3 Barb. 647 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1848
By the Court,
A lunatic cannot be punished for crime, but he may be sued for an injury done to another. He is not a free agent, capable of intelligent, voluntary action, and therefore is incapable of a guilty intent, which is the very essence of crimé j but a civil* action, to recover damages for an injury may be maintained against him, because the intent with which the act is done is not material. But the principle upon which I'his distinction rests reaches also to the measure of damages in a civil action. Ordinarily, in an action for a personal injury; the amount of damages is, at least to a considerable extent, governed by the motive which influenced the party in committing the act. Thus it is usual, and as proper as it is usual, for thé court, upon the trial of an action for an assault and battery, td instruct the jury that the action is maintainable even though the injury was accidental; (that if intentional, yet when the act is done under the excitement of strong provocation, it is a proper ground for the mitigation of damages. , And; on the contrary, that when the act is committed deliberately or maliciously, it is good ground for increasing damages. In short, in such cases, the damages are graduated by the intent of the party committing the injury. But in respect to the lunatic, as he has properly no will, it follows that the only proper measure of damages in an action against him for a wrong, is the mere compensation of the party injured. The charge of the learned judge, upon the trial, was therefore, in this respect, entirely correct. -
But I think sufficient weight was not given, either by the judge or the jury, to the fact that fhe plaintiff himself, immediately after he was discharged from- arrest upon the warrant against him, made application, according to the provisions of
New trial granted.