Bonnie M. KRUSE, Appellant, v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF LAMONI COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Lamoni Community School District, Appellees.
No. 56487.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
July 31, 1975.
Barnes, Schlegel & Walter, Ottumwa, for appellees.
MASON, Justice.
This appeal by plaintiff Bonnie M. Kruse, a teacher in the Lamoni Community School District, presents the question whether the procedure employed by defendants, the school district and the Board of Directors of the district, in moving to terminate plaintiff‘s teaching contract constituted sufficient compliance with the statutory requirements so as to effectively and validly terminate the continued employment of Mrs. Kruse and bar an action by her for breach of contract based upon her discharge.
Plaintiff had instituted an equitable action in the Decatur district court alleging hеr teaching contract had been improperly terminated by defendants and asked that the termination be declared null and void and defendants be compelled to specifically perform the teaching contract, including all obligations and benefits derived thereunder. Plaintiff further asked payment of all benefits accruing under the provisions of her contract.
After defendants’ answer was filed but before trial the parties jointly requested the court to adjudicate certain law points based upon stipulated facts. Rule 105, Rules of Civil Procedure. The court in its ruling dismissed plaintiff‘s petition at her cost. This appeal stems from that ruling.
February 19, 1970, however, plaintiff received by certified mail a letter dated February 18 and entitled: “NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF TEACHER‘S CONTINUING CONTRACT.” (Exhibit C). The letter informed Mrs. Kruse her continuing teaching contract for the year 1969-1970 had been terminated effective as of the close of the 1970 school year pursuant to a majority vote of the school district Board of Directors. The notice also informed plaintiff it was in conformity with
February 26 plaintiff wrote the school board protesting the termination and requested a private hearing thereon. It was further stated plaintiff had not received any communications regarding thе “incidents and reasons” for the school board‘s decision, and such was requested to be furnished plaintiff in writing.
March 19 plaintiff received a letter dated March 18 from Superintendent of Lamoni Schools, L. C. Johnson, concerning the fact the school board would grant plaintiff a private hearing as well as present her with a written statement of the specific reasons for the termination. This hearing took place before the school board March 23. Plaintiff appeared with her attorney, L. P. Van Werden of Osceola. The written statement, however, was not provided as promised.
Prior to the hearing, plaintiff received a letter datеd March 21 from Mrs. Hazel Sprague, school district secretary, requesting that a written resignation be filed. The correspondence also provided it took precedence over the “Notice of Consideration of Continuing Contract” sent plaintiff February 18. In reality, this must have been in reference to the notice of termination of the same date, previously referred to.
At any rate, March 26 plaintiff received an unsigned letter from “The Lamoni Community School District Board of Education” stating: “Two years of employment in the Lamoni Public School System have not indicated the ability to provide course content or maintain acadеmic environment conducive to learning experiences. Said teacher declared to be wanting in adequate strength, capacity, and qualifications to fulfill the job of Social Studies Teacher.” (Exhibit G).
At this, plaintiff‘s attorney wrote Secretary Sprague April 13 protesting the termination and requesting a public hearing relative thereto with at least fifteen days prior notice. April 27, such hearing was held. Plaintiff and her attorney as well as four members of the school board were present. With plaintiff‘s consent further action on the contract termination was delayed until May 4.
May 5 Mrs. Sprague wrote plaintiff the school board had, by roll call vоte, sustained its earlier actions terminating the teaching contract. Decatur County Superintendent of Schools sustained the school board‘s actions July 24, whereupon plaintiff appealed to the State Board of Public Instruction which declined to hear the appeal on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff then filed her petition in the Decatur district court, as previously mentioned.
The foregoing facts are without dispute. They are disclosed in the stipulation of the parties which appears in the appendix.
The trial court dismissed plaintiff‘s petition with costs after finding: “A school district may discharge a teacher for cause (
“Said contract shall remain in force and effect for the period stated in the contract and thereafter shall be automatically continued in force and effect for equivalent periods * * * until terminated as hereinafter provided * * *. [T]he board may by a majority vote of the elected membership of the board, cause said contract to be terminated by written notification of termination, by a certified letter mailed to the teacher not later than the tenth day of April; provided, however, that at least ten days prior to mailing of any notice of termination the board or its agent shall inform the teacher in writing that (1) the board is considering termination of said contract and that (2) the teacher shall have the right to а private conference with the board if the teacher files a request therefor with the president or secretary of the board within five days; and if within five days after receipt by the teacher of such written information the teacher files with the president or secretary of the board a written request for a conference and a written statement of specific reasons for considering termination, the board shall, before any notice of termination is mailed, give the teacher written notice of the time and place of such conference and at the request of the teacher, a written statement of specific reasons for considering termination, and shall hold a private conference between the board and teacher and his representative if the teacher appears at such time and place. * * * In event of such termination, it shall take effect at the close of the school year in which the contract is terminated * * *. The term ‘teacher’ as used in this section shall include all certified school employees, including superintendents.”
By its enactment of the foregoing statute the legislature prescribed the procedural steps to be pursued by the Board of Directors when considering termination of a teaching contract.
