OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a manufacturer of metal-frame stacking chairs, alleges that defendant, a competitor, has “slavishly copied” its chair design and thereby infringed its trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 1 The plaintiff, Krueger International, Inc. (“KI”), moves for a preliminary injunction against the defendant, Nightingale Inc. (“NI”), on the grounds that the KI design is distinctive and that NI’s design is confusingly similar. KI seeks to enjoin NI from advertising, manufacturing or selling copies of the KI chair. For the reasons discussed below, KI’s motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The parties to this action are established manufacturers of office and industrial furniture. KI, founded in 1941, is headquartered in Green Bay, Wisconsin. NI is a Canadian corporation established in 1928. Both companies produce numerous lines of chairs for commercial use. At issue here is KI’s Matrix 2 chair, which competes in the “high density” stacking chair market. High density chairs are strong, lightweight chairs, capable of being stacked up to 40 units high. The stacking feature of the chairs makes them easy to transport and efficient to store. The chairs are sold in large volume, often through a competitive bidding process, to convention centers, school systems and other institutions that must accommodate crowds.- There is no direct retail market for the chairs, although some of these chairs are sold to furniture dealers.
The Matrix chair was introduced in 1976, received a design patent in 1978, and quickly became KI’s single most successful product. 3 At least 10 other designs currently compete in this market. 4 Although the Matrix design patent expired in 1991, no competitor has attempted to produce an exact copy of the Matrix chair until the NI chair.
This Court held oral argument on January 17,1996, at which the parties produced specimens of their own chairs as well as those of two competitors. The defendant’s chair, called the Beetle 300, is a virtual carbon copy of the Matrix chair. The other competing designs are visually distinguishable. Although they all have a thin metal frame made of chrome-covered steel, and a seat and back made of molded plastic, the Matrix and Beetle chairs share three other features which KI claims as trade dress. One feature is a pair of Z-shaped metal rods that zig-zag in and out, connecting the seat and the back. (Competitors use straight connecting rods between the seat and back.) The second feature is the shape of the seat, which has an unusually deep “dip,” and the third is the shape of the back, which suggests a trapezoid.
Defendant NI frankly acknowledges that it copied the Matrix chair down to the last detail, and states that it did so because KI’s design patent had expired and because NI *599 needed to clone the Matrix chair in order to meet government specifications in a competitive bidding process. The bids had been solicited by a government-owned corporation, Unicor, which buys chair components from private manufacturers and sends them to federal prisons, where inmates assemble them. Unicor then sells the completed chairs to federal government agencies. Until July 1994, KI was the fortunate holder of the Unicor contract. When the contract expired, Unicor began advertising for new bids. Included in the bid specifications was a technical drawing of the Matrix chair. Because much of the subsequent story turns on what KI knew about defendant’s response to those specifications, and when, it is appropriate to set out the facts of the bid process in some detail.
At a pre-bid conference organized by Uni-cor in December, 1994, Gregory Wallis, a Unicor executive, opened the meeting by addressing Unieor’s general concerns, including the following:
One issue that we typically are concerned about is if there is any kind of patent or proprietary rights for the products that we are buying. We have had some history with that and we want to be made aware of that up front if there is anything that we would not be allowed to either produce ourselves or purchase elsewhere and combine unth maybe your component parts, something of that nature. If there is any kind of restrictive rights under the products that we will be buying, we need to know that up front.
(Tr. of Unicor Pre-Bid Conf. at 13-14 (emphasis added).) Later in the same meeting, another Unicor spokesman, Michael Campa-nale, answered five written questions from prospective bidders. Two of the five questions concerned the Matrix chair and its prominent place in Unicor’s specifications.
Q: The RFP [Request for Proposal] indicates that all offerors will be evaluated per the minimum specification requirements. Yet many of the [technical requirements] are either proprietary or highly restrictive. Are we to propose what we have that we believe is best for Unicor or are we to force our products to meet Krueger Manufacturing methods and specifications? To do so will cause higher costs for us and a significant competitive advantage to Krueger.
