250 F. 890 | E.D. Mo. | 1918
The right of wage-earners to organize themselves into unions for the purpose of bettering their conditions is a right which no one can question. There can be no doubt that, but for these organizations, the conditions of- wage-earners would have been much less endurable than they are at the present time. The law recognizes them, and has never questioned their right to exist. Nor can any one question the right of any employes to quit their employment, whether they do it singly or collectively, whether it is done for a good reason or without any cause, and no court can compel any man to work against his will. But it is a right which may cause great injury, injury to the wage-earners in the loss of their wages, injury to their employers in the loss of their business, and generally the greatest loss falls upon those who are the least responsible for it, the innocent public. For this reason it is a weapon that should never be used, unless all efforts of conciliation, either by conference or by arbitration, have failed.
This is especially true in times like these, when the nation is engaged in a great struggle which may affect its existence. Probably 2,000,000 of men and women have been taken from their usual vocations to engage in this great struggle. The government is dependent upon the work of wage-earners and manufacturers in order to carry this war to success, and, while the court is not willing to say that an unjustifiable strike in times like this is treáson, it comes mighty close to it, morally. But the courts cannot act as arbitrators, and they have no right to pass upon strikes, whether they are justified or not. The courts, especially the courts of the United States, can only act according to the laws of the country, and their powers are limited to what
There are certain acts which have been declared by the courts, from time immemorial, to be unlawful. In the latest case decided by the Supreme Court (Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed., in which the opinion was delivered at the present term of that court), it was held that it was unlawful to intentionally do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does in fact damage, another person’s property or rights, and therefore is actionable. In that case, the court held that for persons to interfere between employer and employés, by inducing the employés to leave their employment and thereby injure the business of the employer, is unlawful.and actionable; for persons to attempt to prevent persons from dealing with another is an unlawful act, and is actionable. Since the issues which were decided in that case arose, Congress enacted October 14, 1914 what is known as the Clayton Act (38 Stat. 730-737). By that act Congress has seen proper to limit the powers of courts of the United States, sitting as courts of equity, to grant injunctions in disputes between employers and employés, except in certain cases. Section 20 ,of that act says:
“That no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and employés, Qr between employers and employés, or between em-ployés, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law.”
The effect of the acts charged in this complaint, if true, certainly affect the property of the plaintiff and its property rights, and in view of the allegations in the complaint, which are not denied in the answer, that a judgment at law would be inadequate, because it could not be collected from any of the defendants, brings it within that provision that “there is no adequate remedy at law.” That act goes further and says:
“And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons, whether singly or in concert,, from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor [no such relief is asked], or from recommending, advising or persuading others by peaceful means so to do, or from attending at any place where any such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from working, or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do.”
“Or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or others moneys or things of value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes, or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in'this paragraph bo considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States.”
The same finding must be made in relation to the attempted boycott. So far as the distribution of the circulars is concerned, they had a perfect right to distribute them, if it was done peaceably. They had a. perfect right to say to persons who were in the habit of trading in the stores: “I wish you would not trade there; we have been clerks employed there, and have not been treated fairly; we have not been receiving wages that will allow us to live properly when the cost of living is so high; if you people will stand by us, and refuse to trade with these people until they grant us the relief to which we think we are justly entitled,” they may do so. That would not have been illegal,
Now, there is another thing. While the law does not prohibit them meeting at any place where they may lawfully meet, it does not authorize them to meet where they are not authorized to meet. A store, it is true, is to some extent a public place; but it is a 'public place only for those who go there for the purpose of making purchases, for the purpose of making sales, for the purpose of examining the goods, even if they do not buy them — in short, to go there for the purpose of transacting business. It may be conceded that people may go in there who do not want to transact business, for the purpose of conversing or speaking with some'employé; but they have no right to go there for the purpose of doing an unlawful act — that is, to attempt to induce employés to leave their employer and thereby practically ruin the business of the emplpyer. The evidence shows, and some of the defendants admitted that they did go there, and did talk' to the employés for the sole purpose of inducing them to join their union. On the other hand, the evidence on the part of the plaintiff shows that, when .they came there, they tried, in some instances, to- force them to leave the stores, threatened them, and in many instances called them opprobrious names. This is conclusive that they went there for an unlawful purpose.
