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Kucana v. Mukasey
533 F.3d 534
7th Cir.
2008
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*1 сorroborating obtain statutory evidence. Alterna- does not violate the right rep- and, case, tively, hearing, on remand after a new deny resentation did not may Rapheal Rapheal IJ find credible right representation. her there is no hearing provided need for corroborative evidence also Rapheal with a rea- or that evidence opportunity present corroborative is unavail- sonable evidence on However, able on additional basеd evidence of Ra- her own behalf. from the record pheal’s attempts case, to locate such evidence. we that Rapheal conclude did However, again if the IJ finds Ra- not have a chance to Immigra- review the credible, pheal Report is not without against corroborative admitted her. Given evidence significance she will be unable to succeed on the placed IJ on the hand- relief. See 8 U.S.C. written notation of “Kocoker” in her claims for Immi- (“The 1158(b)(l)(B)(ii) tеstimony of the gration Report, required remand is to al- applicant may Rapheal be sufficient to sustain the low to review that document and applicant’s corroboration, testify burden without following her review of the docu- only applicant remand, if the satisfies the trier ment. On Rapheal because is applicant’s testimony fact that is entitled to a new hearing comports credible, persuasive, is spe- statutory and refers to requirements, Rapheal is cific facts suffiсient to demonstrate that free to any corroborative evidence applicant refugee.”). Finally, is a we she has obtained. The IJ is also free to although note that conferencing judge video credibility her and the need for cor- evidence, available and satisfies constitutional and roborative as consistent with the statutory standards, gov- this case the presented evidence hearing. the new ernment’s decision to hold a petition video confer- We GRANT for review and Re- strange ence seems govern- proceedings because the consistent with this mand transport opinion. ment had to Rapheal greater participate

distance to in the video confer-

encing than the distance it would have had bring her to attend hearing live remand,

before the IJ. On encourage we Rapheal’s IJ to consider anew request for an in-person hearing, given logis- Agron KUCANA, Petitioner, tics involved in this case.7 MUKASEY, Attorney Michael B.

III. States, General of the United Congress authorized the use of video Rеspondent. conferencing for immigration hearings No. 07-1002. and, facially, comports this authorization requirements with the of due process. United States Appeals, Court of Rapheal While presents also an as-applied Seventh Circuit. process due challenge, those claims are Argued Dec. 2007. properly challenges considered as July Decided 2008. claimed denials of statutory rights. her The use of conferencing, video even though

it separates attorneys clients, from thеir sue, appeal, Rapheal however,

7. argues On also that the remanding IJ because denying abused its discretion in her an in- case for a ‍‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‍new and on remand the IJ person hearing. may We need not reach this is- differently. exercise its discretion *2 IL, Lang (argued), Chicago,

Michael R. for Petitioner.

Kathryn DeAngelis (argued), Depart- Division, Immigration ment Justice Civil DC, Washington, Respon- for Litigation, dent. EASTERBROOK, Judge,

Before Chief RIPPLE, and CUDAHY Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Judge. Chief Albania, Kucana, a citizen of en- Agron a business visi- tered the United States as not leave when his visa tor 1995 and did but, asylum when expired. applied He at thе in the fall appear he did not removed in absen- he was ordered reopen, a motion to tia. He soon filed overslept. he had An im- contending that motion, and in migration judge denied Immigration Appeals the Board of Kucana did not seek affirmed. order comply he with the review—-nor did Kucana quit States. United this time filed another motion country in Al- contending that conditions he would bania had deteriorated persecution a victim of should he return federal courts’ to review dis- Kucanа, cretionary there. who describes himself as decisions of offi- markets, democracy Act, supporter of and free cials. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), contends that holders of these views are at provides that no U.S.C. *3 beatings risk of and murder Albania. “any court has to review other motion, immigration judge The denied this Attorney decision or action of the General held that the IJ appeal and on the Board Secretary Security or the of Homeland jurisdiction, mo- lacked because successive specified for which is under this directly reopen tions to must be filed subchapter to be the discretion of the the Board itself. Attorney Secretary General or the Security, grant- Homeland other than the (second) Treating papers Kucana’s as a 1158(a) ing of relief under section of this reopen, motion to the Board denied that 1158(a) title.” deals with applica- Section in Albania relief because conditions have asylum, tions for the decision that improved since 1997. 2006 “Stabiliza- Kucana wants us to review not is one Agreement” tion and Association between 1158(a)”; § “under it is a decision not to European Albania and the Union was rati- request and thus not to revive a agreement In 2007 a fied. visa was asylum that for had been abandoned in reached, can through- so Albanians travel 1997 when Kucana failed to attend the today out the EU. Albania is a democratic subject. scheduled to address that guarantees nation with international of hu- man rights; reported there have been no Recently ques- this circuit addressed the political killings years. or detentions for tion—on which other courts of are 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) § ap- divided—whether argues

