This is a consolidated appeal from judgments rendered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Scheindlin, J., in connection with two lawsuits, Allen v. West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 90 Civ. 3841 (S.D.N.Y.), and Krumme v. West Point-Pepperell, 89 Civ. 2016 (S.D.N.Y.). At the heart of this appeal is a dispute among the parties over a pension plan committee’s authority to adopt actuarial assumptions in connection with calculating an accelerated lump sum payment of future accrued retirement benefits. Due to their factual complexity and the numerous legal issues arising in these bitterly contested lawsuits, our discussion of the factual background is extensive.
BACKGROUND
Consolidated on appeal are judgments from two lawsuits, Allen and Krumme. In Allen, the plaintiffs are nine former senior executives of Cluett, Peabody & Company (Cluett).
The sole defendant in Krumme is West-Point. The Allen plaintiffs brought suit against WestPoint and D. Michael Roark, C.
1. The EPI Amendment
In 1975, Cluett established an employee benefit program for its senior executives, the Executive Permanent Insurance Program (EPI Program). Among other things, the EPI Program provided deferred compensation benefits to its participants. Upon reaching age 65, EPI Program participants would receive lifetime monthly payments equal to, on an annual basis, 30% of the participants’ final base salary. Krumme and each of the Allen plaintiffs agreed to participate in the EPI Program.
On October 24, 1988, a wholly owned subsidiary of Farley, Inc. (Farley) initiated a tender offer for all outstanding shares of WestPoint common stock. By November 21, 1988, Farley controlled 35.17% of that stock. Threatened with a hostile takeover, West-Point sought to protect the retirement benefits of EPI Program participants. See Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell,
2. Calculating the Actuarial Equivalent
EPI Amendment § 4A.(l)(e) established the basis for computing the “Actuarial Equivalent” of accrued retirement benefits. It states, in pertinent part:
For the purpose of establishing whether a benefit is the Actuarial Equivalent of another benefit the actuarial assumptions contained in Cluett’s Employee Retirement Plan [“Cluett Plan”] shall be employed for so long as that Plan remains in existence and if such Plan is no longer in existence, the actuarial assumptions last used by such Plan shall be used.
EPI Amendment § 4A.(l)(c) (emphasis added). Section 1.3 of the Cluett Plan sets forth the actuarial assumptions incorporated by section 4A.(l)(c). In November 1988, at the time the EPI Amendment was offered to EPI Program participants, section 1.3 provided:
“Actuarial Equivalent” means an amount of equal value when computed on the basis of interest, mortality and other tables as ■ shall be adopted from time to time by the [Cluett Pension Plan] Committee on the*75 advice of the Actuary, the current factors being as specified below:
1. Mortality Table The 1978 GAM Table (which is the 1971 Group Annuity Mortality Table projected to 1978 with Scale E). An average of male and female rates will be used.
2. Interest rate 5% per annum, compounded annually.
3. Other factors None.
Cluett Plan § 1.3 (first emphasis added).
Within a few weeks after the EPI Amendment was offered, all of the plaintiffs in Krumme and Allen agreed to the terms of the EPI Amendment and opted to receive a single lump sum payment upon a change in control. Krumme, in returning his executed EPI Amendment to WestPoint, appended a cover letter dated December 9, 1988. It stated, in pertinent part: “Finally; I understand that the discount rate applicable under the Cluett Employee Retirement Plan is 5% and that would be the basis on ivhich our benefits ivould be calculated under this change of control payout ” (emphasis added). We now discuss the specific factual events underlying the disputes in Allen and Krum-me.
3. The Error Discovered in the EPI Amendment
In early February 1989, WestPoint discovered a drafting ezror in the EPI Amendment. Section 4A.(l)(c) mistakenly had incorporated the actuarial assumptions contained in the Cluett Plan, and in particular a 5% discount rate that was well below? market rate. See Allen I,
On February 16, 1989, TPF & C recommended that the Cluett Plan’s discount rate be changed from a fixed 5% rate to a floating rate calculated at 120% of the PBGC immediate interest rate, yielding, at all relevant times, a 9.3% discount rate (hereinafter “9.3% discount rate”). Accordingly, the Cluett Committee, on that same day, adopted TPF & C’s recommendation and formally recorded this action in its minutes. At no relevant time, however, did the Cluett Board, which ceased to exist in January 1989, or the WestPoint Board of Directors ever vote to amend the actuarial assumptions in the Cluett Plan to reflect this change in the discount rate to 9.3%.
