MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff Michael Krynski, a Brooklyn, New York resident, brings this personal injury lawsuit arising from a February 26, 2005 automobile accident. Krynski claims that the alleged negligence of Defendants Thomas H. Chase, Jr., a Maryland resident, and Western Express, Inc., a Tennessee corporation, caused Krynski serious personal injuries and economic loss.
Krynski initially filed suit in New York State Supreme Court, Kings County on August 1, 2006. Thereafter, on August 29,
I.
BACKGROUND
It is undisputed that on February 26, 2005, Chase’s 18-wheeled Freightliner tractor-trailer struck the rear of Krynski’s Pontiac minivan. At the time of the accident, both Chase and Krynski were proceeding southbound on the Bruckner Expressway in the Bronx, New York. All parties agree that the accident occurred mid-day on а clear day; that the roadway was both dry and level; and that, at the time of the accident, Chase was acting within the scope of his employment with Western Express, the corporate owners of Chase’s truck. It is also undisputed that at the accident scene, Chase was ticketed by a New York City police officer for following Krynski’s vehicle too closely, a violation of New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129(a).
As is common in automobile negligence cases, Krynski and Chase’s characterizations of the February 26, 2009 accident vary. It is Krynski’s position that his vehicle was struck from behind while he was proceeding at highway speed, approximately 50 mph, and that traffic conditions were light-to-moderate. Krynski estimated Chase’s speed at approximately 75 mph.
In contrast, Chase denies that the vehicles were at speed. Instead, Chase claims that traffic conditions were bumper-to-bumper, and that he struck Krynski at less than 5 mph while attempting to decelerate. According to Chase, he had been following Krynski in thе left lane of the highway for some time before the collision, and heavy traffic conditions had persisted for approximately an hour before the accident. During the bulk of that time, Chase claims to have been traveling at no more than 15 to 20 miles per hour. Immediately prior to the accident, Chase claims to have been distracted by another vehicle in the middle lane, which he states “had its left turn signal on and was speeding up and slowing down.” Chase claims that his attention was momentarily diverted by the actions of that third vehicle, which he believed was trying to enter the left lane between Chase’s truck and Krynski’s Pontiac. A few seconds later, Chase realized that ahead of him Krynski had come to a complete stop. It is Chase’s deposition testimony that at that moment he was approximately one car-length behind Krynski, traveling at ten to fifteen miles per hour. Upon seeing Krynski at a full stop directly ahead, Chase braked but was unable to stop. At the time of impact, Chase claims that he was decelerating, аnd that when he actually struck Krynski, he had slowed to less than 5 miles per hour.
After the accident, a police officer at the scene issued Chase a traffic citation for driving too closely behind Krynski’s vehicle. Chase’s admission to the police officer that he was “too close” to Krynski’s vehicle is allegedly recorded in the accident report, which is annexed as part of the summary judgment record.
1
Chase did not
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court may grant summary judgment only “if the pleadings, dеpositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);
see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
Although “summary judgment is highly unusual in a negligence action, where the assessment of reasonableness generally is a factual question to be addressed by the jury,
King v. Crossland Sav. Bank,
DISCUSSION
Chase’s Liability
To avoid summary judgment, Chase highlights the discrepancy between his version of events and Krynski’s. Chase argues that because there are two starkly contrasting versions of the accident, there is necessarily a triable issue of material fact. This Court disagrees. The fact that opposing parties assert competing versions of the same event is not in itself sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
See Berk v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr.,
A. Presumption of Negligence in Cases Involving Slowing or Stopped Vehicles
“Under New York law, a rear-end collision establishes a prima facie case of liability against the rear vehicle and imposes a duty of explanation on the operatоr of that vehicle.”
See Hong v. Maher,
No. 02-CV-7825,
The presumption applies here, where Chase admits that in the midst of bumper to bumper traffic, he struck Krynski’s stationary vehicle. While the presumption of negligence is not limited to rear-end collisions with slowing or stationary vehiсles, it applies with particular force in these instances, see, 8B N.Y. Jur.2d
Automobiles and Other Veh.
§ 1214 (2009),
Collision between moving and parked or standing vehicle,
as motorists in heavy traffic must anticipate stopping or slowing by motorists ahead.
Harrington v. Kern,
1. Contributory Negligence
Chase claims that summary judgment must be precluded as there is a disputed fact on whether or not Krynski properly signaled so as to avoid a collision. This claim borders on the frivolous. Beyond rank speculation, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Krynski’s stop, if there was a stop, was abrupt, sudden, or otherwise unreasonable.