Kucana in this court that plies agency’s speci- when the discretion is the Board abused its discretion because it by regulation fied rather than a statute. did not mention Professor Bernd Fischer’s parties After the filed their briefs affidavit discussing conditions Albania. case, Gonzales, we held in Ali v. 502 F.3d Abuse of discretion is right standard. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) Cir.2007), § requires No statute the Board to аpplies discretionary decisions under circumstances, any regulation under and a regulations imple- that are based on and confirms that the Board has discretion to Immigration Nationality ment the Act. deny relief even to an alien who would discretionary The decision in Ali was decision, have received a favorable had the request whether to an alien’s for a argument presented been earlier. a hearing; continuance of here the discre- 1003.2(a). § C.F.R. It per is difficult to tionаry decision is whether to discretion, ceive an abuse of for Prof. proceeding hearing. and hold a Reg- new Fischer’s affidavit does not document a specify ulations that both decisions are change 1997; in Albanian conditions since discretionary; regulations both draw their it is instead a reaching historical narrative provisions force from Act allowing back to the time when Albania was totali govern tarian officials to their own dictatorship. parties’ But 1229a(c)(7) proceedings. agreement that See 8 U.S.C. “abuse of discretion” is the Board). (authority for reopening standard of It review led us to wonder they subject follows that equally whether we considering should be Kuca 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). argument na’s at all.

