*1 et al. Grazina KULAWAS

RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL. 2008-223-Appeal.

No.

Supreme of Rhode Island. 11, 2010.

May *2 SUTTELL, C.J.,

Present: GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION GOLDBERG, for the Court. Justice (Kulawas Grazina Kulawas plaintiff, Superior plaintiff), appeals or from a Court summary judgment in favor of the grant of defendant, Hospital (hospital Rhode Island defendant). argues appeal Kulawas hearing justice holding erred in that the release1 Kulawas entered into in with a connection her barred subsequent civil action the employ- arising er same incident. For below, the reasons set forth we affirm the judgment Court. Facts and Travel employed Kulawas had been as an ad- secretary in Department ministrative hospital of Medicine at the since 1998. On 5, 2005, April walking while down a ramped way corridor on her to lunch in the cafeteria, a step” “missed propelled and was forward. She fractured resulting femur in the fall. 8, 2005, September On filed a petition in the Workers’ (WCC) against hospital, seeking weekly indemnity medical and benefits for injury. the work-related The defendant liability, denied and Kulawas demanded a trial, January which commenced on However, on March while pending, the decision was $48,000. agreed to settle the claim for A proposal settlement was submitted to the Jones, Providence, Esq., Lauren E. judge trial based on G.L. WCC 1956 28- Plaintiff. 83-25.1 entitled “Settlement cases;”2 Fay, Esq., procedure Thomas J. for Defendant. that commonly is Appendix “Notwithstanding §§ A for the 1. See release. 28- 28-33-26, 33-25 and in cases where liabili- provides: ty 2. General Laws 1956 28-33-25.1 In ex- “deny injury.” known as a and dismiss.” claimed work related (Emphas- added.) $48,000, Kula- change for es executed a document entitled “Work- provided The release also that Kulawas (release), in *3 Compensation ers’ Release” agreed that: acknowledged which she that there was a “This release is to the dispute bona fide between the con- that the injury is work-related and does cerning whether she was entitled to work- possible not bar nonwork-related compensation ers’ benefits for the claimed claims.” Compensation under the Workers’ (act). Accordingly, exchange Act for a 6, 2006, On March in accordance with settlement, monetary agreed Kulawas to: judge the WCC trial re- “remise, quitclaim release and forever proposal viewed the and entered a decree Hospital/Li- unto the said Rhode Island denying dismissing and Kulawas’s petition their fespan compensation and workers’ (decree). statute, In accordance with the carrier, insurance The Beacon Mutual provided the decree inju- the claimed its Company, Insurance successors and ry “did not occur in the course of [Kula- debts, claims, demands, assigns, all due employment” and that the was’s] action, which I actions or causes now received “shall not be deemed to be the have, ever had or in the may future have payment benefits, but Hospital/Li- said Rhode Island shall be considered a compromise payment fespan and their workers’ of a disputed claim.” The com- carrier, insurance The Beacon Mutual pensation action thereupon was concluded. Company, Insurance for in- the claimed Nonetheless, 30, 2007, July on Kulawas

jury under the of the Work- Court, filed suit in Providence Compensation ers’ Statute of the State Island, alleging that her was the result of specifically of Rhode and more hospital’s negligent the any all failure to maintain and claims for total, reasonably the corridor in a partial specific, whether safe condition medi- cal, hospital and its failure to warn a any dangerous and all other ex- penses payments Additionally, plaintiff and all other condition.3 alleged provided for the hospital duty said Workers’ violated its of care Act of the negligently failing equip ramp State Rhode to the Island, by reason of the with railing. aforesaid a finally benefits has not been pay- claim. The settlement and established, parties may the submit a set- pursuant subject ment to it shall not be [Cjom- proposal tlement to the [W]orkers’ 28-33-27(b). Upon liens set forth in If, pensation approval. upon [C]ourt payment, employer the and insurer shall be consideration, judge a of the [W]orkers’ entitled to a executed release that ful- [Cjourt [Cjompensation deems the settle- ly finally discharges absolves and proposal ment to be in the best interest of employer and insurer from and all lia- parties, including employee, em- bility arising injury.” out of the claimed carrier,