4. The February 22, 1989 Releases
WestPoint, upon adopting the 9.3% discount rate for the Cluett Plan, became concerned that some of the EPI Program participants had executed the EPI Amendment with the expectation that their lump sum benefits would be calculated at a 5% rate. See Allen I,
There has apparently been some confusion as to the method of calculation to be employed in determining the lump sum benefit under the [amended EPI Program]. Some participants have told us that they were led to believe that a 5% discount rate would be used to determine lump sum values. This is incorrect.
The letter continued that “[t]he formula under the Cluett Employee Retirement Plan which is referenced in the [EPI Amendment] calls for converting monthly annuities to lump sum amounts” with the 9.3% discount rate that had “been adopted for all plans of WestPoint Pepperell and its subsidiaries which provide for lump sum payouts upon a change in control.” The February 22, 1989 Letter requested that the EPI Program participants execute an appended election form in which they could either choose to execute a release of WestPoint and remain eligible to receive a lump sum payout at a 9.3% discount rate or rescind their agreement to the EPI Amendment. The letter also provided that, in the event of a change in control, no lump sum payment of the accrued deferred compensation would be made until the election form was returned. All of the Allen plaintiffs executed the release.
On February 23, 1989, WestPoint announced that it had entered into a definitive merger agreement with Farley. On April 5, 1989, Farley purchased approximately 95% of WestPoint’s stock in connection with its tender offer. Deeming that a change in control had occurred on April 5, WestPoint on that same day sent to each of the Allen plaintiffs a check for an amount representing the lump sum payment of their accrued retirement benefits, calculated at a 9.3% rate. The letter accompanying the lump sum payout check stated that “[b]y cashing this check you acknowledge that [WestPoint’s] obligation to make informal [EPI] payments has been fully satisfied” (hereinafter “April 5, 1989 Letter”). The Allen plaintiffs cashed their checks without protest. Krumme, who had not executed the release, did not receive a lump sum check.
5. Pleadings and Pre-Trial Motions
On March 24, 1989, Krumme filed a complaint against WestPoint. He alleged that a change in control occurred on February 23, 1989 when WestPoint entered into a definitive merger agreement with Farley. Furthermore, he claimed that (1) WestPoint breached its contractual obligation under the EPI Amendment to distribute his lump sum payment calculated at a 5% rate and to reimburse him for his legal expenses incurred in connection with his dispute with WestPoint, and (2) because Krumme executed the EPI Amendment in reliance on WestPoint’s representations that 5% would be the rate at which the lump sum would be calculated, WestPoint should be estopped from asserting that the discount rate was 9.3%.
In Krumme, WestPoint moved on October 2, 1989 for partial summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that no contract had been formed between Krumme and West-Point in connection with the EPI Amendment. Specifically, WestPoint argued that Krumme’s December 9, 1988 cover letter accompanying his executed EPI Amendment contained additional terms at variance with WestPoint’s offer, thereby converting Krum-me’s acceptance into a rejection and counteroffer. In that December 9 letter, Krumme stated, “Finally, I understand that the discount rate applicable under the Cluett Employee Retirement Plan is 5% and that would be the basis on which our benefits would be calculated under this change of control payout” (emphasis added). WestPoint asserted that by virtue of Krumme’s use of the term “would be,” Krumme conditioned his acceptance of the EPI Amendment on the inclusion of the additional term that the 5% discount rate would be the exclusive rate at which his lump sum payment would be calculated, notwithstanding that the Cluett Plan and EPI Amendment clearly contemplated that the discount rate was subject to change.
Krumme filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on November 15, 1989. On April 19, 1990, the district court, Conboy, /., in an unpublished order, granted partial summary judgment in favor of Krumme on the limited issue that Krumme and West-Point had.entered into a binding contract with respect to the EPI Amendment. The district court concluded that “the [December 9] letter set out the parties’ understanding of how the provisions of the [EPI] Amendment would have been implemented had the ‘Change in Control’ occurred at the moment of the execution of the Amendment.”
