6 Nev. 163 | Nev. | 1870
By the Court,
Respondent being the duly elected assessor for Storey County, appointed the appellant Hauck his deputy by a writing as follows :
“ Know all men by these presents that I, the undersigned, Assessor of the County of Storey, State of Nevada, do hereby appoint Louis A. Hauck, of Gold Hill, county and State aforesaid, Deputy Assessor for the purpose of assisting me in assessing Gold Hill District in said county. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the fifth day of April, A. D. 1867.
A. M. Khuttschnitt, Assessor of Storey County.”
This appointment, with the accompanying oath of office, was duly recorded as by statute provided (Stats. 1864,143). On the day after the appointment, Hauck as principal, and his co-defendants as sureties, gave a bond for the faithful performance of his duties during his continuance in office. He continuously performed the duties of the office until the expiration of the term of his principal.
On the ninth of May, 1868, respondent made the following writing:
“ Know all men by these presents that I, A. M. Kruttschnitt, Assessor of Storey County, State of Nevada, have appointed Louis*166 A. Hauck a Deputy Assessor for the purpose of assisting me in assessing tbe property in the following district, to wit: Gold Hill District. Witness my hand this ninth day of May, A. D. 1868.
A. M. KRUTTSCHNiTT, Assessor Storey County, Nev.”
Which, with the accompanying oath of Hauck, was duly recorded.
This suit is brought to recover certain moneys, of which Hauck was in default, which defalcation occurred after the date last named.
Respondent recovered in the District Court, and this appeal is taken from such judgment, upon the assumption that the sureties are responsible only for any breach occurring before the date last aforesaid, it being contended that the writing of that date inaugurated a new term of office, to which the bond given had no reference.
If the premise be correct, the conclusion claimed by appellants follows, although the language of the bond is general; as such may be limited and restricted by the recital, by the subject or by facts, which, when applied to the language used, show that it must have been so understood by the parties. And to this effect are the authorities cited by counsel for appellant.
But as is said by Shaw, C. J. in Amherst Bank v. Root et al., 2 Met. 540: “ The cases where it has been held that the generality of the words of an obligation may be restrained and modified, are of two classes; first, where there is a preamble or recital, stating directly or by implication the intent and purpose of the parties to the bond; or secondly, where it is a stipulation for fidelity in office, and it appears by the nature and condition of the office that it was limited to a particular time.”
This case comes within neither of the exceptions noted. The assessor had the power to appoint deputies, limited only by the statutory provision that before such appointment he should “ divide the county into convenient districts, of which division notice shall be given to the board of county commissioners.” This was done before the first appointment, and the only reason for the second appointment seems to have been that he was directed by the commissioners to re-district the county, and upon so doing, made what is called the re-appointment of Hauck.
The judgment herein is correct, and is affirmed.
