This is an appeal from a consolidated Declaratory Judgment Action in which the trial court entered a judgment in favor of appellees Reliance Insurance Company and Federal Insurance Company, and against appellants Leroy Kromer, Jr. and George J. Balikian. Appellants argue that Reliance’s excess-umbrella policy and Federal’s commercial excess policy are “motor vehicle liability insurance policies”, as defined by the 1984 Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law [“PMVFRL”] and, that they therefore, are required to provide uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of their stated bodily injury liability coverage. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1731(a) (1984). We disagree and affirm.
There was evidence to support the following: Appellants Leroy Kromer and George Balikian were employed by Hoch Sanitation Services, Inc., and both worked as runners on a garbage truck. While working, appellants were struck and injured by a vehicle insured by State Farm Insurance Company. Both appellants settled with State Farm for the limits of coverage under the State Farm policy ($100,000/$300,000).
Hoch Sanitation maintained a business automobile insurance policy with Reliance/Planet Insurance Company which provided uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage with a $1,000,000 liability limit. Both appellants submitted claims *634 and received compensation, with Balikian receiving $750,000 and Kramer receiving $250,000.
Reliance had also issued an excess-umbrella policy to Hoch Sanitation with a $1,000,000 liability limit. In addition, Federal Insurance Company issued a commercial excess liability policy with an $8,000,000 limit to cover any excess claims above Reliance’s excess-umbrella policy. Appellants sought Declaratory Judgment from the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas that the subject excess-umbrella policies were motor vehicle liability insurance policies as defined by the PMVFRL, and therefore, provided additional underinsured motorist coverage.
Before rendering its decision, the trial court not only recognized that the Pennsylvania appellate courts have not addressed whether umbrella/excess policies provide uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, but also noted the existing split of authority over this issue. The trial court then concluded that the better rule (which is followed by the majority of jurisdictions and is consistent with the decision of
Electric Insurance Company v. Rubin,
Appellants argue that the subject policies are indeed motor vehicle insurance policies and that they are entitled to full recovery as under the terms of any motor vehicle liability policy.
The governing provision states:
(a) General rule. — No motor vehicle liability insurance policy shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this Common *635 wealth, with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this Commonwealth, unless uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist coverages are provided therein or supplemental thereto in amounts equal to the bodily injury liability coverage except as provided in section 1734 (relating to request for lower or higher limits of coverage).
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1731(a)(1984). 1 The legislature has not defined “motor vehicle liability insurance” thereby leaving the question open as to whether umbrella or excess liability policies fall within the statute. This issue has not been addressed by the Pennsylvania appellate courts, but has been addressed by other jurisdictions while interpreting similar uninsured/under-insured motorist statutes. Courts in other jurisdictions have come to different conclusions over this issue and have typically based their resolution of the issue on the language of the uninsured/underinsured motorist statute enacted in their state.
Courts that have addressed this issue have often observed that there are generally two (2) types of uninsured/underinsured motorists statutes: “minimum liability” statutes and “full recovery” statutes. The majority of jurisdictions have “minimum liability” statutes which are “intended to protect injured motorists by insuring that they will be able to recover at least an amount equivalent to what would have been available if the insured had been injured by a driver who maintained the
required
statutory minimum liability coverage.”
Sidelnik v. American States Insurance Co.,
Here, the premise of the appellants’ argument is that the Pennsylvania uninsured/underinsured motorist statute is a “full recovery” statute. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1731(a) (1984). Appellant argues that unlike “minimum liability” jurisdictions where most courts have refused to include excess and umbrella policies within the definition of a motor vehicle liability insurance policy
2
, “full recovery” jurisdictions have ruled that such policies are indeed motor vehicle liability insurance policies, thus providing uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage. To support his argument, appellant cites cases from “full recovery” jurisdictions that have found umbrella and excess liability policies to be within the definition of a motor vehicle liability insurance policy as defined by their respective uninsured/underinsured motorist statutes.
See Southern American Insurance Co. v. Dobson,
Appellants argue that Reliance’s umbrella policy and Federal’s excess commercial liability policy are identical in all material respects to the policies addressed in the aforementioned “full recovery” jurisdictions. Appellants point out that these jurisdictions have “full recovery” statutes similar to § 1731 of the PMVFRL; that both Federal and Reliance’s policies make reference to automobile coverage; that neither policy specifically excludes uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage; and that Pennsylvania did not statutorily exclude umbrella or excess commercial liability policies from the 1984 PMVFRL, nor did they restrict the phrase “motor vehicle liability insurance policies” to mean only primary coverage. Appellant maintains that, in light of these factors, we should adopt the rule followed by the cited jurisdictions, and find that excess and umbrella policies are motor vehicle liability insurance policies as defined by § 1731(a), and thus required to provide uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. We disagree, and first look to relevant federal court decisions which we find highly persuasive.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals have rejected the notion that uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits should be included in umbrella and excess liability policies. In
Electric Insurance Company v. Rubin,
The excess policy in this case simply was not written to satisfy the MVFRL. In fact, inasmuch as the policy required Nathan Rubin to carry underlying liability coverage, it is clear that the excess policy contemplated that Nathan Rubin have some other policy to satisfy MVFRL. In these circumstances, we find nothing in the MVFRL to support the Rubins’ claim that the excess policy had to be written with liability coverage conforming to the MVFRL’s requirements.