The Allen plaintiffs filed their action on June 6,1990. Unbeknownst to defendants at the time, each of the Allen plaintiffs, by May 1990, had signed agreements with Krumme retaining him as their counsel. See Allen I,
In connection with these allegations, the Allen plaintiffs brought several claims against defendants WestPoint, Roark and Dorsett, alleging that (1) WestPoint breached its contractual obligation to pay their lump sum benefits calculated at a 5% rate and to reimburse them for their costs and attorney’s fees; (2) defendants breached their fiduciary duty to act with due care and without self-dealing when they secretly increased the discount rate to increase WestPoint’s value in contemplation of a buyout bid; (3) defendants committed fraud in connection with the February 22 and April 5, 1989 Letters by misrepresenting and omitting material information concerning the terms of the EPI Amendment;
On August 3, 1990, the defendants in Allen moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that as a matter of law, the Allen plaintiffs had released defendants from liability for all of their claims. On January 25, 1991, the district court, Con-boy, /., dismissed the complaint in its entirety. On September 11,1991, we reversed and remanded for further proceedings. See Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell,
6. Bench Trial on Four Issues
The parties in both Allen and Krumme tried four issues to the district court: (1) the date of the change in control; (2) -whether the' Allen plaintiffs were entitled to have their releases rescinded on the basis of mutual mistake; (3) whether WestPoint, under the EPI Amendment, was obligated to reimburse Krumme and the Allen plaintiffs for their costs and attorney’s fees incurred in connection with investigating and litigating their disputes with WestPoint; and (4) whether the February 22 and April 5, 1989 Letters misrepresented material information and failed to disclose material information concerning the terms of the EPI Amendment.
On January 3, 1996 the district court issued a joint opinion in both Allen and Krum-me, concluding that the change in control of WestPoint to Farley had occurred on April 5, 1989. See Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell,
On the issue of rescission, on May 15,1996, the district court declined to rescind the Allen plaintiffs’ releases on the basis of mutual mistake. See Allen I,
In that same May 13, 1996 opinion, the district court concluded that the Allen plaintiffs and Krumme were entitled to recover their costs and attorney’s fees under the EPI Amendment. See Allen I,
In Krumme, the district court, on October 22, 1996, deferred the computation of the costs and attorney’s fees payable to Krumme until after appeal. Similarly, on February 27, 1997, the district court deferred the computation of the attorney’s fees and costs payable to the Allen plaintiffs until after an appeal. On May 2, 1997, the district1 court certified to us, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the question whether parties may appeal a nonfinal decision to award attorney’s fees and costs before their amounts have been assessed.
Finally, on the question of misrepresentation, the district court on January 28, 1997 rejected the Allen plaintiffs’ three common law claims for constructive fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent omission. See Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell,
In Krumme, on February 20, 1996, West-Point moved for leave to amend its answer to add an affirmative defense of estoppel on the grounds that Krumme, as Cluett’s General Counsel, had supervised Cluett’s 1983 amendment to section 1.3 of the Cluett Plan and had represented to WestPoint in 1985 that the Cluett Plan was in compliance with ERISA. WestPoint argued therefore that Krumme should be estopped from arguing that the Cluett Committee’s authority to adopt new actuarial assumptions under section 1.3 violated ERISA. WestPoint also sought to add counterclaims (1) to rescind the EPI Amendment as the incorporation of the Cluett Plan’s 5% discount rate was a mistake; (2) to reform the EPI Amendment to incorporate the actuarial assumptions contained in WestPoint’s Employee Retirement Plan instead of Cluett’s Plan; (3) for legal
On May 15, 1996, the district court denied WestPoint’s motion to amend. The district court concluded that “the proposed amendments are based on facts known to Defendant since 1989.” See Krumme v. West Point-Pepperell,
On February 11, 1997, judgment was .entered for Krumme in the amount of $535,-206.76, the total of Krumme’s lump sum payment calculated at a 5% rate plus contractual prejudgment interest. Krumme also was awarded costs and attorney’s fees from WestPoint in an amount that was to be determined after appeal. In Allen, judgment on the merits on all claims in the complaint was rendered in favor of the defendants on February 27, 1997.
WestPoint filed timely notices of appeal in Krumme and Allen on March 12, 1997 and March 24, 1997, respectively. The Allen plaintiffs filed notice of cross-appeal on March 27, 1997. By Order dated April 17, 1997, we consolidated the Allen and Krumme appeals.