ployer, appli- insurance and where cable the center for Medicare and Medic- suit, joined 3. Kulawas’s husband in the as- (CMS) may aid services as their interests serting that he suffered of care and loss com- apply, judge may approve the settle- panionship injuries. because of her Because Payment by employer ment. or insurer derivative, right damages we need shall not be deemed to be the separately not it. address benefits, but shall compromise payment be considered tortfeasors, third-party but for sum- could filed motion defendant employer’s or the not to the ground on mary judgment sum, de- hearing justice insurer. in G.L. 1956 28-29- exclusivity provision un- clared that the statute was clear and subsequent action. The barred this ambiguous bring Kulawas could not action was alleged that this hospital also subsequent action preserve failed to barred because injuries stemming recover for the same to sue her common law hearing jus- the same incident. The from 1, 2008, injuries. July On personal summary judgment in favor of granted tice arguments based Superior Court heard hospital, timely and Kulawas filed this 28-33-25.1 was contention *4 appeal. argued plaintiffs The counsel ambiguous. because it ambiguous the statute was that of Review Standard provide upon payment not that did also This Court reviews decision employer “the and insurer a settlement summary judgment on a de novo granting release entitled to a executed shall be Omar, v. 129 basis. Willis party tortfea- employer and third as (R.I.2008). summary will affirm a “[We] plaintiff, to the decree According sor.” if, reviewing after the judgment admissible injury finding “a clear that [the included light in the most favorable to the evidence and not work related this statute was] nonmoving party, [this Court] concluded] the manner in which the the decree and fact ex genuine that no issue of material proposed are at odds.” settlement was moving party is ists and entitled hearing justice rejected argu- this The [summary] judgment to as a matter of that even if the statute ment and declared (citing Impact law.” Id. Lucier v. Recre ambiguous, which she declared it was was ation, Ltd., (R.I.2005)). not, the ambiguity she would resolve Additionally, review questions we statu the hospital favor of because she was satis- tory interpretation de novo. Waterman legislative that “the intent be fied would to (R.I.2009). Caprio, 983 A.2d allow claimant to benefit from the [this] language When the of the statute is clear Compensation process which is a unambiguous, responsibility it our to quicker process coming and easier than give the of the enactment their plain words Superior hearing into the The Court.” Further, ordinary meaning.

justice compen- ruled that the workers’ unambiguous when confronted with an context, when an sation makes statute, statutory “there is no room ap- an offer of settlement and the WCC and we must the statute construction it, proves “[tlheyTe admitting not that (quoting as written.” Id. State v. Green they employers, they’re willing are the but berg, 951 A.2d compromised to resolve this settle- [as a] ment[;] do, over, they your day but if it’s Appeal Issues on and I think that court has ended makes Court, plaintiff Before this con some She declared that to con- sense.” that it the hearing tends was error for strue the statute otherwise would achieve justice grant summary judgment fa an absurd result. hospital plaintiffs vor of the because respect by exclusivity provision

