broadened in Foremost and reaffirmed and interpreted in Sisson ] only applies in the absence of a statute to the contrary, and the Supreme Court in Executive Jet repeatedly and explicitly emphasized that DOHSA was such a statute ... therefore, the requirement of a traditional maritime nexus is not a prerequisite to the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to DOHSA.
Having found that the death in question in this case occurred more than a league from United States shores, the Court held that DOHSA was applicable, and so instructed the jury. In changing its position with respect to admiralty jurisdiction upon further reflection, the Court is reminded of Justice Frankfurter’s advice that “Wisdom ofttimes is never gained at all, and therefore should not be rejected merely because it arrives late.”
Kuntz v. Windjammer “Barefoot” Cruises, Ltd.,
Notes
. The Order accompanying the June 23, 1989 Memorandum addressed only the choice of law issue, and it has already been modified by the Order of March 14, 1990.