7. Arguments Raised on Appeal
With respect to the judgment in Allen, WestPoint appeals from the district court’s conclusion that 5% represented the governing rate at which to calculate the Allen plaintiffs’ lump sums. See Allen II,
With respect to the judgment in Krumme, WestPoint argues that (1) the parties in Krumme never entered into a binding contract in connection with the EPI Amendment; (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying WestPoint’s motion for leave to amend its answer; and (3) Krumme was not entitled to be reimbursed by WestPoint for his attorney’s fees and costs.
On appeal, the Allen plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in concluding (1) that they failed to establish the requisite element of their common law fraud claims and, in particular, that they had not been harmed by the adoption of the 9.3% rate; and (2) that they were not entitled to have their releases rescinded on the basis of mutual mistake. In connection with the fraud and rescission claims, the Allen plaintiffs challenge the district court’s factual findings that (a) the incorporation of the Cluett Plan’s 5% discount rate in the EPI Amendment was a mistake; (b) that the Cluett Committee adopted the 9.3% discount rate to correct this “mistake;” and (c) that the enforcement of the 5% discount rate would result in an undeserved windfall for the Allen plaintiffs.
As discussed below, we conclude that the Cluett Committee effectively adopted a 9.3% discount rate on February 16, 1989, that the EPI Amendment incorporated this 9.3% rate, and that the Allen plaintiffs’ lump sum payments were calculated properly at a 9.3% rate. Because the Allen plaintiffs’ rescission and fraud claims both were predicated on the theory that 5% represented the proper discount rate at which to calculate their lump
DISCUSSION
We have jurisdiction to review the merits of the judgments in Allen and Krumme before the district court has resolved the issue of attorney’s fees and costs. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,
1. Contract Formation Between Krumme and WestPoint
WestPoint appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Krumme on the issue of contract formation. Specifically, WestPoint argues that Krumme conditioned his acceptance of the EPI Amendment on the inclusion of an additional term that the 5% discount rate would be the exclusive rate at which his lump sum payment would be calculated, notwithstanding that the EPI Amendment and the Cluett Plan clearly contemplated that the discount rate was subject to change.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, see Sayers v. Rochester Tel. Corp. Supplemental Mgmt. Pension Plan,
Under New York law, an acceptance “must comply with the terms of the offer and be clear, unambiguous and unequivocal.” King v. King,
We conclude as a matter of law that Krum-me unconditionally accepted WestPoint’s offer. Krumme executed the EPI Amendment without modification. Furthermore, even assuming that Krumme’s cover letter can be read as expressing an additional term that the 5% discount rate was not subject to change, nothing in Krumme’s cover letter suggests that he conditioned his acceptance on this request or “understanding” of his agreement with WestPoint. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Krumme.
2. Change to the Discount Rate
WestPoint argues that the district court erred in concluding that the Cluett Committee had no authority under ERISA to amend the discount rate and that the discount rate incorporated into the EPI Amendment remained 5% at all relevant times. See Allen II,
Under ERISA, an employee benefit plan is required to be “established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument,” 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1), and to “specify the basis on which payments are made ... from the plan.” Id. at (b)(4); see Rinard v. Eastern Co.,
In considering whether, under ERISA, the Cluett Committee’s authority to adopt new
The court, considering the merits of the plaintiffs’ argument did not reach the issue of whether the actuarial assumptions were part of the pension plan, but held that, in any event, a change to the discount rate was not an “amendment;” American Airlines simply had acted pursuant to its authority to change actuarial assumptions from “time to time.” Id. at 1451; see id. at 1452 (“[W]e are unwilling to contort the plain meaning of ‘amendment’ so that it includes the valid exercise of a provision which [is] already firmly ensconced in the pension document.”); accord Oster v. Barco of California Employees’ Retirement Plan,
We disagree with the Allen plaintiffs argument that, in light of Revenue Ruling 79-90, Dooley is bad law. Rather, the court purposefully fashioned a “commonsensical rule of law” that applied regardless of this Ruling. Further, we follow Dooley’s “commonsensical rule of law” and conclude that the Cluett Committee, under Cluett Plan § 1.3, adopted a 9.3% discount rate under ERISA without amending the Cluett Plan’s terms. Dooley,
We address and quickly dispose of Krumme’s and the Allen plaintiffs’ remaining arguments. First, Revenue Ruling 79-90 expresses no requirement that new actuarial assumptions be adopted exclusively pursuant to a plan’s formal amendment procedures. See Rev. Rui. 79-90, 1979 —
Finally, to support their argument that the discount rate was never changed and remained 5% at all relevant times, the plaintiffs contend that (1) on April 24, 1989, Ms. Virginia Mansfield received a lump sum payout under the Cluett Plan calculated at a 5% rate; (2) Bidermann’s actuary, The Wyatt Company, employed a 5% rate to calculate benefits due to former Cluett employees under the Cluett Plan; and (3) although Cluett Plan participants, under 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1), were entitled to receive notice of a material modification to the Cluett Plan, they never were notified of the new 9.3% rate, see 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1). Even accepting the truth of these allegations, however, they do not support the plaintiffs’ argument. We already have concluded as a matter of law that the Cluett Committee, on February 16, 1989, validly adopted the 9.3% discount rate. Any subsequent payments using an erroneous rate would not-change that conclusion.