See Mascitti v. Greene,
2. Traffic Conditions
Chase attempts to create a disputed issue of fact by highlighting that the parties’ testified differently as to the speed of the traffic and of the collision.
4
In noting that speed is a disputed issue, Chase does not suggest that high speed led to circumstances beyond his control, nor can he, as it is his firm testimony that the accident was merely a low-speed fender tap. Accordingly, other than merely pointing out the obvious fact that the parties’ perceptions of the accident differ, Chase fails to set forth any facts from which the speed of the accident might create a material jury question affecting his liability. In other words, Chase’s attempt to create an issue of fact is unavailing because he fails to explain why the speed of the crash is material. Even if this Court were to discredit Chase’s own unequivocal testimony to find that the accident occurred at 50 to 75 mph, as Krynski alleges, Chase does not indicate how that fact might affect the outcome for summary judgment purposes. Negligence as a matter of law is not a bright-line rule and it certainly is not рrecluded merely because a defendant moves faster than 10 mph. Regardless of whether traffic was inching or breezing, speed alone does not absolve Chase of his obligation to maintain a safe distance under New York’s Vehicle and Traffic law, which applies regardless of
speed
or traffic conditions. N.Y. Veh. & Traff. Law § 1129(a);
see Sosa v. Rehmat,
3. Location of Accident
Chase further claims: “[t]here exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding which lane of travel the respective vehicles were traveling in at the time of the accident, thereby warranting denial of the instant motion.” It is not clear why Chase should avoid summary judgment merely because the parties dispute whether the accident occurred in the right lane, left lane, or the middle lane. The undisputed fact is that Chase and Krynski were traveling one behind the other in the same lane, and that Chase overtook Krynski’s vehicle, was unable to stop, and crashed. Accordingly, Chase has failed to articulate any theory as to why a dispute over the precise location of the accident is so material as to warrant denial of summary judgment.
4. Emergency Circumstances
Apart from merely highlighting factual discrepancies, Chase’s only purported negligence defense is that a potential lane-change by an unidentified third-party vehicle presented a sudden emergency. Under the circumstances presented here, the emergency doctrine defense is unavailing and does not raise a triable issue of fact.
The emergency doctrine “recognizes that when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration ... the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent.”
Rivera v. New York City Transit Auth.,
Chase argues that he was unduly distracted by the movements of a third vehicle. Chase admits that while observing that third vehicle, which he believed might cross into his lane, he took his eyes off the road. When, a few seconds later, he returned his attention ahead, the collision with Krynski’s Pontiac was unavoidable. The distraction, he claims, if demonstrable at trial, is sufficient to absolve him of negligence liability and must therefore preclude summary judgment on the issue of liability. This Court is not persuaded. The possibility that a car in an adjacent lane would try to enter Chase’s lane is not a sufficiently unforeseeable or unexpected event as to warrant invocation of the emergency doctrine.
5
See Goldstein v. United States,
Finally, Chase was ticketed for driving too closely to Krynski, a charge to which he voluntarily pled guilty by paying the $100 fine without objection; an action for whiсh he provides no explanation. In
Lohraseb v. Miranda,
Defendant pleaded guilty to failure to yield the right-of-way in connection with this accident. This guilty plea, as an admission that she committed the act charged, constituted some evidence of negligence (citations omitted). A defendant is generally given the opportunity to explain the circumstances surrounding a guilty plea to a traffiс infraction, such as the convenience of entering a plea rather than traveling [out-of-state] to contest the ticket, but defendant failed to offer any explanation for her plea in response to plaintiffs motion. Id. (citations omitted).
As Plaintiff here properly notes, “[i]t is incumbent upon a defendant who opposes a motion for summary judgment to assemble, lay bare and reveal his proofs, in order to show that the matters set up in his answer are real and are capable of being established upon a trial.”
Di Sabato v. Soffes,
B. Presumption of Negligence in Cases Involving Moving Vehicles
Chase’s sworn deposition testimony reflects his recollection that Krynski had come to a complete stop, and that the resulting rear-еnd collision occurred at a speed less than 5 mph. However, to highlight a purportedly material dispute of fact, and thereby avoid summary judgment, Chase would have this Court eschew that prior testimony in favor of Krynski’s contrary description of a high-speed accident. To do so, Chase argues, would remove the presumption of defendant’s negligence that generally applies to accidents involving slowing or stopped vehicles.
