4 W. Va. 499 | W. Va. | 1871
This case involves two questions. 1st. The jurisdiction of a court of equity to interpose by injunction in such cases. 2d. The constitutionality of the act entitled “an act to establish the school district of Wellsburg, in the county of Brooke,” passed July 11th, 1868, by the legislature of this State. Acts ex. ses., 1868, p. 17. That a court of equity has jurisdiction in such cases, is fully sustained by authority. Bull et al. v. Read et al., 13 Gratt., 87. The answer to the second question is made equally definite by the same authority. We are not, however, sent adrift for authority to establish the constitutionality of said act. The constitution itself, Art. X, section 2, declares, “ The legislature shall provide, as soon as practicable, for the establishment of a thorough and efficient system of free schools.” The.establishment of such schools is, therefore, not merely permissive, but obligatory, on the legislature. The system
In conformity with the provisions of the said tenth article of the constitution, the legislature in 1863 established a general system of free schools. Chap. 187, Acts 1863. The first section of said general act declared that “ each and
By the general act of February, 1866, the district system was retained by authorizing the division of every township “into a suitable number of school districts,” (Acts 1866, p. 54, ch. 74, sec. 1) governed by an incorporated board of education. Idem, secs. 2, 3, 4. The amendatory act of 1867, (Acts 1869, p. 113, ch. 98,) and the Code of 1868, p. 290, ch. 45, secs. 9, 10, retain the system of districts; thus showing that the wisdom of the successive legislatures of the State approve of that system, as the most thorough and efficient, for the free education of the youth.
What are called “independent school districts,” as the one under consideration, although created by special acts, have, from their formation to the present, been specially recognized in the general acts; and notwithstanding the designation of “independent,” they nevertheless constitute a part of the general system, sanctioned by the legislature as the most efficient for a particular locality.
That the legislature had the power to establish the school district of Wellsburg, in the manner they have by said act
The mode prescribed by said act for raising the money for the support of the schools within said district, is not unconstitutional, because the money is levied for the “board
The counsel have raised many points in their arguments, indicating that said act violated the constitution, but notwithstanding the ingenious argument, coming with acknowledged force from able jurists, there does not appear that direct violation of the constitution, in the provisions designated in the argument, as would justify this court in declaring that the legislature had transcended its powers. In fact several of the points argued do not fairly arise from the record, and should not be considered.
From the foregoing view of the constitutional provision, and upon the principles decided in Godden v. Cramp, &c., 8 Leigh, 120; Bull v. Read, &c., 13 Gratt., 87; Wade, &c., and Thomas, &c. v. City of Richmond, 18 Gratt., 583; in which cases the leading authorities are fully discussed, and therefore not necessary to be reviewed in this case, we are led to the conclusion that the said act is constitutional; that the taxes and levies complained of by the plain tiff are legal, and should be collected; and that the assent of the plaintiff was not essential to the formation of said school district; that the legislature has the exclusive power to create such districts, even without the assent of the citizens therein, and did not exceed their authority in that respect when, by said act, they created a board of education consisting of three commissioners, who should “be elected by the qualified voters resident” in said district, and gave that board power to make the annual levies for building, school and expense funds. The consequences flowing from this creation of the legislative will, grievous though they may be to the plaintiff, can have redress only in the legislative will and discretion, and cannot be relieved by judicial supervision, unless the corporate authorities of this district exceed their corporate powers, or, the legislative will springs beyond the restricting limits of the constitutions, Federal or State. If the legislative will, in the creation of the district,
I am thus led to the opinion, that the circuit court properly refused the injunction prayed for in this cause, and was equally right in dismissing the bill; and that the order complained of should be affirmed, with costs to the appellee.
Order aeeirmed.