¶ 1. This is a consolidation of two appeals arising from the same request by a newspaper, pursuant to Wisconsin's open records law, Wis. Stat. §§ 19.31-19.39 (2003-04), 1 for documents related to the misconduct investigation and subsequent disciplinary actions taken against a law enforcement *262 officer. Department of Natural Resources (DNR) Conservation Warden Thomas Kroeplin is the subject of the requested documents and is the appellant in Kroeplin v. DNR, No. 2005AP1093. He appeals the circuit court's order and judgment denying his request for an injunction preventing release of the records by the DNR to The Lakeland Times. The DNR is the custodian of Kroeplin's misconduct investigation and disciplinary records and is the appellant in the second case, The Lakeland Times v. DNR, No. 2005AP2427, along with Kroeplin's supervisor, DNR Chief Warden Stark. The DNR and Stark (collectively, "the DNR") appeal the court's grant of a writ of mandamus to The Lakeland Times requiring full disclosure of the requested records.
¶ 2. Kroeplin argues that Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d) exempts all records from public disclosure relating to the investigation of his violation of DNR work rules and of the subsequent disciplinary action taken. The DNR argues that § 19.36(10) (d) exempts only certain parts of those records, which it redacted. Subsection (10)(d) creates an exemption from disclosure for "information used in staff management planning." In the alternative, the DNR and Kroeplin both argue that the public interest favoring nondisclosure outweighs the public interest favoring disclosure. We conclude that the Kroeplin records do not fall within the § 19.36(10) (d) exception and that the public interest in disclosing the Kroeplin misconduct investigation and disciplinary records as requested by The Lakeland Times outweighs the public's interest in nondisclosure. We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶ 3. The material facts are not in dispute. On September 20, 2004, DNR conservation warden Thomas Kroeplin requested a license plate check from a *263 City of Minocqua police dispatcher. Kroeplin's request came to the attention of a local newspaper, The Lake-land Times, which had obtained a copy of the transcript of Kroeplin's call to the dispatcher. The Lakeland Times subsequently questioned the legality of Kroeplin's license plate check request in a series of articles. The articles noted the suspicious nature of Kroeplin's request resulting from the timing of the request — six minutes after his nephew had tried to obtain the same information from the dispatcher about the same car — in conjunction with the fact that the car belonged to a friend of the victim in a drug-planting case in which Kroeplin's nephew was arrested.
¶ 4. Between December 2004 and January 2005, the DNR conducted an investigation into whether Kroeplin's September 20, 2004 request constituted misconduct in violation of DNR work rules. As a result of the investigation, DNR Conservation Warden Supervisor Thomas Wrasse wrote an interdepartmental disciplinary memorandum and sent Kroeplin a disciplinary letter on January 31, 2005.
¶ 5. On February 3, 2005, Gregg Walker, General Manager of The Lakeland Times, filed an open records request for "all public documents related to" the license plate check request, specifying that such documents should include "the agency's conclusions and findings — as well as supporting documents — reached in an investigation of that incident."
¶ 6. Randy Stark, Director of the Bureau of Law Enforcement at the DNR, responded in a February 22, 2005 letter that the DNR would release portions of the disciplinary letter and disciplinary recommendation memo, but would not release the other information requested for various policy reasons. After citing several specific policy reasons for denying the request, *264 which we describe in more detail in our analysis, the letter also informed Walker of his right to bring an action for mandamus pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1) to compel disclosure of the remaining records. In response to the DNR's denial letter, The Lakeland Times and Gregg Walker (collectively, "The Lakeland Times") brought a mandamus action requesting disclosure of those documents.
¶ 7. In accordance with the notice requirements of Wisconsin's open records law, Stark also sent Kroep-lin a letter notifying him that the DNR would be releasing portions of the disciplinary letter and memo regarding his misconduct investigation, and notifying him of his right to seek a restraining order under Wis. Stat. § 19.356 to prevent the DNR from disclosing the records. In response, Kroeplin filed a court action seeking to enjoin release of those records, alleging that the information was "highly personal and prejudicial if made public, and ... has the potential to cause serious harm to the privacy and reputational interests of [Kroeplin]."