3. Attorney’s Fees
WestPoint urges us to review the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs to the plaintiffs although the amount of those fees and costs have not yet been set. WestPoint argues that by doing so, we may conserve scarce judicial resources. The plaintiffs’ attorneys in both Allen and Krum-me have accumulated immense fees and costs over the lengthy course of these lawsuits and disputes are certain to arise as to the proper amount of fees and costs to which they are entitled. According to WestPoint, if we were to determine expeditiously that the district court’s award of fees and costs to plaintiffs was error, we would prevent the needless expenditure of judicial resources. WestPoint contends that we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or, alternatively, under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction.
Under section 1291, we review final decisions of the district court that “leave) ] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States,
Under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction, however, “once we have taken jurisdiction over one issue in a case, we may, in our discretion, consider otherwise nonappealable issues in the case as well, where there is sufficient overlap in the factors relevant to the appealable and nonap-pealable issues to war-rant our exercising plenary authority over the appeal.” San Filippo v. U.S. Trust Co. of New York,
Although we are cognizant of the serious practical considerations supporting West-Point’s argument, we adhere to our prior holdings that we have no jurisdiction, under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, to review a grant of attorney’s fees and costs until the amount of fees and costs have been set.. See Pridgen,
4. Denial of Leave to Amend
WestPoint appeals from the district court’s denial of WestPoint’s motion for leave to amend its answer in Krumme. West-Point, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), moved to amend its answer to assert counterclaims against Krumme for, among other things, legal malpractice and breach of contract on the grounds that Krumme had solicited clients adverse to WestPoint on matters substantially related to Krumme’s work for Cluett.
Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, ,the proposed amendments are based on facts known to Defendant since 1989. Defendant has offered no adequate excuse for its delay in seeking to amend its answer. Moreover, it is readily apparent that the proposed amendments would require a new wave of discovery and would substantially delay the resolution of this action.
Krumme,
A decision to grant or deny a motion to amend is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Foman v. Davis,
Without considering the merits of West-Point’s proposed counterclaims, we affirm the district court’s order denying the motion to amend. WestPoint knew of Krumme’s retainer agreement with the Allen plaintiffs since March 1993. As Krumme’s case was near resolution and discovery had been completed, the district court acted well within its discretion in concluding that WestPoint’s new counterclaims would prejudice Krumme.
CONCLUSION
In Allen, we affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of defendants WestPoint, Dorsett and Roark. Because we conclude that the 9.3% PBGC-based rate was the proper rate at which to calculate the Allen plaintiffs’ lump sums, we need not review the district court’s decision with respect to the Allen plaintiffs’ rescission and misrepresentation claims.
In Krumme, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Krumme on the issue of contract formation between Krumme and WestPoint and the district court’s denial of WestPoint’s motion for leave to amend. With respect to Krumme’s breach of contract claim, we conclude that West-Point is entitled to summary judgment to the extent that it argues that the 9.3% PBGC-based rate was the proper rate at which to compute the lump sum payments for EPI Amendment participants on April 5, 1989. We vacate the district court’s judgment on the merits in Krumme and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In both Allen and Krumme, we conclude that we have no jurisdiction to review the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs until the amount of those fees and costs have been set. We remand for the calculation of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees and costs in Allen and Krumme.