A: All of the indicated specifications and requirements are not intended to be restrictive. This is exactly why we developed it as an RFP, Request for Proposal, and not simply as a bid package. All samples will be considered that fall within a competitive range of pricing and technical factors....
Q: Section C [of the Request] is obviously a set of specifications for the Krueger Matrix ... chair. Are these considered hard specifications or can a product which does not meet these exact specifications, but is an equal or even superior product, be proposed and awarded?
A: [Y]es. All proposals which indicate equal or even superior specifications will be considered.
(Id. at 20-21, 23.) Campanale explained that the specifications were meant to ensure quality and to maintain “a general consistency with the hundreds of thousands of high density stacking chairs” (i.e., Matrix chairs) that Unicor had already sold to federal agencies. “There is also a need to consider the customer’s concern and possible preference to be able to have chairs which meet, reasonably match in the areas of color, stackability, style, quality and performance.” (Id. at 24-25.) Two employees of KI attended this conference.
In March 1995, Unicor awarded the contract to NI, having ranked KI’s bid third, below competitor CPSI. The contract is worth at least $7.7 million over five years.
Unicor immediately asked NI to provide a prototype of the Beetle chair to allow Unicor to verify that the Beetle and Matrix chairs would “stack” interchangeably. (Campanale Decl. at 2.) Within a few days, a prototype arrived at the Unicor office. The chair was a patched-together affair: NI had made the metal frame, but had cannibalized the seat and back sections from a Matrix chair. As NI states in its motion papers, “[t]he prototype included Nightingale’s own frame, but *600 because we had not yet tooled the back and seat, we inserted a Matrix back and seat into the prototype, for purposes of the prototype only.” (Breen Decl. at 5.) Significantly, the NI frame featured two Z-shaped rods connecting the seat and back. The Matrix components fit on this frame perfectly.
A few days later, KI Vice President Daniel Schütz visited Unicor and saw the Beetle prototype. (Schütz Aff. at 1.) Schütz was sufficiently alarmed to protest to Campanale, a Unicor executive, that “it appeared to be a KI chair.” (Campanale Decl. at 2.) Campa-nale said that the chair was only a prototype and that NI would soon be making its own parts for the seat and back. (Id.)
On March 30, 1995, KI filed a formal protest with the Government Accounting Office (the “GAO”), challenging the contract award to NI. The essence of KI’s protest was that Unicor had improperly favored NI in the bidding process by waiving certain requirements for NI but not for other bidders, and had given more weight to price considerations than the specifications had indicated. KI also protested the fact that Nightingale had submitted a prototype using KI parts.
KI’s protest effected an immediate stay of the contract and Unicor directed NI to stop production until further notice. In the meantime, NI began preparing photographs of the Beetle chair for promotional purposes. In May 1995, as part of the bid protest process, NI sent an updated copy of its entire chair product line to the GAO and to KI’s attorney. (Kunzi Decl. at 1.) Included was a photograph of the Beetle chair. Although a KI lawyer knew what the Beetle chair looked like as of May 1995, the lawyer maintains that this photograph was subject to a GAO protective order, which barred attorneys from disclosing competitive information to their clients during the bid protest process. NI’s lawyer disagrees, contending that a publicity brochure does not constitute competitive information subject to the protective order.
WhoUy apart from the bid protest, however, NI soon began sending new product cata-logues to its representatives and dealers. (Breen Decl. at 6.) These catalogues also contained photographs of the Beetle chair. In June, a shipment of catalogues arrived at Unicor, where Campanale placed them on a table. Sometime thereafter, Schütz, the same KI executive who had seen the Beetle prototype and had expressed concern, visited Campanale. This time Schütz looked through the catalogue, “noticed the photographs of the Beetle chair,” and took a copy with him. (Campanale Decl. at 2.)