With contention that was not barred the counsel’s plaintiffs plaintiff argues the release of the act. The that be specifically reserved tortfeasor, the rights against third-party agree the cause the terms of settlement ment, decree, justice that well the release and hearing agreed the reservation as as WCC, was not plaintiffs injury in accordance with provide work-related, by subject it was not the act which to third-party covered was not liens act, no rele- was exclusivity provision has the for a nonwork- and the support injury in this case. As this related she suffered on her vance contention, employer’s premises. According plain- directs our attention to tiff, the involving “going-and-coming agreed because cases work-related, jurispru- not it rule” in workers’ was was not act, and, therefore, According plaintiff, dence. covered upon relied set forth in apparently going-and-com- provision 28-29- rule when it denied claim for 20 does not ing apply. Kulawas’s However, argues defendant benefits.4 contentions largely rest by any “is writ- unsupported this assertion language the release argument oral ten or submitted before decree; that, argues although § she 28- or the Before Court.” [WCC] specifically provides 33-25.1 that: “[u]pon Court, this defendant contends payment, and insurer shall resulted from a fall that idio- *5 a be entitled to executed release However, in nature.5 pathic holding our fully finally absolves and discharges depend on the does not resolution this the and insurer from any and all parties deny- the a issue because reached liability arising out of the inju- settlement in the and-dismiss WCC. ry[,]” in agreed the this case ato Lastly, plaintiff provided is enti- release that defendant with argues that she less than it sue the that to which was entitled. negligence tled to not- withstanding her failure her preserve Exclusivity The Provision law right common to do so in accordance by begin noting We 33 chapter §§ with 28-29-17 and The 28-29-20. 28, including title pro the argument bases this on her con- vision that for a provides compromise set that she did tention not receive workers’ claim, tlement of a squarely falls benefits, therefore, and, exclusivity provision. within the act’s Sec apply. these statutes do not provides tion 28-29-20 in relevant as part Analysis follows: essence, to its in “Rights rights Reduced the issue this lieu of other centers on case contention remedies. —The $48,000 payment injury she received for an chapters 29-38 context, idiopathic 4. In the workers’ 5. An fall has been described as "going-and-coming” operates "[wjhen a bar rule as employee fall that an occurs is sud injuries compensation for while an that occur denly by overtaken an internal weakness” employee traveling is to or from work employee injury such that the suffers an in Services, place. McGloin v. Trammellcrow by underlying physical duced an condition Inc., 881, (R.I.2010). 987 A.2d 886 Because employment. Riley unrelated to the v. Oxford harshness, fact-specific the rule's several Co., 111, Paper Me. 149 103 A.2d 113 by exceptions recognized have been this (1954). generally v. See Zuchowski United Court, including respect with to situations Co., States 102 R.I. 229 A.2d 61 Rubber can that a which demonstrate (1967); Corry v. Commissioned Mess Officers' or causal connection nexus exists between (1951). (Open), 81 A.2d 78 R.I. 689 injury employment. suffered and the Toolin Resource, Aquidneck Island Medical (R.I. 1995). claim, all of action Farr forfeited causes title, remedy for an this Id. This shall be in from the collision.6 chapters, resulting those by granted and remedies as to was am- concluded that release lieu of all Court at existing, either common to the now it did not refer biguous because or law or otherwise Id. at motorist claim. 381. uninsured officers, directors, employ- agents, its approach The before us does not case * * ees; Farr; in which complexity this Kulawas obtained a undisputed that It is policies with two separate was faced and that a decree in the WCC that the re- We concluded of insurance. of title 28 was chapter with accordance ambiguous, was lease was However, that it plaintiff contends issued. appeal. pressed below but not raised and not the exclu- language the release in Farr has little holding at Our Id. of the act that controls sivity provision exclusivity pro- relevance to 28-29-20’s directs in this case. result bearing no whatsoever on vision and has Casualty Surety & to Aetna our attention employee’s effect of an fail- preclusive (R.I.1991), Farr, Co. v. her law preserve ure to his or common action which Shir- declaratory judgment rights. in an automobile ley injured Farr Furthermore, Waterman, this term in motorist during with an uninsured collision had occasion to address the this Court employment. Id. at 379- the course of her pension consequences setoff settle- a vehicle driving 80. Farr was owned in accordance with 28-33- ment entered by Aetna. and insured *6 Waterman, at 25.1. In 983 A.2d employer’s was the workers’ Aetna also retirement benefits were offset plaintiffs in- separate carrier under a compensation settle- against compensation his workers’ at 380. Farr’s claim poliey. surance required by ment G.L.1956 36-10-31.7 as benefits, de- compensation for workers’ provi- that the plaintiff argued setoff settled, Aetna, by par- was and the fended misapplied sion was to a settlement under specifically executed a release that ties § 28-33-25.1 and further that the state compensation to Farr’s workers’ referred system estopped retirement should be claim, but not her uninsured motorist of errone- making from the offset because subsequently at 380-81. Farr claim. Id. by made its-then assistant ous statements sought uninsured motorist benefits under Waterman, 983 A.2d at 843-44. director. by policy, filing the Aetna automobile rejected arguments; This those we Court arbitration. Id. at 380. Aetna for in ac- concluded that a settlement reached complaint declaratory judgment, filed a for §of 28-33- by executing provisions a release in cordance with the alleging 25.1, paid pay- an ‘amount or connection with her workers’ “constitutes "Any paid payable under the complicated 6. further when the amount or This case was any provisions of Company, Insurance which was Peerless any action dam- law or as the result of carrier, motorist moved to Farr’s uninsured ages injuries against personal the [Sítate intervene, Aetna, contending that not Peerless of Rhode Island on account of death or obligated pay the was uninsured benefits. disability of a member the retirement [of Farr, Casualty Surety A.2d Aetna & Co. 594 system] against payable be offset shall (R.I.1991). 380 payable in lieu of benefits out of funds by provisions provided the state under the provides Laws 1956 36-10-31 in General chapter on account of the death or of this pertinent part: disability of the member.” Moreover, Manzi, able under the 687 A.2d at purposes law’ for of the off- employer argued * * Waterman, set *.” 983 A.2d at 845 barred from pursuing a tort claim based 86-10-31). Further, (quoting we held 28-29-20, §on provision. Waterman, estoppel did not We declared in clear and unequivocal lan- representations based on made the re- guage: system tirement that a settlement under “Moreover, the exclusivity clause of § 28-33-25.1 did not constitute workers’ Act bars payments, benefits or such plaintiffs from bringing this action. the offset provision trig- would be Section 28-29-20 provides that Waterman, gered. at 846. We for an under title concluded that because the fact that 29-38, chapters and the remedy re- statements were erroneous and ultra pursuant ceived to those chapters, ‘shall vires, estoppel was not available. Id. be in lieu of all rights and remedies as to