Notes
. The plaintiffs in Allen are Gordon E. Allen, John Currier, James J. Dunne, Leo Fornero, Gerard P. Mandry, Norman K. Matheson, Bruce E. Moore, Nicholas Pallotta and Cochran B. Sup-plee (hereinafter the "Allen plaintiffs”).
. A "Change in Control” occurred if, among other things, "any individual, corporation, ... or other person ... is or becomes the Beneficial Owner of Securities of WestPoint representing twenty percent (20%) or more of the combined voting power of Westpoint's then outstanding securities." EPI Amendment § 4A.(l)(g).
. Section 16 of the EPI Amendment provided, in pertinent part, that
[i]f at any time upon or after a Change of Control there should arise any dispute as to the validity, interpretation or application of any term of condition of [the EPI Program], ... Cluett agrees, upon written demand by [a participant], ... to pay ... the [participant's] costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees ... incurred by the [participant] in connection with any dispute or litigation, regardless of whether the [participant] is the prevailing party, involving any provision of [the EPI Program], EPI Amendment § 16.
. The above-quoted actuarial assumptions in section 1.3 were added to the Cluett Plan on November 22, 1983 by Cluett’s Board of Directors. The Cluett Board amended section 1.3 and specified the actuarial assumptions to comply with Revenue Ruling 79-90. See Rev. Rui. 79-90, 1979 —
. Section 11.1 provides, in pertinent part:
The Board of Directors reserves the right at any time, and from time to time, to modify or amend in whole or in part any or all of the provisions of the [Cluett] Plan, but no such amendment shall substantially change the rights to benefits which, prior to such amendment, have become fixed or matured by retire- . ment, termination or death.
Cluett Plan § 11.1. Under section 9.1, the Cluett Board "haLd] the sole authority to ... amend or terminate, in whole or in part, the [Cluett] Plan.”
. Section 9.6 states, in pertinent part, that the Cluett Committee has
the exclusive right to interpret the Plan and to decide any matters arising thereunder in connection with the administration of the Plan.... Its decisions and the records of the Committee shall be conclusive and binding upon the Company, Participants, and all other persons having any interest under the Plan.
The Committee shall adopt from time to time actuarial tables to be used as the basis for all actuarial calculations and shall determine from time to time the percentum rate or rates of interest to be used as the basis for calculations required in connection with the Plan. As an aid to the Committee, the Actuary appointed by the Committee shall make annual actuarial valuations of the assets and liabilities of the Plan and shall certify to the Committee the tables and rate or rates of interest which he would recommend for use by the Committee.
Cluett Plan § 9.6 (emphasis added).
. The release stated, in pertinent part:
I understand that the lump sum payment of the actuarial equivalent of my deferred compensation benefit will be in full satisfaction of all obligations of West Point-Pepperell, Inc., as successor to Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc., under the terms of my Deferred Compensation Agreement, and that in accepting a lump sum payment I shall thereby release West Point-Peppe-rell, Inc., its directors, officers, employees, and agents, and its successors and assigns, from all obligations under the Agreement.
. The complaint also included a third claim for gross negligence and deceit on the theory that if the discount rate had in fact been 9.3% when Krumme executed the EPI Amendment, West-Point had engaged in gross negligence and deceit by informing Krumme that the EPI Amendment incorporated a 5% discount rate. Krumme has abandoned this claim as the discount rate was indeed 5% at the time he executed the EPI Amendment.
. It is unclear from the record the date on which defendants first learned of Krummc’s agreements with the Allen plaintiffs. The record indicates, however, that defendants knew of Krumme's agreement with the Allen plaintiffs at least as early as March 3, 1993, when Kruramc testified in his deposition.
. The Allen plaintiffs alleged that defendants’ misrepresentations included, inter alia, statements that (a) the discount rate was 9.3% when in fact the proper discount rate was 5%; (b) the change in control had occurred on April 5, 1989 when in fact, a change in control had occurred as early as November 21, 1988; (c) the Allen plaintiffs were "confused" and mistaken in their belief that a 5% discount rate had been incorporated into the EPI Amendment.
Furthermore the Allen plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to disclose, among other things, that (a) the discount rate had been increased to 9.3% on February 16, 1989; and (b) the discount rate had been increased in an attempt to increase the attractiveness of WestPoint to a buyout group.