As amended ID parties Real Act of asked the post-argument We Immigration Nationality Act limits memoranda on the effect of Ali and order, 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). the De- vate when order itself is Surprisingly, unreviewable; argued advisory Justice that would be an partment does not cover decisions opinion. Corp. See Powerex v. Reliant — Services, reason for principal Inc., U.S. -, not Energy (at to which least the one (2007). this conclusion S.Ct. 168 L.Ed.2d space) devotes the most the memorandum Department’s A second contention in the the Board that in cases such as Kucana’s is post-argument memorandum is that (whether a factual decision coun- making already court has held worsened) rather than try conditions have inapplicable reopening decisions. The begin discretionary one. This does рanel Singh v. deciding Ali. Before whether distinguish (7th Cir.2005), said this: *4 (the discretionary to a continuance 1996, Before for motions to decision), de- immigration judge an must reopen solely regula- derived from the good a reason for cide whether there is tions. codified motion to time, in turn on depends more which in in reopen process 8 U.S.C. the statements of fact said to whether 1229a(c)(6), § provision within the sub- Surely are true. good constitute the cause in chapter referred to of the alien’s circumstances the evaluation 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)].However, the statu- [§ notwithstanding cannot be reviewed tory language only describes the con- 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) § and Ali. reopen filing tents of motions to and the decision, Every discretionary unless Conspicuously any deadlines. is absent coin, flip of a rests on the made specific language entrusting the decision appreciation of the state of the tribunal’s on a motion to to “the discretion of the world. Sec- litigation and ‍‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‍state Moreover, Attorney of the General.” 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) nоt mean that a could 1252, § subsection of the section that ran- decision is unreviewable when made jurisdiction-stripping also contains the that if the domly unthinkingly, or provision, provides petition- that when application attention to an agency pays appeals er a motion to or recon- does, it then acting and has reasons for as order, appeal should be sider (because in those reasons can be reviewed un- appeal with the consolidated principle precede, the reasons and do not 1252(b)(6). derlying order. 8 U.S.C. discretion). stripe This is a equal, the unnecessary if would be provision That in argument that we have considered other 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) juris- deprived us See, wanting. e.g., found contexts and place. first See Stone v. diction Co., Liberty v. Mutual Insurance Daniels INS, 386, 397, 115 514 U.S. S.Ct. Cir.2007) (prohibition on 484 F.3d 884 (1995) (noting that 131 L.Ed.2d 465 remand orders does appellate review of give construe statutes to courts must not the court of free to re leave effect, every provision). if possible, view, mattеr, the rea independent as an first, passage gives two reasons: This order); sons behind the Rubel v. Pfizer (7th Cir.2004) (same). the extent of the Board’s discretion Inc., F.3d 1016 statute; than by regulation been set rather applied understanding And we have second, allowing that the clause consolida- See, e.g., law. Jiménez Vira reopening challenges original tion of and Mukasey, 518 F.3d 511 Cir. cocha if unnecessary 2008); decisions would Leguizamo-Medina (7th Cir.2007). review of deci- prevents One cannot The first of these subsidiary findings that moti- sions not tо review the inapplicable circuit after discre- is not tenable reasons tionary reopening opinion This a fresh look. decisions. Ali. The second needs Rule has been circulated under Circuit was that con- panel’s view 40(e) majority judges. to all active A did proceedings concerning direct solidation of hearing (Judges favor a en banc. point- decisions would be reopening Rovner, Wood, Flaum, Ripple, less, never denying reopening if orders voted in favor of a en Williams subject review. That was were banc.) opinion panel true when the issued its 2005) longer. but is true no On (April question remains is the What Act, ID Pub.L. May the Real any Kucana has advanced “consti whether I, Today Div. B Tit. took effect. questions or of law”. His tutional claims are within our denying reopening decisions phrase brief does not his contentions provided to the extent terms; argument those the entire 1252(a)(2)(D): And al the Board abused its discretion. (B) (C), Nothing subparagraph or or might the ninth circuit deem such though chapter any provision other of this (be argument proposition “of law” (other section) than which limits or requires cause the law the Board not to *5 review, shall be con- eliminates discretion), abuse its see Ramadan v. Gon precluding strued as review of constitu- zales, Cir.2007), 479 F.3d 646 rehear questions tional claims or of law raised denied, ing en banc 504 F.3d 973 upon petition a for review filed with Cir.2007) J., (O’Scannlain, eight other appropriate appeals court of accor- judges dissenting), explained in Jimé with this section. dance why nez Ramadan misreads Viracacha discretionary may now Because decisions 1252(a)(2)(D). § they reviewed when entail “constitu- be law”, questions or tional claims of there’s Kucana argument offers a second nothing incongruous about the consolida- support reopening: After 2002 his 1252(b)(6). § Applying tion rule (who mother has become a citizen of the § denying to orders mo- States) appli United filed on his behalf an reopen any part tions to will not make cation for a visa as an immеdiate relative. unnecessary. the statute The Board not did mention this when de only changed clining Real ID Act to reopen Although The not his case. among statutory any obligation relation subsections but Board does not have to principal opinion explaining also alleviated the consideration write an each decision judiciary obligation that had led the to confine claus- not to it does have an to every argument such as made it. es least consider to they Judges addressing had to were con- scope opinion have. Sometimes one sub (such ject asylum) that an elimination of all mentioning cerned review as while not (such permit agency would to violate statutes another an immediate-relative as visa) may imply and the Constitution will. The enact- that the latter has been 1252(a)(2)(D) §of that rather than ment eliminates overlooked decided. And we 1252(a)(2)(B) giving may argument for reason narrow assume for sake of reading and, arguments ignoring potentially dispositivе as the other ad- issue is — Singh vanced in also have been overtaken an error of law that would allow review events, 1252(a)(2)(D). by Singh we conclude that must be under The Board must discretion; only overruled extent it exercise when it done holds It follows that by proceedings. their own sheltered its decision so they equally subject 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). however, Kucana, help This does (internal omitted). Ali, Id. citations there- the Board he did not because fore, overruling operates as de facto applicаtion that his mother’s any argument our decision opportu- him an give justifies reopening (7th Cir.2005),1 which held He adjustment of status. nity apply for § 1252 was not a bar to our review of immediate-relative the 1-130 attached “authority reopen motions to because to his motion before form solely motions to derived for any argument make judge but did not regulations.” Singh also noted that application. Kucana’s on that visa based “any specific the statute was devoid of did not address appeal to thе Board entrusting the decision on a mo- language exclusively subject; papers all of dealt his tion to to ‘the discretion of that conditions in Alba- his contention ” Attorney General.’ Id. surprise it is no changed. nia have So I Although believe that we are bound did not address opinion the Board’s principal and that the holding Ali respond to subject; an need not agency opinion represents logical extension of in the record lurking potential arguments I I holding, separately write becausе by counsel. never advanced continue to concerned the breadth of for review is dismissed petition Ali, our holding. Ali’s we addressed jurisdiction. lack of to hear from the denial a motion to continue—an interim deci- RIPPLE, Judge, concurring, nature, sion, “de- discretionary which dubitante. *6 1229a,” which, from 8 U.S.C. rives that principal opinion I agree with turn, immigration judges upon “confers present appears of the case disposition our authority to conduct removal plenary in Ali v. by holding our to be controlled fur- F.3d at 660. We proceedings.” 502 (7th Cir.2007). Gonzales, Ali 659 502 F.3d regulation re- ther observed that “[t]he jurisdictional bar contained held that the implements simply continuances garding to “applie[d] in 8 U.S.C. statutory authori- immigration judge’s regulations under discretionary decisions pro- the course of removal ty to control the Im- implement are on and that based Here, however, the ratio- Id. ceedings.” Kucana, Nationality Act.” migration and beyond the being ‍‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‍applied Ali is nale of fur- principal opinion The slip оp. at 536. rulings; being it is procedural of realm explains that ther deny aliens review of substantive used to in Ali was discretionary decision [t]he Immigration Ap- of the Board of decisions request an alien’s whether to on a mistake or mis- peals that are based the dis- hearing; of a here continuance understanding of the factual basis to cretionary decision is whether Supreme Court that the claim—decisions hearing. and hold a new proceeding under Federal analogized to motions 60(b). deсisions Regulations specify that both Procedure See Stone Rule of Civil INS, regulations draw 115 S.Ct. discretionary; both v. 514 U.S. (1995). Furthermore, al- in the Act 131 L.Ed.2d 465 provisions their force from only a present case involves though govern officials to allowing immigration 40(e). pursu- ant to Circuit Rule the entire court 1. Ali was circulated to 540 Mukasey, Miah v. 519 All’s rationale would See