Id. at 818-819 (citations omitted).
In
Boyce v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance,
No. CIV. 92-6525,
This language shows that in an uninsured motorist accident, the party that is legally required to pay for damages is the uninsured motorist. In this instance, neither the plaintiffs nor the insured is legally required to pay the uninsured benefits under the underlying insurance policy. Since the excess policy only covers excess exposure for the insured or other protected persons, and neither the insured nor the plaintiffs has [sic] excess exposure, the court finds that the excess policy does not provide coverage for uninsured motorists benefits. It is limited to damages that the insured ... [are] “legally required to pay.”
*639 Id. at 9. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for reconsideration in this case in which they requested the court to reform the excess liability policy so as to provide uninsured motorist coverage as required by § 1731 of the PMVFRL. In its memorandum denying Plaintiffs motion the court reasoned as follows:
Section 1731 only requires that motor vehicle liability policies contain certain uninsured motorists benefits. Unlike the primary insurance contract which provided uninsured motorist benefits through a motor vehicle insurance policy, the policy in dispute between the parties is not a motor vehicle liability insurance policy. Rather, the policy provides umbrella excess liability coverage. As an excess policy, it provides coverages to a protected person for all types of liability that the protected person may be legally required to pay over and above his or her basic insurance coverage, of whatever type. Therefore, the court will not reform the excess liability insurance policy to provide four million dollars in uninsured motorist coverage since the poliey in question is an excess liability policy rather than a motor vehicle liability policy ...
Boyce v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company,
No. CIV. 92-6525,
In
Stoumen v. Public Service Mutual Insurance Co.,
The court then listed important reasons why umbrella policies should be excluded from uninsured/underinsured motorist statutes:
First, umbrella policies insure the policyholder in general, rather than a particular automobile within the state. In fact, not only is it immaterial where the insured’s car is kept, car ownership is immaterial. In either case, the insurance company will issue the insured a policy. Thus, the court finds that umbrella policies are not issued “with respect to a[] motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this Commonwealth ...” § 1731(a). Second, umbrella policies’ raison d’etre is to provide individuals with affordable protection against excess judgments of third parties, rather than provide individuals with automobile insurance. This fundamental difference is underscored by the difference in premiums that an insurance company charges for the two types of policies. Due to the relative risks associated with each, the premiums that insurance companies charge for umbrella policies are substantially lower than the premiums that insurance companies charge for automobile insurance. Third, the amount of coverage provided by umbrella policies is far greater than coverage provided in the typical automobile insurance policy. Thus, if the Court were to adopt the plaintiffs position, a motorist holding an umbrella policy would actually be better off if he became involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist because he could then submit a claim under his umbrella policy and receive millions of dollars in coverage.
Id. at 143 (citations omitted). The court then went on to conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would hold that umbrella policies are not automobile insurance policies as defined by § 1731 of the PMVFRL.
Despite having a “full recovery” statute, the Connecticut Supreme court has also held that excess and umbrella policies are not motor vehicle liability insurance policies and, therefore, do not provide uninsured or underinsured motorist cover
*641
age. In
Mass v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company,
Moreover, in response to plaintiffs argument concerning Connecticut being a “full recovery” statute, the court held that the type of uninsured motorists statute enacted, whether it offers “full recovery” or “minimum recovery”, is not dispositive of the question presented.
Id.,
Similarly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court, despite having a full recovery statute, also ruled that umbrella policies do not fit the legislative definition of a motor vehicle liability policy. In
United Services Automobile Association v. Wilkinson,
At least one commentator agrees that umbrella policies are indeed unique and distinguishable from general automobile policies.
Umbrella policies serve an important function in the industry. In this day of uncommon, but possible, enormous verdicts, they pick up this exceptional hazard at a small premium. Assuming one’s automobile and homeowners policies have liability limits of $100,000 or even $500,000, the umbrella policy may pick up at that point and cover for an additional million, five or ten million. It may assume as a primary carrier certain coverages not included elsewhere, ... but there is no intention to supplant the basic carriers on the homeowners or automobile coverages.... However, because of the misunderstanding of the courts as to the nature of such coverages, they have been held to fall within the definition of automobile liability insurance.
J.A. Appleman & J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 5071.65, P. 107 (1981) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
We must also reject appellant’s incantation that the PMVFRL was intended to afford the “greatest possible coverage to insured and injured claimants.” This overly generous reading of the Act’s intentions harkens back to the now defunct No-fault Act with its “maximum feasible restoration” language which no longer controls.