In July 1995, although the bid protest was still pending, Unicor instructed NI to begin immediate performance on the contract “in the best interests of the Government.” In September, Unicor notified both the GAO and KI’s attorney that NI had begun production. In October, the GAO dismissed KI’s bid protest because Unicor had agreed to reopen bidding on technical considerations. Between September and December, 1995, Nightingale shipped enough chair parts to Unicor to produce 10,000 Beetle chairs. Its contract, however, is still subject to termination if its product samples fail Unicor testing. (Ralston Decl. at 3.)
In November 1995, Nightingale displayed the Beetle chair at trade shows in New York City and Toronto. It was at these trade shows, the first on November 2 and the second on November 17, KI asserts, that it first saw the Beetle chair. Not until December 7, 1995, however, did an investigator for KI attempt to find a Beetle chair and not until about December 11, 1995, was KI’s Canadian counsel successful in securing a chair. (Jaraczewski Aff. at 6; Jameson Aff. at 1-2.) KI filed a Complaint in this action on December 19, 1995, and requested a preliminary injunction two days later.
DISCUSSION
I. Merits of the LanhamAct Claim
A. Inherent Distinctiveness.
This case presents one of the most difficult analytical issues in all of trade dress law: how to determine whether a product design is “inherently distinctive.” The issue is particularly pressing and unresolved in this circuit, whose rule for trade dress protection was upended three and a half years ago by the Supreme Court in
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,
The general rules of trade dress protection had been long established. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protected the “trade dress” of a product, which is defined as the product’s “total image,” including “features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, [or] graphics.”
LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.,
The classic test for determining the distinctiveness of a trademark was outlined in
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,
But as many courts have observed in varying degrees of frustration, the
Abercrombie
classifications do not translate easily to the trade dress context. The problem is not severe when the trade dress involves product packages and labels, which, like trademarks, at least have the advantage of using words and symbols independent of the product to convey information to consumers.
See, e.g., Paddington,
In
Knitwaves,
this circuit announced a departure from its earlier approach to trade dress law.
Knitwaves
involved the design of children’s sweaters, particularly the use of “leaf’ and “squirrel” designs placed on the sweaters. The court stated (1) that the
Abercrombie
classifications “make little sense when applied to product features” and were therefore “inapplicable” to product designs, and (2) that henceforth the new test for inherent distinctiveness is whether the manufacturer “used” or “intended to use” the de
*602
sign “to identify the source and distinguish his or her goods.”
Knitwaves
at 1006-09 (citations omitted). In adopting this approach, the court cited approvingly to the Third Circuit decision in
Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd.,
Further, I believe that Knitwaves’s new test for inherent distinctiveness confuses the analytical requirements for inherent distinctiveness with those of secondary meaning. Inherent distinctiveness cannot hinge on how a producer intends to promote a design. If such were the case, the evidentiary requirements for inherent distinctiveness would be almost identical to those for secondary meaning, and there would be no point in having two categories. A producer could only prove “intent” by producing evidence of how he or she has advertised (or positioned) the product, and by producing consumer surveys showing how well the advertising worked. This is precisely the kind of evidence required for a showing of secondary meaning.
See Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,
In fashioning its “intent” requirement, the
Knitwaves
court relied on dicta from the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.,
— U.S.-,-,
Knitwaves,
however, does provide some guidance for a workable approach to inherent distinctiveness, particularly when read in conjunction with efforts by other courts. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits offer particularly useful instruction. The Fifth Circuit’s
Chevron
test, first developed for product packaging, states that “[i]f the features of the trade dress sought to be protected are arbitrary and serve no function either to describe the product or assist in its effective packaging,” the dress is inherently distinctive.
Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc.,
The Eighth Circuit also emphasizes the issue of functionality, asking:
whether, and how much, the trade dress is dictated by the nature of the product.... If the specific design of the trade dress is only tenuously connected with the nature of the product, then it is inherently distinctive .... If the design of the trade dress is dictated by the nature of the product, then secondary meaning must be proven.