. Specifically, the district court asked:
May the parties take an immediate appeal where the District Court has found that one party has a contractual right to attorneys’ fees and expenses, where all other issues going to the merits of the case have been resolved, and where all that remains for decision is the amount of such fees and expenses?
. This opinion was later amended and reissued on February 11, 1997 to correct two minor textual errors. Inexplicably, it appears that only the pre-amended, January 28 opinion has been published in the Federal Supplement. We amend the two errors here (the page references are to Allen III,
(1) on page 692, second column, sixteen lines down from the top of the page, the sentence is amended to read, "(5) that plaintiffs had the option of challenging....,”
(2) on page 697, first column, nine lines down from the subsection V, Attorneys’ Fees, the sentence beginning with "Defendants have announced their intention .... ” is amended to read, "Defendant WestPoint has announced its intention to challenge this Court’s determination that it must pay plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees.”
. The Allen plaintiffs do not appeal the judgment in favor of defendants on their claims for breach of fiduciary duty and violation of New York labor law. We therefore deem these claims abandoned.
. WestPoint also argues that in the event we determine that the Cluett Committee had no authority under ERISA to adopt a new discount rate for the Cluett Plan, the Cluett Committee’s action was voidable, not void ab initi''-, and
. For example, on April 24, 1989, WestPoint used a 5% discount rate in connection with calculating a lump sum payment for a retiring employee, Virginia Mansfield. This payment, unlike the one the Allen plaintiffs each received, was distributed pursuant to Ms. Mansfield’s retirement under the Cluett Plan, not a change in control under the EPI Amendment.
In addition, after Cluett was sold to Bider-mann Industries in 1990, TFP & C was replaced with a new actuary, The Wyatt Company, whose dutif included the calculation of benefits due to Cluett employees under the Cluett Plan. Donald Parsons, Jr. of Wyatt, stated in an affidavit that as of January 1993 the discount rate contained in section 1.3 of the Cluett Plan was 5%.
Furthermore, the Allen plaintiffs argue that if the discount rate in fact had been increased from 5% to 9.3%, they were entitled to, but never received, notice from WestPoint. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (summary of a material modification to terms of plan must be furnished to plan participants no later than 210 days after the end of the plan year in which the modification is executed).
. WestPoint also argues that the district court in Krumme wrongfully gave collateral estoppel effect to its conclusion in Allen II that the Cluett Committee had no authority under ERISA to change the discount rate and that it remained 5%. Because we conclude that the Committee had authority to adopt the 9.3% rate and vacate the district court's judgment in Krumme, we do not reach or consider this argument.
. We reject WestPoint’s arguments that (1) because the Allen plaintiffs pleaded no ERISA law claim in the complaint, they arc barred from pursuing a claim or remedy under ERISA; and (2) that because benefits due under a "top hat” plan (the EPI Program) are at issue, ERISA law is irrelevant to determine the Cluett Committee's authority to adopt actuarial factors. We adopt the district court’s reasoning. See Allen II,
We also reject WcstPoint’s argument that, in light of the Cluett Committee’s broad powers to interpret the Cluett Plan under section 9.6, the Cluett Committee’s action is to be accorded deference. See Algie v. RCA Global Communications, 60 F.3d 956, 960 (2d Cir.1995) (affirming district court’s conclusion that deference was not due to plan administrator on issue of whether severance plan was validly terminated under 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3)).
. The holdings in Alday and Coleman are not to the contrary. Those cases do not stand for the proposition that any change to the terms of a pension plan is valid only if effected pursuant to a plan's amendment procedures. In neither of those cases did the courts consider whether a specified plan term could be validly modified pursuant to an express plan provision that authorized changes by a process other than plan amendment.
. Plaintiffs offer the legal opinions of two actuaries, Steven Harrold and F. Thomas Senior, as support for its argument that Revenue Ruling 79-90 requires actuarial assumptions to be adopted pursuant to a plan’s amendment procedures. We find these opinions unpersuasive.
. In light of our conclusion that the Cluett Committee had authority under ERISA to adopt new actuarial assumptions, we need not consider WestPoint's motion for leave to amend with re-spcct to its proposed estoppel defense and counterclaims for rescission and reformation of the EPI Amendment.