¶ 8. The DNR submitted an affidavit in which Stark explained the reasons he provided in his denial letter. After considering all submissions and oral argument, the circuit court ruled that neither the Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d) exception to Wisconsin's open records law nor the public policy reasons asserted by the DNR in its denial letter justified the DNR's failure to fully comply with the newspaper's open records request. The court consequently denied Kroeplin's request for an injunction and issued a writ of mandamus ordering the release of all documents related to the investigation of Kroeplin's license plate check request and subsequent *265 disciplinary measures taken. The court stayed enforcement of the judgment pending appeal in the two companion cases.
¶ 9. The circuit court reaffirmed its decision upon reconsideration after the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided
Hempel v. City of Baraboo,
DISCUSSION
I. Statutory Interpretation
¶ 10. The first issue we must resolve is whether Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d) exempts from disclosure the investigation and disciplinary records The Lakeland Times requested. The resolution of this case turns on our interpretation and application of § 19.36(10)(b) and (d) and other relevant statutes. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
State v. Stenklyft,
¶ 11. Statutory interpretation begins with the statute's text; we give the text its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that we give technical or specially defined words their technical or special definitions.
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County,
¶ 12. We begin our discussion recognizing the strong presumption of openness and liberal access to public records established by Wis. Stat. § 19.31, which describes the open records law's underlying policy of open access to records related to government officers and employees:
In recognition of the fact that a representative government is dependent upon an informed electorate, it is declared to be the public policy of this state that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those officers and employees who represent them. Further, providing persons with such information is declared to be an essential function of a representative government and an integral part of the routine duties of officers and employees whose responsibility it is to provide such information. To that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in every instance with a presumption of complete public access, consistent with the conduct of governmental business. The denial of public access generally is contrary to the public interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be denied.
The strong presumption favoring disclosure of public records "reflects the basic principle that the people must be informed about the workings of their govern
*267
ment and that openness in government is essential to maintain the strength of our democratic society."
Linzmeyer v. Forcey,
¶ 13. The strong presumption of public access may give way to statutory or specified common law exceptions, or if there is an overriding public interest in keeping the public record confidential.
Hathaway v. Joint Sch. Dist.,
A. Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(10)(d) is Ambiguous
¶ 14. Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(10) (d) is an exception to Wisconsin's open records law relating to employee *268 personnel records. The subsection exempts from public access
[i]nformation relating to one or more specific employees that is used by an authority or by the employer of the employees for staff management planning, including performance evaluations, judgments, or recommendations concerning future salary adjustments or other wage treatments, management bonus plans, promotions, job assignments, letters of reference, or other comments or ratings relating to employees.
The parties offer competing interpretations of the statute as applied to Kroeplin's records.
¶ 15. Kroeplin argues that Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10) (d) applies to all records related to his misconduct investigation and subsequent discipline because "[i]t is obvious that a disciplinary record in an employee personnel file will be used by an employer when engaging in the kinds of activities listed in § 19.36(10)(d)." Kroeplin offers limitations on this broad construction of § 19.36(10)(d) by explaining that the only disciplinary records covered by § 19.36(10)(d) would be those that reflect actual discipline imposed, as opposed to records of investigations where an employee was exonerated and discipline was not ultimately imposed. Under his construction of § 19.36(10)(d), the latter documents may be disclosed, since those records will not be used by the employer for "staff management planning."
¶ 16. In what it calls a "narrow but reasonable" interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d), the DNR argues that § 19.36(10)(d) exempts from disclosure most, but not all, of the information contained in Kroeplin's investigation and disciplinary records. The key to the DNR's interpretation of the statute is its distinction between factual information, which the DNR argues may be disclosed under § 19.36(10)(d), and supervisory opinions, which it argues may not be dis *269 closed. "[T]he focus of the exception," the DNR argues, "is evaluative information, including both evaluative statements themselves and related information that forms or will form the basis of an evaluation, recommendation or judgment used for purposes of staff management planning." Also, under the DNR's interpretation of the § 19.36(10)(d) exception as applied to disciplinary or misconduct records, "mere theoretical usage or simply the remote possibility of use would not be sufficient."