Additionally, opinion we are of the that injury now existing, either at com- State, our holding Manzi v. mon law or otherwise against an em- ” (R.I.1997) (mem.), controls the result Manzi, ployer.’ (em- 687 A.2d at 462 Manzi, in this case. summary judg added). phasis ment was entered with respect to the argues Kulawas that the case at bar is tort claim Manzi; different from Island, the State of Rhode based on a Manzi had released all claims workers’ compensation settlement in ac state when he settled his workers’ compen- Manzi, cordance with 28-33-25.1. case, further, sation this Court A.2d at 462. The hearing was not asked to examine the language of justice and this appeal Court on concluded the release for ambiguity exclu- that Manzi’s tort claims were barred be sion. Our decision in Manzi did not rest cause of the release executed the WCC on the breadth of the release or on its and the exclusivity provision of the act. *7 Indeed, language. Manzi submitted af- Manzi, Id. Significantly, in plaintiff the fidavit from the lawyer, state’s the argued that because the settlement he “ parties agreed that the settlement ‘in no reached with was a compro way plaintiff barred’ from filing a civil payment mise disputed of a claim “and not Manzi, action the state.” payment A.2d workers’ compensation bene at 462. Although we fits,” he cannot envision proceed could a with his civil action. more added). explicit waiver liability on (emphasis part This Court held of an this evidence equally that the clear unambiguous and language unavailing. We held that specifies 28-33-25.1 that “the employ provision er of the act plaintiff and insurer shall “bars a be entitled to a from a filing executed second fully release which cause of action on finally the basis of a legal theory absolves and different discharges circumstances any insurer from in which a liability plaintiff and all arising recovery seeks for the out injury,” injuries of the claimed same on such that “Man- which his or her workers’ zi discharged defendants from liability was based.” Id. We signed when he pursuant are release satisfied that our holding in Manzi Manzi, § 28-33-25.1.” 687 A.2d at 462 determines the issues before us in this added). (emphasis case. Rights Law Waiver of Common to the decree points also plaintiff