Stuart Hall,
A third test based on the Abercrombie classifications was developed 19 years ago by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals:
In determining whether a design is arbitrary or distinctive this court has looked to whether it was a ‘common’ basic shape or design, whether it was unique or unusual in a particular field, [or] whether it was a mere refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods view by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods.
Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd.,
The
Seabrook
approach is fully consistent with the case law in the Second Circuit. Before
Two Pesos,
the question of market context generally arose in light of the so-called functionality defense.
E.g., Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co.,
Before applying these principles to the instant case, it is appropriate to address some common misconceptions about the interplay of patent law and trade dress law. The plaintiff in this case contends that because the Matrix chair has received a design patent, this patent constitutes proof of inherent distinctiveness. The defendant argues just the opposite: that KI is unlawfully seeking to extend its expired patent monopoly, and that patented designs can never claim the protection of trade dress law. Both arguments are incorrect. A design patent is analytically distinct from a protectable trade dress, and industrial products may qualify for both kinds of protection without violating the policy goals of either patent or trade dress law.
See, e.g., Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc.,
[Trademark rights ... do not “extend” the patent monopoly. They exist independently of it, under different law and for different reasons. The termination of either has no legal effect on the continuance of the other. When the patent monopoly ends, it ends. The trademark rights do not extend it.
In re Mogen David Wine Corp.,
It is also important to note that the requirements for a design patent are distinct from those for a trade dress. A design patent (unlike a utility patent) is granted for a product’s non-functional, ornamental features. It is appropriate only for industrial design, and one of its purposes is to promote progress in the “decorative arts.” 1 McCarthy § 6.03[5]. To qualify for a design patent, the features must be new, non-obvious and ornamental. 1
Id.
They need not be inher
*605
ently distinctive. As the Supreme Court has stated, “To qualify for protection, a design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is not dictated by function alone, and must satisfy the other criteria of patentability.”
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
When a design patent expires, the design becomes copyable. It may not, however, be copied in such a way that customers are deceived about what they are buying. “Federal trademark laws, independent in origin from design patent law, have the dual purpose of protecting both the trademark owner and the public from confusion, mistake and deception.”
In re Mogen David Wine Corp.,
The existence of a design patent, however, is relevant to the functionality defense. Because a design patent is granted only for non-functional designs, it can serve as evidence that a plaintiffs trade dress is not functional.
See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc.,
The functionality doctrine was articulated by the Supreme Court in
Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories,
the degree of functionality of the similar features, the degree of similarity between non-functional (ornamental) features of the competing products, and the feasibility of alternative arrangements of functional features that would not impair the utility of the product. These factors should be considered along a continuum. On one end, unique arrangements of purely functional features constitute a functional design. On the other end, distinctive and arbitrary arrangements of predominantly ornamental features that do not hinder potential competitors from entering the same market with differently dressed versions of the product are non-functional and hence eligible for trade dress protection. In between, the ease for protection weakens the more clearly the arrangement of allegedly distinctive features serves the purpose of the product ..., especially where the competitor copying such features has taken some significant steps to differentiate its product.
Stormy Clime,
The problem, of course, is that a design feature may be both functional and pleasing. (Indeed, many industrial designs combine these two elements.) This has led the courts into a hopeless tangle about the difference between aesthetics and functionality. Some courts developed a doctrine of “aesthetic functionality” that was both unnecessary and illogical. If a pleasing design helped to sell a product, so the theory went, its aesthetic appeal became an “essential” competitive quality that could not in fairness be denied to others. Thus the doctrine of “aesthetic functionality” denied trade dress protection to design features whose only sin was to delight the senses. In 1990, however, the Second Circuit substantially redefined this doctrine and injected a welcome dose of sanity to the discussion.
Wallace,
The approach in
Knitwaves,
however, seems to be a step backward from
Wallace
because it revives a false dichotomy between aesthetics and source identification.
Knit-waves
seems to instruct that a design can serve only one primary purpose: either aesthetic or source-identifying, but not both.
