249 Pa. 162 | Pa. | 1915
Opinion by
This was an action in trespass to recover damages for physical injuries to a boy employed in the defendant’s coal breaker. The declaration did not allege in terms any violation of the Act of May 1, 1909, P. L. 375, “To provide for the health and safety of minors in......coal ......breakers’?; but it set forth several special grounds of negligence, arid particularly averred that the injuries complained of resulted from the defendant’s “violation” of “duties” and “regulations prescribed by the laws of the Commonwealth for the safety of laborers and employees,” further, that Edward Krutlies was born March 12,1895, and that, when employed by, and injured in the service of, the defendant company, he was a minor under the age of sixteen years. The jury first rendered a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff; then, when directed “to report specially” upon what branch of the case they based their finding, a special verdict was returned in these words: “We, the jury.......find and specially report that our verdict in this case is based upon and founded upon the fact that the plaintiff was undér six
The defendant originally took the minor plaintiff into its service in the summer of 1909, on a certificate obtained by him in the winter of 1905, when only a little over eight years old, to the effect that he was then fourteen ; in the latter part of 1910, the legislature having previously passed the Act of 1909, supra, prescribing that no child under fourteen should be employed in a coal breaker and none under sixteen should be so engaged without a special age certificate, the defendant laid off the plaintiff and other boys in its service, requesting each of them to procure the certificate required by this statute; thereupon, the minor plaintiff forthwith secured and produced to the defendant a paper signed by one George Howell, superintendent of the public schools of Scranton, which stated, ^Edward Krutlies was sixteen years old November 13,1909, and, therefore, may work without an employment certificate.” When this document was presented, the defendant again took the plaintiff into its service, and put him to work oiling machinery, at which duty he was engaged when injured on May 18, 1910. From the dates and ages already stated, it appears that, as a matter of fact, this boy was less than fourteen at the time he was last taken into the defendant's employ, and when injured; but, since the declaration averred a date of birth which made him then more than fifteen, and also alleged that the defendant was negligent in ordering “a minor under the age of sixteen years” to do the work at which he was engaged at the time of the accident, the trial court treated the case as though it was conclusively conceded the lad was over fourteen, and left it to the jury to decide whether or not he was above the age of sixteen. There was evidence sufficient to sustain the finding that he was under the latter age; but the material points urged by the appellant are: (1) That recovery was allowed on a ground not specifically averred in the state
This case was tried once before and a nonsuit entered, which was subsequently removed. Prior to the first trial, the plaintiff asked leave to amend his statement, so that the statute on which he relied might be made specifically to appear, but this was denied. At the next trial, however, the court below ruled that the statement was sufficient to sustain a recovery grounded on the employment of a minor under the age of sixteen in violation of the Act of 1909, supra. The appellant does not contend that it was taken by surprise when this ground was advanced at the trial, and, under the circumstances, there could have been no actual surprise in that respect; but it does contend that there were no allegata sufficient to sustain the verdict. It would have been better practice for the plaintiff, in the first instance, to have averred the specific violation of the Act of 1909, supra, upon which he subsequently recovered; but we are not convinced of the insufficiency of the statement filed to support the verdict rendered. When the employment of a minor is shown to be illegal because forbidden by a statute like the Act of 1909, supra, that, in itself, is sufficient evidence of the defendant’s negligence, and, if the injury complained of occurred in the course of the plaintiff’s service under such unlawful employment, that is enough to show a causal connection, and the law will refer the injury to the original wrong as its proximate cause: Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Machine Co., 225 Pa. 348; Syneszewski v. Schmidt, 153 Mich. 438. The statement of claim plainly informed the defendant that the plain
We still have to determine the question: Did the defendant show a sufficient compliance with the Act of 1909, supra? This act, after providing that no minor
The question of the sufficiency of the excuse offered by the defendant, namely, that the minor plaintiff deceived it concerning his age, remains to be considered. In several states the courts of appeal have held that, even though a child deceives his employer as to his age, such minor can recover for injuries growing out of his unlawful employment: see Hrabchak v. Del. & Hudson Co., 54 Pa. Superior Ct. 626, 632; Kirkham v. Wheeler-Osgood Co., 39 Wash. 415, 424; American Car & Foundry Co. v. Armentraut, 214 Ill. 509, 514; Syneszewski v. Schmidt, 153 Mich. 438, 445; Braasch v. Michigan Stove Co., 153 Mich. 652, 655; but, in Koester v. Rochester Candy Works, 194 N. Y. 92, where an infant under sixteen made a false declaration concerning his age, it was ruled that it was for the jury to determine whether the defendant was justified in relying upon the minor’s statement, or should in the “exercise of reasonable prudence and caution, before actually hiring the plaintiff, have made further inquiry and received further assurance and proof” of his age. Thus it may be seen that the courts of states having statutes regulating the employment of minors have taken two views upon the subject before us: (1) That one who employs minors, when sued for an injury to such a worker, must justify the legality of the employment by proving the plaintiff within a permitted age and that he, the defendant, had complied with all the statutory requirements in relation to the employment of persons of the age in question; further, if the law contains no provision by which the employer may protect himself, through certificates or other means, then he takes such workers into his service at his own risk, so far as their age is concerned, and a false statement by the employee in regard thereto will in no sense bar a recovery for a subsequent injury. (2) That one who em
The assignments are all overruled and the judgment is affirmed.