The specifying in the WCC entered that, contends notwith- The in the course occur did not com- preserve her failure to her standing The respondent. with employment of her §§ with 28- rights in accordance mon law that, examined when argues 28-29-20, may pursue a tort she 29-17 stating in the release language of the light argu- This employer. action the claim that ment, that it “is Kulawas’s contention again, rests on and does not bar com- accepted work-related “has not injury is that she claims,” inju- it be- work-related benefits for a work-related pensation non possible therefore, and, preservation of her ry” the resolution apparent comes rights law in accordance with claim ex- common plaintiffs workers unnecessary. dis- § 28-29-17 was We preserving on claims based pressly was terms, By payment approved a agree. its ar- Kulawas work-related. that were not WCC, with by judge accordance that, from although precluded she is gues not be deemed to be “shall WCC, sums seeking any additional payment “possible free to seek she is benefits, compro- but be considered a shall claims” because these nonwork-related claim.” It is mise reject We this preserved. claims were compen- overall part nonetheless a of the engage syllo- in a and decline to contention by the remedy sation that was enacted that if the are satisfied gistic exercise. We Legislature. a settle- intended to exclude Legislature monetary The award that Kulawas re- carefully release worded ment based ceived was issued in accordance with exclusivity pro- provisions of the act. The decree issued act, it have done so in would vision hearing and directed that the set- after language. clear and definite subject tlement amount was not third-party set forth in 28-33- liens as The state’s 27(b). plaintiff sought and received expedi system provide “was established the benefits of the workers’ under a no- injured tious relief to workers may she not avoid the fair replacing a cum system fault of benefits exchange for those benefits. system.” tort lengthy and often bersome Kaya Partington, 681 A.2d v. An who not retained has State, (R.I.1996) (citing Labbadia his or her common law 28- creating this prohibitions 29-17 is con barred *8 scheme, Legis statutory compensation § bringing tained in 28-29-20 from a tort clearly system lature intended that this of employer in against action his or her situa benefits serve “as the exclusive in which tions “workers’ workers, injured completely available to appropriate.” Lopes benefits are v. G.T.E. replacing all other remedies then avail (R.I. 949, A.2d 950 Corp., Products 560 prin 1989) venerable able.” Id. Based these (citing Hornsby Corp., v. Southland (R.I.1985)); also, ciples fully 1069, we are satisfied and because A.2d 1071 see 487 the act exclusivity provision that Corp., Diaz v. Darmet 694 A.2d 737 (R.I.1997). 28-29-17, subsequent negligence suit precludes a Section entitled agree we with of common law against plaintiffs “Waiver —Notice justice plaintiffs day right[,]” provides that in claim of common law hearing part employee: relevant gone. court has come and FLAHERTY, dissenting. held to have waived his or her Justice “shall be recover right of action at common law to respectfully I dissent the holding from damages personal injuries if he or majority opinion and am of the not his or her at given she has summary judgment improperly grant ap- the time of the contract of hire or Although my ed this case. I share in pointment writing notice in that he or colleagues’ admiration of the “venerable (10) right claims that and within ten principles” compen she this state’s workers’ system, sation it is opinion that em days copy after that has filed a ployers are negotiate and insurers free to depart- notice with the director [of they for less than that to which are enti training].” ment of labor and tled under G.L. 1956 28-33-25.1. 2See precepts One of foundational al., Ludington John P. et Modern Workers system compen the state’s (1993) (“A Compensation 204:16 at 27 injured employee sation is that an “is en question common is whether a settlement certain, limited, timely though sured of a tort claim releases a compen compensation” injuries workplace claim, sation or whether the settlement of a workers’ exchange employee’s for a waiver of the releases claim”). tort Counsel for Rhode Island right pursue an action at law Hospital argu conceded as much at oral employer. Cianci v. Nationwide Insur However, ment. majority forecloses Co., (R.I.1995) ance 659 A.2d possibility by this interpreting the exclu DiQuinzio Co., (quoting v. Pandera Lease sivity immunity provisions of the “An (the act) Act covered under the act has no common-law in all instances which there is a right of action insurer em [or settlement under 28-33-25.1. I agree ployer] expressly because the act address that, blush, at it appear first would es such claims and thus immunizes the might those of the act bar plain liability carrier from common- premises-liability tiffs claim. In my opin law suit.” Id. at 669-70. Because it is ion, however, that is not a analysis correct uncontroverted availed because of act’s definition of the term compensation remedy herself “injury” and because construing 28-33- accepted pro the benefits that were foreclosing ability 25.1 as of the parties vided, is, compromise “a payment of a negotiate for less than a full and final claim,” preserve and did not liability release of all collides with the well- common law to recover damages for canon of statutory interpreta established personal injuries, bring she is barred from requires give meaning tion that us to ing this action. every sentence a statute. See Local W0, International Federation Technical Conclusion Engineers v. Rhode Is Professional Board, land State Labor Relations opinion, For the reasons stated in this (R.I.2000) (“[W]e are *9 judgment Superior we affirm the mindful that has long ap ‘[t]his [C]ourt in papers may Court. The this case be plied statutory interpretation a canon of returned to the Court. to all gives which effect of statute’s sentence,

