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Kryger v. Dokken
386 N.W.2d 481
S.D.
1986
Check Treatment

*1 application The criterion for of this rule

include be one of “those who expectably from the

reasonably and deviate upon the

highway abutting and enter land travel,” ordinary

in the course of and that land, entry upon abutting

there be an property. Re-

in this case the railroad’s Com-

statement

ment e. rule was application City

its Kimball 35, 41, Falls, Sioux We said: motor driven vehicle

When a becomes unmanageable, or gotten

defective or has driver,

out control of the or when of the recklessly,

such vehicle is driven or when becomes and an ac- driver brought which was not

cident results in the

about some defects such accident not an inci- highway, travel, happen

dent to result of use is classed as an unusual

highways, but occurrence, (citations extraordinary

omitted) opinion, the failure the driver

(Lancaster) keep roadway the bus on the extraordinary occur-

was an unusual expected

rence the railroad was not guard against. I would anticipate trial court on this issue.

also affirm the KRYGER, Plaintiff

Elmer C. Appellant, DOKKEN,

Sigrid P.

No. 15159 Briefs Feb.

Considered on *2 although she has resided prop- on the

erty for forty years. over While conceding Appellee was not Appellant al- leged three alternate theories recovery. granted The trial court a motion for sum- mary judgment in Appellee favor of based on pleadings, depositions and affidavits parties. of both Appellant argues Appellee that while knowledge or notice of the abandoned well under our governing statutes aban- wells, existing doned and 46-6, SDCL ch. she was obliged, owner, nevertheless as an danger know of the proper and to take safety measures. agree. We do not The abandoned well statutes are not applicable they specifically because address duty property plug owners to exist wells when are abandoned or for They purport feited. do not provide Kessler, Brookings, Jim standard of care owners who have no appellant. knowledge previously or notice of aban doned property. wells on their George Boos, Milbank, B. for defendant appellee. We next determine if SDCL 21-10-81 obligates successive owners to abate an FOSHEIM, Chief Justice. continuing unknown Appellant nuisance as wrong claims or whether the contemplated appeal is taken Plaintiff Elmer C. by that statute is the creation or continua- Kryger (Appellant) from an judg- order and tion of a nuisance which does not arise ment Sigrid entered in favor of Defendant solely ownership of the land. (Appellee). P. Dokken 21-10-1,2 As we read SDCL essentially undisputed. facts are On nuisance involves an unlawful act or omis Appellee June held a auc- perform sion to The owner of property tion on her person- for the sale of duty has no to correct or discon property. al She marked sunken areas on tinue a nuisance knowledge without of it. neighboring flags lots with red to avoid In Waggoner Development, v. Midwestern However, possible Appellant accidents. Inc., (1967), stepped through 10 to 12 inches of sod into said: an abandoned Appellee’s property. well on consequence,