motion (8th Cir.2008); Thong n. 1 to motions to re- F.3d 789 appear apply equally Gonzales, 506 F.3d 1209- philack for which must be consider—the basis (10th Cir.2007). principal opinion 10 misapprehension mistake or of law. See 8 short, minority with would cause us become 1003.2. In the rationale of C.F.R. conclusion, minority, giving executive logical taken to its de- Al% branch the to insulate its deci jurisdiction of to review prives this court review where there is fact law made sions the BIA’s mistakes of in the no clear indication statute Con during deciding the course of whether an gress strip jurisdic us of our from this intended to alien should be removed Coun- posture respect tion. Our isolated try. may give pause us herе. today Although appears the result to be approaching problem presented In respectful- circuit I precedent, dictated case, I believe the first that, ly suggest had intended to effort should be to reconcile Ali with deprive jurisdiction specific this court Gonzales, 1024 F.3d Cir. decisions, substantive it would have done 2005) policies underlying since the stare explicitly, so as it did 8 U.S.C. suggest preferability decisis recon- 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). spreads As Ali its do- rejection ciliation precedent its fields, it turning minion to substantive in part. whole or McClain v. Retail Food this court into a virtual council of revision Plan, Employers Joint Pension respect to settled federal law. Before (7th Cir.2005). And I believe that taking steps, these we should revisit the precedents may comfortably these two holding in Ali and determine whether we reconciled. closely should chart a course that more statutory language adheres to the chosen Singh, “spe- we held the lack of by Congress. and enacted language cific entrusting the decision on a motion to to ‘the discretion of the ” CUDAHY, Judge, dissenting. Attorney General’ meant the court had to review the BIA’s deci- In Ali v. F.3d on a reopen. Singh, sion motion to (as Cir.2007), view, adopted which *7 F.3d at (quoting 1026-27 8 U.S.C. opinion acknowledged) minority is in a 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)). petitioner In the circuits, among respect one the to our Ali appealed immigration judge’s an denial of jurisdiction appeals over from denials of his motion for a continuance. We found continuances. Six of our sister courts had that althоugh continuances were men- concluded that 8 U.S.C. only immigration tioned regulations and preclude appellate did not federal courts statute, not in a judge’s reviewing denying from orders such mo a continuance derives Only Eighth tions. the and Tenth Circuits Ali, (citing from a statute. 502 F.3d at 663 precludes had held that (b)(1)). 1229a(a)(l) 8 U.S.C. & We rea- federal reviewing courts of soned that an immigration judge’s denial of a continu (citing immigration judge’s authority ance. Id. at 664 Yerkovich v. Ash 990, croft, Cir.2004); 381 F.3d conduct and control the course of remov- 797, Onyinkwa Ashcroft, al in” proceedings “sрecified subchap- Cir.2004)). INA, Yet even these con ter II necessarily courts of the and this encompasses tinue to exercise over motions the discretion to continue granting the motion of relief under ... whether on section 1255 of proceedings, sponte. jurisdic- A party Congressional of a or sua this title.” clear com- applies therefore to continu- tional bar mand would have barred our review of the decision, ance decisions. final statutory language sug- and gested plenary nature of the au- IJ’s original). (emphasis Id. thority procedural over the steps on the think and Ali are neces- I do not way to that unreviewable final decision. 1229a(b) sarily incompatible. 8 U.S.C. Thus, pro- Ali’s continuance motion “was a immigration judge makes clear step along way cedural to an unreview- power over the conduct of plenary Ali, able final decision.” at F.3d 664. examples of proceedings gives removal discretionary judge the kinds of acts contrast, In the underlying sought reliеf may proceed- course of the perform the asylum case is discre- —a 1229a(c)(7), contrast, § ings. the sec- tionary but reviewable decision—and there says governing motions statutory language suggesting is no agency’s authority all nothing at about the level of deference to afforded a denial Rather, reopen. it to decide motions reopen. of a motion to theAs concurrence lays requirements an alien simply out out, points principal the rationale of the filing must fulfill when a motion to opinion would bar our review of motions to reconsider, which are based on errors of Ultimately, principal opinion rests “ ‘specific language law and fact. Absent rejection Singh upon its the focus of the specific legislative history or ais reli- judicial reviewability ID Act upon Real intent,’ able congressional indicator or questions claims or of law.” “constitutional specific congressional preclude intent According principal opinion judiciаl ‘fairly review that is discernible in reading eliminates the need for a narrow ” scheme,’ legislative the detail jurisdiction-stripping provisions 1372, Traynor, 485 U.S. 108 S.Ct. judiciary’s principal meets the concern (quoting 99 L.Ed.2d 618 Bowen v. Mich. judicial I this area. think this exercise Acad. 6 U.S. psychoanalysis yield prin- to broader must 7 673, 106 (1986)), judicial S.Ct. 90 L.Ed.2d 623 ciples favoring review of adminis- immunity I am reluctant to broaden the trative decisions. process from review of administrative “strong presumption There is a necessarily reliability. for its renowned intends rеview of admin Traynor Turnage, istrative ‍‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‍action.” RIPPLE, Judge, with whom Circuit U.S. 108 S.Ct. 99 L.Ed.2d WILLIAMS, ROVNER, WOOD and omitted). (1988) (citation only It is join, from the Judges, dissenting course, presumption, of not an ironclad rehearing denial of a en banc. *8 rule, and is where it is clear that overcome Congress strip presents important intended to federal courts This case issue agency respect scope to the of this court’s power of their to review decisions. with holding Id. Part of our rationale in Ali was based in Ali v. 502 F.3d 659 (7th Cir.2007). Ali, adjust our seeking on the fact that Ali wаs addressed to hear from the denial ment of status under 8 U.S.C. 1255. 1252(a)(2)(B)© interim deci- expressly bars us of a motion to continue—an Section decisions, discretionary in nature. 502 reviewing providing sion that is such Here, however, the rationale that “no court shall have to F.3d 660. (i) any regarding being applied beyond of Ali is the realm judgment review ruling; being it is used procedural such a CORPORATION, LM INSURANCE a motion to re- deny aliens review of Plaintiff-Appellant, Immigra- Board of

