This is an appeal from an order of the trial court sustaining PMA Insurance Company’s (appellee’s) preliminary оbjections and dismissing appellant’s complaint. Although presented in his brief as two separate questions, appellant, George Kuney, raises only one issue in this appeal; i.e., whether an employee has an independent cause of action against his employer’s workmen’s compensation insurer if the insurer has engaged in cоnduct designed to frustrate the employee’s right to compensation under the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act, 77 Pa.S.A. §§ 1 et seq. We hold that he does and reverse.
Appellant was injured on February 4, 1985, while working as an employee of Continental Data Systems (Continental). Appellee is Continental’s workmen’s compensation insurance carrier. Appellant filed a claim petition with the *600 Pennsylvania Bureau of Workmen’s Compensation. The claim wаs litigated before a referee who filed a decision on February 10, 1987. It was determined by the referee that aрpellant was entitled to total disability benefits commencing April 12, 1985, interest on compensation past due, costs, and attorney’s fees. Appellee filed an appeal of the referee’s award to the Pennsylvaniа Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, as well as a request for a supersedeas. On April 14, 1987, appellant filed this civil action against appellee alleging that appellee had acted in bad faith in refusing to pay appellant any compensation or medical benefits. Appellant further alleged that appellee had engaged in conduct designed to delay and frustrate appellant’s assertion of his rights. Appellee filed preliminary objections to the complaint. The trial court held that appellant’s claim fell within the jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and that the Act is appellant’s exclusive remedy. The court sustained Appellee’s preliminary objections and dismissed Appellant’s complaint. Appellant filed this timely apрeal from that order.
Appellant argues that this action is not barred by the Workmen’s Compensation Act becаuse it is directed at the employer’s insurance carrier, and not the employer, for injuries caused by the cаrrier, separate and apart from those which were incurred at his workplace. Appellee resрonds that the Act is appellant’s exclusive remedy and precludes any action against it, relying upon
Rosipal v. Montgomery Ward,
We find that the instant case is analogous to
Reed v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company,
The Workmen’s Compensation Act provides an exclusive remedy for personal injury or death arising from employment-related accidents. Although the initial determinant of this present law suit may have been such an accident and such injuries, it is not that occurrence fоr which this suit is brought. That cause of action was resolved through the workmen’s compensation machinery. This present аction is based upon Hartford’s alleged independent intentional torts and breach of their agreement, unrelated to Reed’s employment. This is not a case of permitting an employee to sue the employer direсtly. Rather this is a completely independent cause of action, arising out of the relationship between insurеd and insurer qua insurer.
Id. at 135.
Appellee argues in its brief that the Workmen’s Compensation Act has been amended since the deсision in Reed to include all injuries including intentional torts. As correct as that statement is, it would not have affected the outсome in Reed. The decision in Reed was not based upon a reading of the Act that excluded intentional torts from its exclusive remedy provision. Rather, the court held that the Act did not bar an action by the employee against the insurance carrier fоr its own conduct. We find the decision in Reed persuasive.
In the instant case appellant has alleged in his complaint that his injuries were caused by, and are the causal result of appellee’s conduct, which was separate and apart from
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the work-related injury. Upon review of appellant’s complaint, we find that appellant has alleged sufficient facts to state а cause of action for deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation against appellee based upon its own conduct, and that the preliminary objections should not have been sustained.
See Pekular v. Eich,
Order reversed and case remanded for proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion. Jurisdiction is not retained.