As a injured he was with One cannot be said in manner to anticipated permanent disability. neglect some Ap- perform or refuse to un- pellee knowledge had no of the abandoned less he has or be (1) provides: Annoys, injures, endangers 1. SDCL § 21-10-8 or the com- fort, health, others; repose, Every or successive owner of who neglects continuing upon, decency; Offends abate a of, with, obstructs, property, or in Unlawfully the use created interferes or owner, obstruct, former is liable therefor in the same tends to or renders manner as the one who river, first created it. navigable bay, passage, any lake or canal, basin, stream, any public park, or or provides: 2. SDCL 21-10-1 street, square, highway; or unlawfully doing A nuisance consists in an persons any way inse- renders other act, omitting perform duty, or which act life, property. cure in or in the use of or omission either: [plaintiff] He an charged knowledge that an act invitee or business authority visitor. No citations of harm involves to anoth- required support of the well estab- er. principles lished (cites omitted). 62, 154 N.W.2d land owes invitee or business visitor Appellee had no exercising *3 the of reasonable or ordi- well, it cannot be said that she abandoned nary care for his and is for liable perform duty. to a While an act of failed This, however, duty. the breach of of may constitute a want possessor is the extent of the The care, it on a of care must be founded is to of land not an insurer as the safe person in wrongdoer to the owed the premises. It is neces- condition of the or to of which he is a member. jured a class sary pos- that that the it be established 229, 283 N.W.2d Hartung, Blumhardt v. presence sessor had of (S.D.1979). that We conclude the liabil 232 dangerous premises his the a of successive owners to abate continu ity or that condition existed for such a the expressed in SDCL 21-10-8 justify to period of time as the inference simply ownership of not arise from that he of its existence. 49 See 58 Am.Jur.2d Nuisance land. N.W.2d at 793. He further Id. 51 wrote: Appel of It is also the contention is when unsafe It the condition attend- necessary it to lant that was not establish dangers ant have observed are the was negligence because abandoned well possessor known to of land not the injured party which a who could not a person injured known to the that recov- therefore, and, ery permitted. the harm the owner is avoid a of responsible be as matter held 276, N.W.2d at 795. 51 danger” theory. Both law under a “hidden Norris, principal the that the rely Ashley v. cite and on Werth parties strictly is to of liable owner Co., (N.D.1972), in 899 Realty 199 N.W.2d owes them an invitees but rather the North Dakota affirmed. repeatedly of care has been view, perils. In our that hidden Modica, 514, 516 Stenholtz position Appellee the supports Cain, (S.D.1978); Underberg v. see also the the court held that defendant since (S.D.1984),and Mortenson 348 N.W.2d 145 the knowledge of defect. must have 444 We Braley, 349 N.W.2d a “reasonable discusses whether Werth recog now deviate from this decline adopted and the standard” should be owner rule. nized dropped as an distinction licensee/invitee judgment, we summary Upon review of principle. 907. We fail archaic Northern governed by Wilson v. Great Ap argument in for find comfort 19 Co., Railway however, rea since even under a pellant, (1968): standard, it cannot said owner be sonable most viewed must be evidence unreasonably. Appellee acted that non-moving party; favorable to ultimately rests on Appellant’s position proof upon the movant The burden of is ac liability theory, or self-insurer strict no clearly genuine that is show there necessitate of which would commodation fact and that issue material law; whereby becomes liable rule an owner matter of judgment entitled to proper onto he invites the his is to (3) Though purpose when of the rule would pecuniary gain. inexpensive Such rule ty speedy for just, secure action, for it never writing Roberts contradict determination for a substitute Chicago, used as a Milwau intended to be this Court Norris v. by jury where Co., trial court trial or kee, Railroad St. Paul and Pacific fact exists. of material any genuine issue (1952): S.D. (4)A party surmise that a prevail dangerous bors a condition. springs Law upon trial is grant not sufficient basis to reasoning. Reasoning springs from a the motion on issues which are not right sense of what is wrong. sham, shown to be frivolous or so unsub- It is not reasonable for an owner or stantial it be obvious it would be possessor of land to somebody invite onto try futile to Summary judg- escape liability, when, all ment is remedy an extreme and should but for a inspection, reasonable he could be awarded when the truth is clear discover a condition thereby touching reasonable doubts the exist- injury avoid Again, an invitee. as I did genuine ence of a issue as to material 349 N.W.2d at I cite fact should be resolved the mov- (1965): (6) Where, however, ant. genuine is- A of land is subject to liabili- sue of fact exists it is looked ty physical harm caused to his invi- *4 favor and is particularly adaptable to ex- if, tees a condition on the land but pose sham claims and defenses. if, (footnotes (a) knows or the exercise of reason- omitted). being There no material issues able care condition, would discover the fact, the trial court properly awarded a and should realize that it involves an summary judgment unreasonable risk of harm to such invi- tees, and (b) expect WUEST, JJ„ HERTZ, MORGAN and discover or danger, realize the or will Circuit acting protect it, fail to against themselves Justice, concur. HENDERSON, J., specially. concurs (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to SABERS, J., having been a member protect them danger. of the Court at the time this action was Court, submitted to the participate. did not

HENDERSON, (concurring spe- Justice

cially). case,

To understand this the reader must

appreciate majority minority opin-

ions in Mortenson Braley, Dakota, STATE of South Plaintiff footpad rubber anti-skid Appellee, missing from the ladder. It could reasonably inspected. Here,

have been however, there was a foot of covering dirt BAWDON, Jesse Harold the well and it could not have Appellant. inspected. Therefore, been I concur No. 14829. Court, hue to but thought my content in dissent in Morten son, 349 N.W.2d at 446. Stenholtz v. Mo Argued Sept. dica, (S.D.1978), should be expanded I dissent in Certainly,

Mortenson. it is reasonable that reasonably inspect owner of land should when he invites the

public onto his land to do business with so, Especially is this where he har-

Case Details

Case Name: Kryger v. Dokken
Court Name: South Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 16, 1986
Citation: 386 N.W.2d 481
Docket Number: 15159
Court Abbreviation: S.D.
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