¶ 17. In a "plain language" interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d), The Lakeland Times argues that the statute does not apply to any of the records at issue in this case, emphasizing that the text of § 19.36(10)(d) does not mention investigative or disciplinary records. The Lakeland Times contends that an interpretation of the statute that prevents disclosure of disciplinary and investigation records which might be used some day for "staff management planning" is overly broad, ignores the statute's history and context, violates statutory construction standards, and "allow[s] record custodians to deny any meaningful public oversight of the disciplinary process." The Lakeland Times further contends that the DNR's distinction between factual information and judgments is an "unworkable" and "artificial" distinction in conflict with plain statutory language.
¶ 18. yWe conclude that Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d) is ambiguous; each party's interpretation of the statute has reasonable aspects. On the one hand, the plain language of the § 19.36(10)(d) exception applies to information used for "staff management planning, including performance evaluations .. . ." Performance evaluations, in turn, may make reference to information contained in records relating to disciplinary actions, in general, and disciplinary actions taken based *270 on investigations of possible criminal activity or possible misconduct, in particular. Thus, it may be reasonable to read § 19.36(10)(d) as exempting from disclosure performance evaluations containing this information.
¶ 19. On the other hand, the phrase "staff management planning" suggests an ongoing planning process. In that context, it is reasonable to interpret Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d) as referring to performance evaluations as some kind of ongoing or regular evaluation of job performance by management, which suggests, in turn, that it is the more routine and typical disciplinary action such as for tardiness or absenteeism which is subject to the absolute bar to disclosure under § 19.36(10)(d). In addition, the text of § 19.36(10)(d) fails to mention disciplinary or misconduct investigation records at all, leading to the possible conclusion that § 19.36(10)(d) does not except disciplinary and misconduct investigation records under any circumstance, as argued by The Lakeland Times. Therefore, given § 19.36(10)(d)'s unclear application to misconduct investigation and disciplinary records, the parties in this case have come to three different but plausible interpretations of the statute.
B. Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(10)(d) Does Not Create A Blanket Exception for Disciplinary and Misconduct Investigation Records
¶ 20. The parties' dispute centers on the meaning and application of the term "staff management planning" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d). Kroeplin argues that § 19.36(10)(d) serves as a blanket exclusion of all his misconduct investigation and disciplinary records. More specifically, Kroeplin reasons that because performance evaluations are expressly excepted from disclosure under § 19.36(10)(d) as one *271 among other types of documents related to staff management planning, and because the records The Lake-land Times seeks will likely be used for future performance evaluations, these documents therefore are "absolutely protected" from disclosure. The DNR argues that only certain parts of those records are excepted from disclosure under § 19.36(10)(d). We disagree with both parties' arguments.
¶ 21. We look first to the statutory language itself. As we have explained, the text of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d) is ambiguous insofar as determining whether Kroeplin's misconduct investigation and disciplinary records are excepted from public disclosure. However, we note two things in the language of § 19.36(10)(d). First, the subsection does not expressly except disciplinary records from public access; as The Lakeland Times points out, § 19.36(10)(d) does not contain the word "discipline" within its text. Second, performance evaluations are just one type of document among others listed in that subsection that are exempt from disclosure as containing information an employer uses for "staff management planning." A common sense reading of "performance evaluations" in this context refers to evaluations management generates on a routine basis for planning purposes.
¶ 22. While performance evaluations might make reference to disciplinary records, there is no clear indication by the text of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10) (d) that the legislature intended to exclude access to disciplinary records simply because performance evaluations may contain information gleaned from documents of disciplinary matters. In contrast to the types of documents listed in § 19.36(10)(d) as being exempt because they relate to staff management planning, disciplinary records may contain information of great interest and
*272
value to the public. Previous case law on this topic firmly reflects the public's interest in disciplinary actions taken against public officials and employees, especially those employed in a law enforcement capacity.