Knitwaves
at 1008-09 (no protection because plaintiffs “objective in the two sweater designs was primarily aesthetic,” and therefore “the designs were not primarily intended as source identification”). This approach is neither helpful nor logical. In the instant case, it would force me to determine whether the plaintiff chose its chair design because it was attractive or because it was meant to serve as a trademark (i.e., a source identifier). The likely answer is, both. Moreover, this plaintiff never had to choose between the two objectives because the design was patented and could not be copied. In more general terms, every producer hopes to create a design that is more pleasing than not and that that design will be associated with it. Every producer hopes that it and its trade dress will be remembered because its design is pleasing, not because it is ugly.
See Rogers,
Applying these - principles to the facts before me, I conclude that plaintiff KI has a protectable trade dress in the overall look of its Matrix chair. Although each of the individual design elements serves both functional and aesthetic purposes, it is the overall look that I must consider.
Milstein,
Turning to the issue of functionality, defendant argues that the Matrix chair design is functional because only a clone of the Matrix chair will “interstack” perfectly with it. I disagree. As defendant should be well aware, the argument of perfect compatibility has not been embraced in this circuit for many years, and it was explicitly rejected in
Wallace,
To determine whether the design features at issue are functional, I must ask whether their shape is “dictated by the functions to be performed.” Warner
Bros.,
I conclude, however, that KI may not claim a trade dress in each of its design features individually. The shape of its seat, in particular, is not highly distinctive in this market and its “dip” may have been designed largely for comfort, a functional consideration. 6 KI has made a case, however, that the combination of the seat, the back and the Z-shaped connecting rods give the Matrix chair an aesthetically unique appearance. Because other competitors seem to have no trouble producing visually distinguishable chairs, defendant should be expected to do the same. Defendant need only change the shape of its chair back or seat sections, or avoid using Z-shaped connecting rods. Although changing the shape of the Beetle chair shape might make it imperfectly stack-able with the Matrix chair, as discussed supra, neither Unicor nor the market generally requires such perfection.
B. Likelihood of Confusion
Having found that the overall look of the Matrix chair is inherently distinctive, I next turn to whether buyers are likely to be confused by the similarity between the two designs. As with the first prong of the test for trade dress infringement, the burden of proving likelihood of confusion falls on the plaintiff. In this circuit, the likelihood of confusion is weighed according to the eight factors set out by Judge Friendly in
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp.,
On the evidence before me, I conclude that plaintiff has shown a likelihood of confusion, but not such an overwhelming likelihood that a preliminary injunction is justified in light of its delay in bringing this action. Because the products compete in the same market, I need not conduct an extended analysis of proximity and bridging the gap, both of which strongly favor the plaintiff. I will address in some detail, however, the evidence relevant to the other factors.
1. Strength of the Trade Dress
A mark’s strength is its “distinctiveness ..., or more precisely, its tendency to identify the goods sold under the mark as emanating from a particular, although possibly anonymous, source.”
Paddington,
*609
For the purposes of this motion I have found the Matrix design to be inherently distinctive, but KI has not persuaded me that the design has acquired secondary meaning. The evidence required to prove secondary meaning includes advertising expenditures; consumer surveys showing that customers associate the trade dress with the source; sales success; unsolicited media coverage of the product; attempts to plagiarize the mark; and length and exclusivity of the mark’s use.
See, e.g., Thompson Medical
Plaintiffs advertising expenditures have been surprisingly low. Over the last 20 years, KI has spent only about $600,000 to promote the Matrix chair, primarily through catalogs. In the last four years, KI has spent less than $40,000 per year on advertising. (Jaraczewski Aff. at 2, 4.) The nature of this advertising, moreover, does not encourage buyers to associate the Matrix design with KI. There are no slogans of the “look for” type, such as, “Look for the Z,” or “It’s not a KI without a zig-zag.”