provisions, with no clause or part Justice INDEGLIA took no in the unmeaning surplus word construed as ”) appeal. age.’ (quoting Department consideration or decision of this Rhode Island added.) Health, Retardation, thereto.” Al- (Emphasis and Hos able Mental (R.I. R.B., though parties quibble did not about pitals v. 1988)). the fact that fell and fractured her femur, injury it was that this established Exclusivity Clause Waiver during did not occur the course of her Rights of Common-Law Indeed, they agreed that the employment. established It has not been injury did not so occur. as that term is defined injury, an suffered exclusivity in provision If the contained act, trigger act’s in the § is construed to bar all claims 28-29-20 Hawkes v. provision. See Commercial Co., an employee against employer of an after a 261- Union Insurance (Me.2001) § disputed the tort claim under 28- (holding settlement 33-25.1, § who released claims of an then the final sentence of 28- under Maine’s workers’ com- 33-25.1, and all claims gives employer which an barred, not in part act were pensation liability, to a executed release of all * * * injury claims personal “because the nullity. would be rendered a In other employ- in the did not arise course words, Assembly’s the General inclusion of ment,” immunity rendering thus and language entitling employer to such a exclusivity provisions inapplicable). The payment in release after accordance with a of the act exclusivity provision provides § settlement 28-33-25.1 under would be * * * remedy injury that “the for an shall completely unnecessary if the exclusivity rights in all and remedies as to be lieu of provision interpreted were to serve as an injury existing, now either at common automatic bar to further lia * * law or otherwise G.L. 1956 28- bility every case which there was a added). However, “inju- 29-20 (emphasis light settlement of a claim. In statute, term ry” is a defined under the statutory language, consider “personal injury which it to a to an limits statutory interpreta ation of the canon of employee arising out of and the course requiring meaning given tion be employment, of his or her connected and sentence, I every accept cannot such a employment.” referable to the Section 28- result.8 See Local International Fed 2(7)(i). Whether broken fe- 29— eration Technical and En Professional mur as defined the act 747 A.2d at gineers, 1005. very point was the of contention between well majority’s I dissent as parties that led to their eventual settle- holding premises-liability that Kulawas’s ment and the execution of the release. claim also is barred because she waived Further, they successfully negotiated after rights common-law when she did not the dispute, resolution to reserve these under 28-29-17 approve asked the court to them proposed because she received a agreement, compensa- settlement and the court spe- First, tion cifically found as a fact in the 28-33-25.1. as WCC decree * * * notes, majority “a payment approved the “claimed did not sj WCC, [plaintiff by judge in the course employ- occur accordance with * ** ment connected therewith and refer- ‘shall not be deemed to be view, 258-page provision automatically the fact that the act not to release all lia- provision no other contains for an "entitle- bility, negotiate but to allow the it ment” to a release bolsters the conclusion in a release. Assembly that the General intended for this *10 compensation also observed that the portion benefits, compro shall be considered a but of the act plaintiffs would have barred the ” (Em claim.’ mise Manzi, civil against employer. suit his added.) has said that phases This Court 687 A.2d at In making 461-62. that obser- employee properly “if has not reserved vation, however, we analyze did not rights his or her common-law under the act’s definition “injury.” of the word act, bringing he or she is barred from a Therefore, I agree do not that the exclu- tort action or her if employer clause, itself, sivity in operates and of compensation appro are benefits bar civil claims in all situations where the Cianci, priate.” v. Nationwide Insurance parties pursuant have executed a release (R.I.1995) Co., 662, 659 A.2d (holding 28-33-25.1, §to because such a construc- that the act immunizes insurer as well tion would reduce the final sentence of omitted). employer) as the In (emphasis section, entitling to a view, my an employee who has not re release, to mere “surplusage.” Local served his or her common-law is International Federation Technical and prohibited from bringing only tort action Engineers, 747 A.2d at 1005. Professional if compensation ap were benefits propriate, which is not the case here.9 Interpretation of the Release Again, for workers’ benefits carefully record, After examining the appropriate, to be there an injury must be release, particularly the settlement propos- within falls the definition under the al, decree, in a light WCC most favor- Also, my act. opinion, construing 28- able to plaintiff as the nonmoving party, it 29-17 to every instance in which my opinion is genuine there are issues there is a settlement and accompanying of material fact about whether received under 28-83-25.1 fur encompasses release only her workers’ ther would render the final sentence of or, claim alternatively, that section entitling to a claims, whether it extinguishes all includ- surplusage. release mere Local In ing her premises-liability claim. Aetna ternational Federation Technical and Farr, Casualty Surety & v.Co. 594 A.2d Engineers, 747 A.2d at 1005. Professional (R.I.1991) 379, 381 (citing Lennon v.