See, e.g., Dewar v. Padilla,
Chase’s claim that a presumption of negligence applies only in cases where the
Although, logically, the majority of rear-end collisions involve the slowing or stopping of the forward vehicle, speed is not the controlling issue. Regardless of whether the forward vehicle is stopped, slowing or proceeding apace, drivers following behind have a statutory duty to maintain a safe distance between their vehicles and vehicles in front of them, a duty that adheres regardless of the speed of traffic. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1129(a);
see Rebecchi v. Whitmore,
Finally, even were it not obvious that a moving vehicle is typically not struck from behind on an open roadway in the absence of negligence, the presumed, rebuttable application of
res ipsa loquitur
in such cases is made clear by reference to New York Jurisprudence 2d: Automobiles and Other Vehicles— § 1215 of which is entitled:
“Res Ipsa Loquitur
— Moving vehicles struck by following vehicle.” 8A N.Y. Jur.
Autos, and Other Vehs.
§ 1215;
see also
8 Am.Jur.
Autos
§ 842, “Collision with vehicle moving normally” (citing
Rose, supra); contrast with
8B N.Y. Jur.2d
Autos and Other Vehs.
§ 1214 (2009),
Collision between moving and parked or standing vehicle;
8 Am.Jur. § 839,
Collision with stopped vehicle.
Myriad, cases cited in New York Jurisprudence § 1215 stand for the general proposition, stated above, that defendants in rear-end collision actions have a duty to provide a non-negligent explanation for striking plaintiff drivers, and that in the absence of a non-negligent explanation negligence is presumed.
See, e.g., Flores v. Bueno,
Western Express’ Liability
Western Express is liable for damages resulting from Chase’s negligence pursuant to New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 аnd
respondeat supen-
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that no genuine issues of material fact exist as to Defendants’ liability. Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED. The case will go forward to trial on the issue of damages, including whether Plaintiffs injuries are sufficiently severe to permit any recovery at all for non-economic loss under New York Insurance Law § 5102(d). The case will be referred to the designated Magistrate Judge for a settlement conference.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Although Chase's alleged verbal on-scene admission it is not considered by this Court on summary judgment, as Chase's deposition testimony does not indicate that he ever made
. As the Court in
Hong
held, "[a] federal court sitting in diversity applies the law of the forum state and, in tort actions, New York courts generally apply the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred.”
. New York Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1129(a), states as follows:
The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.
. Chase's speed-based argument is two-fold: as a superficial matter, Chase simply argues that where the parties’ accounts differ as to the speed of the collision, there is necessarily a genuine issue of fact that precludes summary judgment. On that point, this Court disagrees for the reasons set forth above. Alternatively, Chase argues that New York's presumption of negligence does not apply to accidents occurring at speed, and that without that presumption summary judgment cannot be granted. Here too, Chase is incorrect; however, this latter argument is addressed more fully in section "B” of the Court's decision.
. Similarly, the fact that Krynski stopped, while in bumper-to-bumper traffic, is also not unexpected.
See Kowchefski v. Urbanowicz,
. While Chase’s decision to plead guilty and pay the New York traffic fine may be attributable to convenience (as he is an out-of-state resident), it is not for this Court to speculate аs to his motives or to otherwise provide Chase with possible defenses to adverse summary judgment. In any event, for the reasons set forth herein, liability in this case is amply supported on other independent bases, and does not turn exclusively upon inferences drawn from the fact of Chase’s guilty plea. All available and undisputed evidence thus suggests Chase's negligence liability.
. In
Berk,
the Court rejected the non-movant’s proposed hybrid approach, and instead credited his prior sworn testimony for summary judgment purposеs, stating, in relevant part: “The Court will also credit Berk’s [the nonmovant’s] own sworn deposition testimony setting forth his version of events to determine whether summary judgment would be appropriate. The Court finds pertinent support for this approach in a recent case from the Eleventh Circuit
[Evans v. Stephens, su
pra]. Confronted with a similar effort by a nonmoving party to manipulate the factual record for purposes of avoiding summary judgment, the Court rejected the “pick and choose” standard....”
Berk,
[W]e accept the nonmovant’s version of the events when reviewing a decision on summary judgment. When the nonmovant has testified to events, we do not (as urged by Plaintiffs' counsel) pick and choose from other witnesses' essentially incompatible accounts (in effect, declining to credit some of the nonmovant's own testimony) and then string together those portions of the record to form the story that we deem most helpful to the nonmovant. Instead, when conflicts arise between the facts evidenced by the parties, we credit the nonmoving party’s version. Our duty to read the record in the nonmovant’s favor stops short of not crediting the nonmovant's testimony in whole or part: the courts owe a nonmovant no duty to disbelieve his sworn testimony which he chooses to submit for use in the case to be decided.
Evans,