Cf. Coach Leatherware,
In place of a consumer survey, plaintiff provides four affidavits of modest value. Two affiants are employees of KI, who state that the Matrix design is immediately recognizable as a KI product. These are concluso-ry statements made by interested parties and thus carry little weight. The other affidavits are equally unhelpful. One affiant, an executive with the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority, asserts that the Matrix is “unmistakable in its design” and that the convention center bought 12,000 Matrix chairs because of their “distinctive styling, user comfort and ease of handling.” (Smith Aff. at 2.) This merely establishes that anyone who buys 12,000 chairs will make it his business to learn where they come from. The fourth affiant, a manager of a competing office furniture manufacturing company, states that he “immediately” recognizes the design as originating with KI. (Hieftje Aff. at 2.) This merely proves that competitors in this industry know each other’s chairs. These affidavits do not establish secondary meaning.
KI’s evidence of sales success is too sketchy to be persuasive. KI asserts that it has sold 3.7 million Matrix chairs in the last 20 years, including $150 million in U.S. sales. (Jaraczewski Aff. at 4.) At oral argument, KI’s counsel added that of all the stacking chairs now in the hands of consumers, 25% are Matrix chairs. (Tr. of Hearing at 26-7.) KI has not, however, provided a sworn affidavit to this effect. Even if the Matrix chair dominates the industry, this merely proves that the design is popular, not that buyers associate the design with KI.
KI has offered no evidence of unsolicited media coverage.
Finally, although KI secured a registered trademark for Matrix, it has not sought to register its trade dress.
In sum, although I have found that the Matrix chair has a distinctive look, KI has not provided sufficient evidence of acquired secondary meaning. Therefore, I conclude that the mark is only moderately strong.
2. Similarity between the Marks
The chair designs are almost identical, but similarity alone does not create customer confusion. “Similarity in overall appearance alone cannot establish source confusion as a matter of law.”
Coach Leatherware,
When the labeling is subtle or obscure, however, the likelihood of confusion is higher.
E.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
In this case, the KI’s name is embossed into the plastic underneath the Matrix seat, an obscure place for a label. All Beetle chairs produced after mid-January will be similarly marked with NI’s name. In addition, NI asserts that it will ship the Beetle chairs in prominently marked boxes. Such labeling may indeed prevent pre-sale confusion among architects and designers, who are the most sophisticated buyers in this market, but it will not help less sophisticated customers, who are unlikely to peer underneath the seat. As KI points out, such customers could well be confused post-sale. If they see a Beetle chair of inferior or different quality and assume it to be a Matrix chair, KI’s reputation will suffer. Moreover, about 7,300 Beetle chairs will never be permanently labeled because they were manufactured before NI’s embossing mechanism had been .completed. (Def.’s Mem. in Opp. at 19.) Although NI promises that these unmarked chairs will be equipped with hang tags, this cannot be a complete solution. As this circuit has observed, hang tags are removable. “Once the hang tag comes off, the [products] are again virtually identical and likelihood of confusion remains.”
LeSportsac,
3. Actual confusion
Evidence of actual confusion is not required, because actual confusion is difficult to prove and the law requires only likelihood of- confusion.
E.g., Lois Sportswear,
4. Defendant’s good faith
Defendant admits that it copied the Matrix chair. Intentional copying gives rise to a presumption of likelihood of confusion.
E.g., Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co.,
5. Quality of Defendant’s Product
The evidence on this score is inconclusive, raising only a possibility that defendant’s product may be inferior. KI presents a three-page affidavit from one of its own engineers, who recently examined a Beetle chair and found numerous flaws. (Nordgren Aff. at 2-3.) Defendant counters with an affidavit from its president, William Breen, who asserts that KI must have tested a “pre-production prototype” and that the actual production run is of the highest quality. (Breen Decl. at 8.) A test on one chair, possibly from an early production run, is not persuasive evidence of inferior quality.