The Effect of Manzi MacGregor, 423 A.2d 820 the absence of a record that could illumi- acknowledge I that in the case of Manzi what, State, any, nate if (R.I.1997) negotiations occurred 687 A.2d 461-62 (mem.), between the held, order, concerning the re- this Court in an that a lease, action, plaintiffs civil and without evidence of their which was based on intent terms, they agreed release, when injuries the same to its were the foundation opinion, ambiguous. his settlement of a disputed workers’ See Mod- em Compensation § Workers 204:16 at 27 (explaining was barred because the scope had release “is signed an unquestionably comprehensive primarily question of intent as manifest- liability terms”). release of all stemming ed agreement settlement order, dicta, Therefore, injury. In our extraordinary we remedy noting It is worth bringing Cianci v. Nation decade before a tort action Co., (R.I. wide Insurance Clearly, insurer. workers' 1995), injured worker had collected work "appropriate” were benefits in that case. ers’ benefits for more than a *11 and inappropriate, summary judgment Lovett, v. it. See Canavan vacate I would I, THEREFORE, Grazina Kula- NOW Harnett, A.2d and Schefrin was, of the sum of for and in consideration Poulin, (citing Johnston (R.I.2004) ($48,000.00)Dollars Forty-Eight Thousand For these rea me, Hospital/Li- Island paid by Rhode from the ma sons, dissent respectfully I compensation their fespan and workers’ holding.

jority’s carrier, Mutual In- The Beacon insurance receipt of which is Company, surance A APPENDIX remise, hereby hereby acknowledged, do COMPENSATION WORKERS’ quitclaim unto the said release and forever RELEASE and their Hospital/Lifespan Rhode Island Grazina, Kulawas, WHEREAS, of the carrier, compensation insurance Greenwich, State of Rhode Town of East Company, The Beacon Mutual Insurance April Island, that on or about claims debts, all assigns, and due its successors injury, work-related she suffered claims, demands, actions or causes of ac- fracture, wit, which arose femur tions, have, I ever had or in the now which employ- her in the course of out and may have said Rhode Island future alleged ment, injury is which claimed their workers’ com- Hospital/Lifespan and compensable provi- under the have been carrier, The Beacon pensation insurance Island Workers’ Com- of the Rhode sions Company, for Mutual Insurance Act. pensation injury under the claimed WHEREAS, Rhode the said Compensation Statute of the Workers’ their work- Hospital/Lifespan and Island Island, specifical- more State Rhode and carrier, insurance ers’ ly any and all claims for Company, de- Beacon Mutual Insurance medical, total, specific, partial whether or work-related nies the claimed expenses and all other and and petitioner, said payments provided and all other WHEREAS, dispute there fide is bona Compensation for under said Workers’ parties as to whether existing between the Island, by Act of the State of Rhode rea- petitioner the said entitled to- or not work related son of aforesaid claimed benefits injury. injury under the Workers’ Com- any way limiting forego- Without Island, Act of the State of Rhode pensation I ing, hereby voluntarily I state that seek and desire the of the aforesaid WHEREAS, petitioner the said re- sum, pend- I petition that know the now quests and desires ing Compensation in the Court in Workers’ respondent Forty- said of the sum of wherein I am the State Rhode Island ($48,000.00) Eight Thousand Dollars to expenses seeking compensation, medical of all payments lieu payments and other Workers’ total, partial Compensation Act of the State of Rhode in- expenses and all other Island; I hereby expressly authorize hospital expenses un- cluding medical attorney, Boyer Esquire, L. Gregory Act of the Compensation der the Workers’ decision, stipulation to a decree or assent Island, which amount un- State of Rhode in the to be filed admitted der all the circumstances is compensa- whereby my petition for fair, adequate all to be and reason- all other tion for the claimed able. *12 relief under the presence Executed of: Act of the State of Rhode Island shall be [Signature] /s/ denied and dismissed as nonwork-related injury; that I further by understand that STATE OF RHODE ISLAND my acceptance of the aforesaid sum of PROVIDENCE, SC. money by entry of the aforesaid decision, stipulation, decree or I have set March, 2006, On day this 2nd before up an effective bar against my recovering personally appeared Kulawas, me Grazina any additional money sum sums of to me known and known me to be the injury, the Workers’ party described the aforesaid instru- Compensation Act of the State of Rhode ment and who executed the above instru- Island, and that I voluntarily seek and ment and acknowledged to me that she desire of the aforesaid sum hav- executed the same. ing full knowledge of the above facts. [Signature] /s/

This release to the claim that Notary Public is work-related and does not bar possible nonwork-related claims. WHEREOF,

IN WITNESS I have

hereunto set hand and seal in duplicate

original in Providence on day this 2nd

March, A.D., 2006. Grazina Kulawas

/s/

Grazina Kulawas