Jeffrey v. Erie Ins. Exchange,
Having this discussion in mind, we will now focus upon the language of Reliance’s umbrella policy as well as Federal’s' commercial excess liability policy. “In interpreting
*643
an insurance contract, we must ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the written agreement. When the policy language is clear and unambiguous, we will give affect to the language of the contract.”
Paylor v. Hartford Insurance Co.,
I. Coverage. The company hereby agrees, subject to the limitations, terms and conditions hereinafter mentioned, to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be obligated to pay by reason of the liability
(a) imposed upon the insured by law, or
(b) assumed under contract or agreement by the Named Insured and/or any officer, director, stockholder, partner or employee of the Named Insured, while acting in his capacity as such, for ultimate net loss on account of:
(a) personal injuries, including death at any time resulting therefrom,
(b) property damage,
(c) advertising liability, caused by or arising out of each occurrence happening anywhere during the policy period.
Federal’s Commercial Excess Liability Policy provides that Federal agreed:
to pay on behalf of the insured loss resulting from an occurrence insured by all of the policies scheduled in ... the Declarations.
Federal’s Commercial Excess Liability Policy also provided that “loss” means in pertinent part:
all sums actually paid or sums which the insured is legally obligated to pay in the settlement or satisfaction of a claim
Neither of the above policies express any intention of providing first party underinsured motorist coverage. In fact, it is clear from the language of both policies that they provide
*644
third party liability, coverage only.
3
This is evident from the phrase used in both policies: “to pay on behalf of the insured ... sums which the insured is legally obligated to pay”. Here, the appellee Hoch is obviously the insured. Reliance and Federal’s obligation as insurers of Hoch, is to pay on the part of Hoch, sums Hoch is legally obligated to pay to third parties. As the trial court properly concluded “[t]he underinsured motorists claims of [appellants] do not constitute sums which the insured is legally obligated to pay nor are they payments made on behalf of the insured.” Here, appellants, who are employees of Hoch, are making a claim for first party underinsured motorist coverage under Reliance’s Umbrella Policy and Federal’s Commercial Excess Policy when the language of both clearly indicates that no such coverage exist. Coverage under Federal’s and Reliance’s excess policies is only triggered by claims of liability against the insured from third parties. Such coverage is not triggered by claims for first party uninsured motorist coverage. Accordingly, we find that neither of the subject excess insurance policies provide under-insured motorist coverage.
See Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. McLaughlin,
Moreover, we reject appellants’ invitation to follow those jurisdictions with “full recovery” statutes who have bootstrapped excess and umbrella policies to their respective uninsured/underinsured motorist statutes under the guise of carrying out the legislatures intent of allowing “full recovery under the terms of any applicable policies when a person is injured by an uninsured motorist.”
Howe,
We find no merit to appellants next argument that the policies are arguably ambiguous. We have reviewed the policies and have concluded that there is no language which would suggest an intent to provide underinsured motorist coverage. Nor do we find language which would permit the imposition of added coverage to the contract.
Finally, appellants argue that the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations mandates that the insurance policies be construed in favor of the insured. When considering issues of coverage under insurance contracts the proper focus is the reasonable expectation of the insured.
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Corbett,
Order Affirmed.
Notes
. Since the appellants were injured in 1988, the 1984 enactment of the PMVFRL governs this case. In 1990 the Pennsylvania Legislature amended § 1731, making the purchase of uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist coverage optional.
. Courts in "minimum liability” jurisdictions have generally found, that the minimum level of insurance provided by the underlying policy provided all the the protection contemplated by the statute.
See,
Lisa Kay Gregory,
"Excess" or "Umbrella" Insurance Policy as Providing Coverage for Accidents With Uninsured Motorist Coverage for Accidents With Uninsured or Underinsured Motorists,
. An insurance expert testified at trial and succinctly explained the difference between a liability insurance coverage and underinsured/uninsured motorist coverage:
A liability policy is commonly known and referred to as a[sic] third party coverage. There are three parties, the insurance company; the insured and the claimant [I]f the insured is liable for whatever is claimed, the insurance company will pay on behalf of the insured to the claimant the damages sought up to the liability limits____ [U]ninsured/underinsured motorist coverage is not liability coverage in that it’s [ ] first party coverage. It deals between the insurance company and the insured, and the insurance company agrees to reimburse or to pay the insured, what the insured is entitled to because of damages it sustained by some negligent tortfeasor.
Trial Transcript at 35-36, 10/26/94.
. In Both Florida and Kansas, umbrella policies were held to be subject to their uninsured motorist statutes mainly because their statutes were of the "full recovery” type.
See e.g., Chicago Insurance Co. v. Dominguez, 420
So.2d 882 (Fla.App.1982)
review denied,