6. Sophistication of the Buyers
High density stacking chairs are sold to two tiers of customers, one highly sophisticated and the other moderately so. The highly sophisticated tier includes architects, designers and contract furniture representatives, who decorate and furnish convention centers and school systems through a competitive bidding process. (Tr. of Hearing at 11-12, 38). Chairs are often just a part of their total bid package. As plaintiff testified at oral argument, such architects and designers often supply large quantities of chairs: “It may be a hundred, it may be a thousand, it may be ten thousand if we are talking about a convention center.” (Tr. at 12.) The second group of customers includes executives at the convention centers and the school systems themselves, who sometimes choose the chairs directly from among choices supplied by the architects or approve the chairs proposed by bidders.
The relative sophistication of this market may weigh in defendant’s favor, but how much is difficult to tell. In general, the more sophisticated the customers, the less likely they are to be confused about the source of the product.
See, e.g., Paddington,
7.Senior User’s Delay in Asserting Its Claim
This factor weighs strongly against the plaintiff, despite defendant’s brazen act of deliberate copying. One of plaintiffs own executives saw the Beetle prototype in March 1995, nine months before this action was filed. Plaintiffs only response to seeing *612 the prototype was to protest that defendant was using KI parts. Plaintiff expressed no alarm that defendant had already duplicated the distinctive Matrix frame, and plaintiff did not assert or warn about any trade dress rights at that time. Plaintiff argues that a mere prototype does not necessarily indicate the final design, that defendant falsely represented that the prototype was only a general illustration of the product, and that plaintiff should not be required to file premature lawsuits. These purported justifications are not persuasive. KI has consistently maintained throughout this action that the single most distinctive element of its trade dress is the Z-shaped connecting rods. The Beetle prototype frame, made by defendant, featured precisely those Z-shaped rods. The Matrix seat and back fit defendant’s frame with perfection. KI’s lack of suspicion and further active investigation at this point is baffling. Moreover, sometime in or after June 1995, the same KI executive who had seen the Beetle prototype discovered defendant’s new catalogue in the Unicor offices and “noticed the photographs of the Beetle chair.” (Campanale Decl. at 2.) And still KI voiced no concern.
It is unclear what KI’s attorney should or should not have done in May 1995, when he received a photograph of the Beetle chair among other materials. If the photograph was covered by the GAO protective order, KI’s counsel still could have asked the GAO for a waiver of the protective order or alerted defendant’s counsel to the possibility of a trade dress claim. This is a moot point, however, because defendant’s public cata-logue was in or should have been in KI’s hands in or around June 1995, just a month later when NI began shipping the catalogues to Unicor and its dealers and representatives.
Another six months elapsed before KI took action. Such nonchalance is inexplicable. KI passed up many opportunities to assert its rights, such as sending a cease and desist letter to defendant, alerting Unicor that KI had proprietary rights in the Matrix chair design, and launching a prompt investigation either after it saw the prototype in March 1995, or even after seeing the chair at the first trade show on November 2, 1995. The evidence suggests that plaintiff did not begin to think about a trade dress infringement claim until it both lost the Unicor contract and the Beetle chair began appearing at trade shows — i.e., until KI decided to take the competitive threat seriously. The trade dress laws, however, were not designed to protect producers from competitive injury.
8. Balancing the Factors
Having considered the nine factors relevant to the likelihood of confusion, I find that three factors weigh heavily in plaintiffs favor: similarity, proximity, and bridging the gap. Two additional factors, the strength of the mark and defendant’s good faith, weigh moderately in plaintiffs favor. Three factors favor neither side: evidence of actual confusion, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the buyers. The ninth factor, delay, undercuts much of plaintiffs argument. Had KI asserted a forceful trade dress claim earlier — say, in the summer of 1995 when it first saw or should have seen a photograph of the Beetle chair, and when defendant’s production line was idled by the bid protest — defendant might have been persuaded to change its design. Plaintiffs silence allowed defendant and Unicor to believe that no trade dress claim would be forthcoming. This tips the equities more in defendant’s favor than the other factors would otherwise indicate. Thus, although plaintiff has not met its burden for preliminary relief, plaintiff has established a likelihood of confusion sufficient to go to trial.