Discharge for cause at any time during the school year is covered by
“Discharge of teacher. The board may, by a majority vote, discharge any teacher for incompetency, inattention to duty, partiality, or any good cause, after a full and fair investigation made at a meeting of the board held for that purpose, at which the teacher shall be permitted to be present and make defense, allowing him a reasonable time therefor.”
I. In seeking reversal plaintiff contends: (1) the school board‘s attempted termination of her contract was null and void by
Plaintiff argues the question is compliance with
Plaintiff argues she was denied due process of law when the school board “* * * failed to provide her with the statutorily required list of termination reasons prior to the private Heаring and prior to the Board purportedly taking final termination action on Plaintiff‘s teaching contract.” She contends a teaching contract is a property interest protected by due process.
Defendants, on the other hand, argue although
Defendants deny plaintiff‘s due process rights were trampled or that the trial court erred in dismissing the suit.
II. We consider first defendants’ contention since plaintiff was ultimately afforded a hearing and an opportunity to protect her interest any defect in the procedural steps taken by the board in tеrminating plaintiff‘s contract was waived. Defendants thus seek to support the trial court‘s ruling entered May 2, 1973, which provided: “* * * When the teacher meets with the Board and participates in a meeting where the complaints before the Board are considered, want of notice or defect of notice is not material. * * * [citing authority]. This Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the statute.”
A somewhat similar contention was urged by the board in Barrett v. Eastern Iowa Community College District, 221 N.W.2d 781 (Iowa 1974). In the cited case plaintiff-teacher in seeking reversal contended the board had failed to comply with the provisions of
It is apparent strict adherence to the statutory dictates of
For reasons undisclosed, plaintiff received the March 23 letter from the school board secretary requesting she tender a written resignation and stating it took precedence over the February 19 notice of consideration of continuing contract. In any event, the record discloses no notice of termination was sent after plaintiff‘s private hearing with the school board.
This court has recently stated: “* * * A board considering termination has the responsibility of timely informing the teacher in writing of that fact and of the teacher‘s right to a private conference on request. By following the statutory procedure, the teacher may then have the conference and also a written statement of the board‘s reasons.” (Emphasis supplied). Flanders v. Waterloo Community School District, 217 N.W.2d 579, 583 (Iowa 1974).
“* * * We think, too, that the requirement to inform is a prerequisite to terminating a contract, at least in the absence of circumstances which are not present here. The legislature placed this requirement in the law for a purpose. * * * [citing authority].” Flanders, 217 N.W.2d at 582.
The Flanders court spoke in fairly strict terms. Defendants, however, cite several cases in support of their argument substantial compliance is sufficient. These cases all deal with
This court has recently declined to adopt a substantial compliance test as to
“* * *
“In any event there is no reason to suppose the rule should be applied to
It is our conclusion since strict compliance with the time specifications of
Other jurisdictions which have considered the problems arising under their particular statutes from prоcedures employed by school boards in seeking termination of teaching contracts have expressed similar views. See Zeller v. Prior Lake Pub. Schools, Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 719, 259 Minn. 487, 108 N.W.2d 602, 605, 89 A.L.R.2d 1012; Henley v. Fingal Public School District # 54, 219 N.W.2d 106, 110 (N.D.1974); Pollock v. McKenzie County Public School Dist. # 1, 221 N.W.2d 521, 525 (N.D.1974), and Wagner v. Little Rock School District, 373 F.Supp. 876, 882 (E.D.Ark.W.D.1973).
We recognize, in this connection, there may be circumstances where strict compliance is not required by reason of the teacher‘s activity. See Flanders v. Waterloo Community School District, 217 N.W.2d at 582-583. The record discloses no such circumstances here.
Strict adherence to the statutory dictates of
“The Notice of Termination of Teaching Contract” of February 18 was not one of a contemplated course of action by the school board but rather it was one of final decision not to renew Mrs. Kruse‘s teaching contract. At the hearing later afforded plaintiff the board made no change of the termination action unanimously voted at the February 17 meeting of the board which was without plaintiff‘s knowledge. The statute requires the furnishing of written notice that the board is considering termination of the contract at least ten days before termination.
The list of reasons for termination ultimately received by Mrs. Kruse was not furnished her prior to the private hearing. It must be conceded this procedure did not afford plaintiff the benefits contemplated by the statute in the preparation of her defense and did not constitute strict compliance with the statute.
Mrs. Kruse was entitled to know the reasons relied upon by the board in considering the termination of her contract and to have a fair opportunity to defend against such charges. After all, the statute requires the decision to terminate the contract be rendered only after the procedural steps have been satisfied. The board‘s failure to furnish a list of reasons as required by
Defendants argue plaintiff‘s writing of the letter of February 26, her employment of counsel, her protest of April 13 and attendance at the April 27 meeting constituted a waiver of any defects in the рrocedural requirements set forth in
The board in the present case in effect gave no notice it was contemplating
Plaintiff in written argument asserts she was not given notice of the actual termination of her teaching contract subsequent to receipt of the letter requesting her resignation and prior to the statutory deadline of April 10 for mailing notice of termination of contracts to teachers. Defendants challenge this assertion as an attempt to present an issue not properly preserved for review. See Erb v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction, 216 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 1974). It is unnecessary to decide whether the issue was properly preserved since plaintiff‘s contention in this respect has been given no consideration in arriving at our determination she had not waived the defects in the procedure employed by defendants in seeking to terminate her contract.
