67 Pa. Super. 37 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1917
Opinion by
The damages sought to be recovered resulted from a right-angled collision between the automobile of the plaintiff, driven by himself, and a car owned by the defendant but driven by his nineteen-year-old son. The defendant, owner, was not in the car at the time of the accident. The action is not brought against the son who operated the car, but seeks to charge the absent owner with the consequences of the negligent operation of his car by another. Under such circumstances there is surely no need to discuss the fundamental principles underlying the long line of decisions — nor even for a citation of the cases — which declare that under such a state of facts the relation of master and servant must be established or the doctrine of respondeat superior may not successfully be invoked. This principle has been steadily and continuously asserted by the Supreme Court and this court. Its existence and effect were recognized by the learned trial judge, both in his charge to the jury and in his opinion refusing to enter a judgment for the defendant n. o. v.
The verdict established the plaintiff was without fault and the driver of the defendant’s car was negligent. If the latter was the servant of the defendant, the owner must answer. There we reach the crux of the case. As was said by our Brother Kephart in Scheel v. Shaw, 60 Pa. Superior Court, page 76: “In the case at bar the
Now these are the facts recited by the learned trial judge as undisputed, on which he predicates the conclusion that the relation of master and servant existed between this defendant and his nineteen-year-old son. “The son lived with his father at Royersford, Montgomery County; was competent to drive and was the only driver of his father’s car. The car was a pleasure car for the use of the defendant and his family; the son was permitted by his father to drive the car whenever he desired, and if any members of the family chose to enjoy the car, the son drove it for them. The son had been educated at a business college; had had. employment with various persons; had received, with his father’s consent, the wages he earned, and out of them clothed and partially educated himself. On the day of the accident, desiring to go to Downingtown in response to a letter offering Mm a position, he requested his father to permit him to take the car for the journey, first advising him of the purpose of his visit. The father consented. The son drove to Downingtown alone, and on his return while he was driving the car, the collision with the plaintiff’s car occurred.” The learned judge further uses this language, which we think fairly enough expresses the conclusion to be drawn from the established and recognized authorities: “Where liability for such act is sought to
We think the able counsel for appellant has briefly but convincingly stated the answer to the position taken by the learned trial judge in the following words: “It is submitted that the court below confused the main purpose of the son’s trip with the incidental and paternal interest of the father in his son’s welfare. It would be difficult indeed to imagine the case of a son performing any act advantageous to himself in which a father, having proper, paternal feelings, would not be interested.”
We have then this situation. The liability, if any, of
Under these circumstances we are unable to reach the conclusion the father had any such interest in the business in which the son was engaged, while operating the car, as would or should justify the assumption the relation of master and servant existed. The defendant, therefore, was entitled to have had a binding direction in his favor, or to have judgment thereafter entered n. o. v.
The judgment is reversed and the record remitted to the court below with direction to enter a judgment in favor of the defendant notwithstanding the verdict.