Counsel for the defendants says they went there to induce them to join the union, and not for the purpose of quitting the service. But from the moment the strike was declared, which was on Friday morning, from that moment any member of that union was, by the rules and regulations of the union, required to quit the employment of this plaintiff. The strike was caused by reason of the failure of the manager of the plaintiff corporation to subscribe immediately to the contract presented to him, wherein it was provided, among other things,
The next question is: Were the acts of the defendants unlawful by reason of the fact that by ordering this strike, and inducing so many of the employes of the plaintiff to withdraw from employment, 85 of the 140 retail stores of this plaintiff had to be closed by reason of the strikes, causing a loss of the value of $36,000 of perishable food, such an unlawful act as would justify the court, in view of the Food Conservation Act of Congress, to grant the writ of injunction. That act provides:
“That it is unlawful under this act for any person or persons to knowingly commit waste or willfully to permit preventable deterioration of any necessaries in or in connection with their production, or distribution.”
And furthermore it makes it an offense for any person to restrict the distribution of any necessaries, or do anything whereby transportation, producing, harvesting, manufacturing, supply, or dealing in any necessaries of life is interfered with. If these defendants, by reason of their acts, caused a loss of all this perishable food, they were certainly guilty of a violation of this act, and in the opinion of the court it would be wholly immaterial whether it was done by violence, threats, intimidation, or otherwise. The owner of this perishable food would be entitled to the aid of a court of equity of the United States to restrain them from acts which will cause still greater destruction of such food. The evidence shows that this plaintiff, in every one of the stores, dealt in meats, butler, eggs, vegetables, oleomargarine, lard, and other perishable goods; that they were also bakers, and dealt in breads, cakes, pies, and pastries; and, of course, these defendants, who liad been employes of the plaintiff, knew these facts, and they must have known that, if the stores were closed, especially on Friday and Saturday, that these food products would naturally deteriorate, if not altogether spoil and be wasted.
a The court is not willing to believe that the strike was called on Friday for the reason that they knew there would he more perishable goods on Friday and Saturday, which could not be carried qver Sunday, and that caused them to strike on that day, as claimed by counsel for plaintiff. The court is unwilling to ascribe to these defendants such a despicable, willful act. They are as much interested in the production and in the cheapness of food as anybody; in fact, more so than people of large means. I believe they never gave it any thought; at least, I am unwilling to believe that they started the strike on that day on that account, but rather believe it took them some days before they could organize the union, and it took some few days before
The court is somewhat in doubt whether there is any evidence which justifies it in finding that there was any interference with interstate commerce. The evidence shows that plaintiff did considerable interstate business before that time, but there is nothing to show that during the time the stores were closed there was any interstate business offered to them.- There is nothing to show that they received any mail orders during that time which required the shipment of goods to the state of Illinois, where, I believe, they testified they do most of their interstate business. There is nothing to show that there was any interference with any goods to be shipped to, or which were received by rail at their warehouse from, other states, and for that reason the court finds that there is nothing to indicate that there was any interference with interstate commerce. There were threats to interfere with the delivery of the goods at the stores, and, while there is no- evidence here to show that there was any actual interference, it finds that, by reason of threats in the course of deliveries to the stores, no attempt was made to make such deliveries.
But, no matter what advice was given, acts of violence were committed by members of the union. They were committed for the purpose of carrying out successfully the object of the union, that is, to secure a successful strike, or otherwise to put the plaintiff out of business, and every member of that union, the defendants here, is equally re
There was also evidence introduced tending to show that some pickets in front of that store were advising people who wanted to go into the plaintiff’s store not to go there, because it was unfair to lahor, and advised them to go to Cohn’s store, who was fair to labor. Be was present at the meetings when reports were made, and he contributed $25. So far as this contribution is concerned, there would, ordinarily, be nothing wrong in it. If. he sympathized with the employés in a strike, and he believed the employés were suffering, and he was willing to contribute some money to relieve them, there would be nothing wrong in that, and it would not be aiding them, so far as they acted unlawfully; but he attended their meetings, and told them to go ahead, and before that time he had offered the sum of $100 if they would succeed in closing up the stores of the .plaintiff. That moment he made himself an accomplice of those who were engaged in this unlawful action, and is just as liable as they are, and for that reason there is no reason why the injunction should not go against him.
As to the Meadow Brook Grocery Company, there is no' evidence that justifies an injunction against it. Perhaps it was not a proper thing, from a moral standpoint, to distribute the boycott circulars; but people will frequently do things from selfishness that are not exactly ethical, yet not in violation of any law. They distributed circulars, which under the Clayton Act may be done, if done peaceably, and therefore does not justify an injunction. -
For these reasons the injunction against the Meadow Brook Grocery will be denied, but the temporary injunction .against the other parties will be granted, upon the execution by the plaintiff of a bond in the sum of $10,000, conditioned that it will pay to the defendants, or any of them, the damage which they, or either of them, may sustain by reason of the temporary injunction, if on final hearing it shall be held that it was wrongfully granted.