III. At another point in written argument defendants contend even though this court should determine strict compliance with
It is undisputed the board at all times purported to act under
In Ramey v. Des Moines Area Community College, 216 N.W.2d at 346, the contract under consideration before the court contained a provision that the contract was subject to the provisions of
In our view defendants cannot, after the fact, attempt to show their actions were not invalid because of substantial compliance with
We hold defendants’ attempted termination of plaintiff‘s teaching contract was null and void.
IV. It is deemed necessary to consider plaintiff‘s contention defendants’ attempted termination of her teaching contract was null and void in another respeсt set out earlier. In this connection she maintains she was denied constitutional due process of law guaranteed under the state and federal constitutions when defendants failed to provide her with the statutorily required list of termination reasons prior to the private hearing and prior to the board purportedly taking final termination action on her teaching contract.
In other words, plaintiff insists she was deprived of liberty or property without due process of law by defendants’ failure to furnish her a written statement of specific reasons for considering termination of her teaching contract prior to the teacher‘s private hearing with the school board. She cites and relies on Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, as support for her position.
As stated, after receiving the February 18 “Notice of Termination of Teacher‘s Continuing Contract” plaintiff, while protesting the board‘s action, filed а written request for a private hearing and a written statement of specific reasons for the board‘s decision to terminate her contract. The private hearing was held March 23 but the written statement of reasons as requested was not received until March 26.
The portion of
This provision of the statute demands that upon the teacher‘s request the board must give the teacher a written statement of specific reasons for terminating the teaching contract. This court now determines that the legislative purpose of this requirement is to afford the teacher an opportunity to successfully argue his dismissal was arbitrary and capricious if he can prove that each of the stated reasons underlying his dismissal is trivial, is wholly unsupported by a basis in fact, or is unrelated to thе educational process or to working relationships with the educational institute or his contemplated dismissal is based upon any impermissible constitutional reasons, such as race, religion, or the assertion of rights guaranteed by law or the constitution. As tending to support this statement of principle in whole or in part see Erb v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction, 216 N.W.2d at 342-344 and Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375, 377 (8 Cir. 1973).
To achieve this legislative purpose of this provision of the statute we construe it as requiring that a school board considering termination of a teaching contract must (1) give the teacher notice in writing of the time and place of the conference with the board considering termination of the contract, (2) at the request of the teacher furnish a written statement of the specific reasons for considering termination prior to the time of the conference, and (3) hold the private conference.
The written statement of the specific reasons for termination was not furnished Mrs. Kruse until March 26 following the private conference of March 23. Such procedure was not in strict compliance with
Plaintiff also maintains defendants’ failure tо furnish the written statement of specific reasons prior to the private conference violated her federal constitutional rights. In this connection Scheelhaase, 488 F.2d at 240 and Courter, 378 F.Supp. at 1193, in dealing with the federal constitutional question recognize that under Iowa law public teachers do not enjoy tenure, rather they are hired on a year-to-year basis. Courter interprets Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d
In the concurrence of Chief Justice Burger in Sindermann and Roth, referred to earlier, the Chief Justice points out that the central point in both decisions “is that the relationship between a state institution and one of its teachers is еssentially a matter of state concern and state law.” Iowa has by enactment of
Since defendants did not strictly comply with the requirements of
The case is therefore
Reversed and remanded.
MOORE, C. J., and RAWLINGS, REES, HARRIS and McCORMICK, JJ., concur.
UHLENHOPP and LeGRAND, JJ., concur specially.
REYNOLDSON, J., takes no part.
UHLENHOPP, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the result and in all of the court‘s opinion except the sentence in division IV that the purpose of
Two matters are involved here: a teacher‘s right to a hearing before the board votes not to renew his contract, and a board‘s right not to renew a contract. Quite a few of the decisions in this area deal with the first matter—whether procedural due process required a hearing under the facts of the particular case. We do not have that problem in Iowa, as
The first paragraph of
A special situation exists when a board does not renew the contract because of the teacher‘s having exercised a constitutional or statutory right—such as his right of free speech. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570. The rationale of this principle is that “if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.” Id. at 597, 92 S.Ct. at 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d at 577. Thus nonrenewal predicated on a teacher‘s having exercised a constitutional or statutory right cannot stand. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231. But teachers do not have a constitutional right to tenure, or a nonconstitutional right to it either in the absence of a statute giving it to them. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548. We have no such statute. Compare opinion of district court in Scheelhaase v. Central Community School Dist., 349 F.Supp. 988 (N.D.Iowa) (granting damages to an Iowa teacher on ground nonrenewal was “arbitrary and capricious“), with opinion of court of appeals in same case, 488 F.2d 237 (8 Cir.) (reversing the judgment).
I therefore do not concur in the sentence in question in the court‘s opinion in the present case.
LeGRAND, J., joins in this special concurrence.