II. Motion for Preliminary Injunction
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show (1) the likelihood of irreparable injury, and (2) either (a) likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the movant’s favor.
Tough Traveler,
*613 Preliminary injunctions are generally granted under the theory that there is an urgent need for speedy action to protect the plaintiffs’ rights. Delay in seeking enforcement of those rights, however, tends to indicate at least a reduced need for such drastic, speedy action- Significant delay in applying for injunctive relief in a trademark case tends to neutralize any presumption that infringement alone will cause irreparable harm pending trial, and such delay alone may justify denial of a preliminary injunction for trademark infringement.
Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust,
In the instant case, for the reasons discussed, I decline to manufacture a sense of urgency that is not supported by plaintiffs own conduct. Although the law urges leniency toward a plaintiff who has good cause for delay, either because the plaintiff did not know how severe the infringement was or because the plaintiff was making good faith efforts to investigate, neither of these justifications applies here.
See Tom Doherty
As
socs., Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc.,
On balance, although I have found that some likelihood of confusion exists, I have also found that this likelihood is not overwhelming because of the general sophistication of the buyers in this market, particularly of Unicor, the biggest current buyer of NI’s chair. Plaintiffs delay in bringing this action tips the equities in favor of defendant, which will suffer considerable economic harm if forced to cancel its contract with Unicor or to immediately re-tool to alter its design for the Unicor contract. Unicor, whose prison facilities depend on the supply on product, will also be unfairly prejudiced in the delay in receiving products occasioned solely by the late assertion by KI of its trade dress rights.
I remind defendant, however, that KI has raised serious questions of trade dress infringement, that this case is destined for trial, and that the requirements for a finding of success on the merits are significantly lower than the preliminary injunction standard at issue here.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the plaintiff has shown sufficiently serious questions going to the but has not shown a likelihood of irreparable harm or a balance of hardship tipping decidedly in its favor given its delay in asserting its rights. Plaintiffs motion for emergency relief came six to nine months after plaintiff learned of defendant’s plans to copy its Matrix chair. This is too late. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
.Plaintiff does not cite the Lanham Act or any particular section of that Act in its Notice of Motion. Plaintiff does mention the Act in a passing reference in its supporting papers. (Mem. in Support of Motion at 22). I assume for the purposes of this motion that plaintiff means to invoke 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), which has been interpreted as providing protection to unregistered trade dress designs.
See LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.,
. Matrix is a registered trademark of KI.
. KI asserts that Matrix sales (at wholesale price) have totaled more than $150 million, including almost $50 million since 1991. (Pl.'s Notice of Motion at 5.)
. In their motion papers, the parties have introduced photographs of other competing products.
. Plaintiff has submitted the Declaration of Gregory B. Wallis, a Contracting Officer at Unicor, to support its argument that the Uni-cor specifications were minimum requirements and did not necessitate copying KX’s chair. Nevertheless, ¶ 8 of the Wallis Declaration appears to raise a question about the distinctiveness of the Matrix chair: "Krueger's products were determined to be generally representative of the market and was (sic) used as a baseline reference. To the maximum extent possible, unique or proprietary elements of Krueger's chairs were removed to maximize competition.” I do not, however, find Wallis’ statement contrary to my conclusion about the inherent distinctiveness of the KI chair because although Unicor’s specifications do include a drawing of the KI chair as an example, the specifications themselves do not call for any of the distinctive trade dress aspects of the KI chairs. For example, the specifications specify a general size for the backs and seats but do not require a particular shape. Similarly, nowhere do the specifications require a zig-zag, in-out shape for the connection between the back and seat.
. At oral argument, defendant unveiled (practically with a drum-roll and a flourish) a specimen of the competing Staxx chair, whose seat is extremely similar in shape to the Matrix seat, although not identical.