open, a decision of the a mistake or Appeals that is based on factual basis of misunderstanding of the SPAULDING ENTERPRISES INCOR into the realm expansion the claim. This PORATED, Spaulding Moving and of outcome determinative decisions takes Storage Incorporated, Spaulding statutory long way language us a from the Trucking Incorporated, John J. Lala by Congress. chosen and enacted See 8 gos, Lalagos, Rosetti, P. Laura Jean 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). U.S.C. Rally Capital Services, LLC, and Jef deny aliens review of Applying Ali frey Samuels, Defendants-Appel D. reopen crystalizes the decision whether to lees. revisiting the breadth of importance No. 07-2606. holding: Supreme Court has

analogized motions to to motions Appeals, United States Court under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Circuit. Seventh INS, 60(b), see Stone U.S. 3, Argued April 2008. (1995). 115 S.Ct. 131 L.Ed.2d 465 Indeed, panel’s since the consideration of July Decided 2008. ease, Supreme has charac- Court July Rehearing Denied 2008. “important terized motions to as an safeguard” designed proper to “ensure a disposition.” and lawful Dada v. Muka- n — n -,

sey, U.S. 128 S.Ct. 2322- (2008).

24, 171 L.Ed.2d 178 This new hold-

ing Supreme Court should make us

pause, deep take a breath and consider really

anew whether we want to take the path contrary

Circuit down a so

manifest intent of and to the

Supreme that in- understanding Court’s course,

tent. If we take such our deci- scrutiny

sion will no doubt warrant close Supreme ‍‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‍Sup.Ct. Court. See R. 10.

Case Details

Case Name: Kucana v. Mukasey
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: Jul 7, 2008
Citation: 533 F.3d 534
Docket Number: 07-1002
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
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