See Local 2489 v. Rock County,
¶ 23. In
Ledford v. Turcotte,
¶ 24. The issue in
Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v. School Dist. of Sheboygan Falls,
¶ 25. In
Woznicki v. Erickson,
*274
¶ 26. In
Linzmeyer,
a teacher at Neenah High School was investigated for possible inappropriate contact with female students; no criminal charges were filed and the school district did not initiate any disciplinary action against Linzmeyer.
Linzmeyer,
¶ 27. In
Local 2489,
we explained that the misconduct investigated in that case involving employees of the Rock County Sheriffs Department " 'allegedly occurred in the location where the public has entrusted [the employees] to work and during the performance of [their] public duties, and therefore should be more subject to public scrutiny.'"
Local 2489,
¶ 28. This line of cases plainly demonstrates the great importance of disclosing disciplinary records of
*275
public employees and officials where the conduct involves violations of the law or significant work rules. Kroeplin's construction of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d) would eliminate the holdings of extensive case law on disclosing these type of records by reading into the language of the subsection the implication that the legislature intended to abrogate this important public policy. Abrogation by implication is not, however, the way one would expect the legislature to signal that it is making a significant change in the common law on disclosing disciplinary records of public employees or officials. As the supreme court in
Hathaway
explained, "[i]t would be contrary to general well established principles of freedom-of-information statutes to hold that, by implication only, any type of record can be held from public inspection."
Hathaway,
¶ 29. Kroeplin also contends in his reply brief that all investigative records relating to his possible misconduct are exempt under Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d). This contention rests on the same grounds as his argument for excluding the disciplinary records under the subsection. Thus, we reject his argument as it relates to the investigative records for the same reasons we rejected his argument that his disciplinary records were exempt under § 19.36(10)(d).
¶ 30. There is an additional reason to reject Kroeplin's argument that Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d) serves as a blanket exception for the investigative records. Interpreting § 19.36(10)(d) in conjunction with § 19.36(10)(b), the DNR argues that subsection (10)(b) does not apply to disciplinary records; rather, as the DNR points out, subsection (10)(b) applies only to records of ongoing investigations into an employee's *276 possible misconduct. Consequently, the DNR asserts, if subsection (10)(d) is read in harmony with subsection (10)(b), one cannot plausibly interpret (10)(d) as creating a blanket exception for investigative records. We agree.
¶ 31. Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(10)(b) codifies common law standards
2
and continues our tradition of keeping records related to misconduct investigations closed while they are ongoing, but providing public oversight over misconduct investigations once the investigations have concluded. Once a misconduct investigation has concluded, those records may be disclosed to the public, subject to the common law balancing test. The text of § 19.36(10)(b) is unambiguous and provides in relevant part that "[information relating to the current investigation of... possible misconduct connected with employment by an employee prior to disposition of the investigation" shall not be disclosed, except to an employee or an employee's representative. Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(b). We have construed this sub
*277
section to mean that investigation records of possible employee misconduct shall not be released to the public while the investigation is underway.
Local 2489,
¶ 32. Based on the plain and unambiguous language of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(b) and our holding in Local 2489, we conclude that a public employee's investigation records are not exempt from disclosure under § 19.36(10)(d). Subsection (10)(b) is the only exception to the open records law relating to investigations of possible employee misconduct. Consequently, because there is no dispute that the investigation records at issue here were generated as a result of an investigation into allegations of possible misconduct by Kroeplin, and because there is no dispute that the investigation had achieved its disposition when The Lakeland Times filed its open records request, we easily conclude that these records are not exempt from public disclosure under either § 19.36(10)(b) or (d), subject to the common law balancing test.
¶ 33. We also note, as does the DNR, that the notice requirements under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a), enacted at the same time as Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10), provide another basis supporting our conclusion that § 19.36(10)(d) does not apply to Kroeplin's investigative and disciplinary records. Section 19.356(2) (a) requires an authority to give notice to the employee who is the subject of the open records request of its intent to
*278
disclose certain records, which include records "containing information relating to an employee that is created or kept by the authority and that is the result of an investigation into a disciplinary matter involving the employee or possible employment-related violation by the employee of a statute, ordinance, regulation, or policy of the employee's employer." Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)l. This statute evinces a legislative intent to disclose public employee personnel records of the type involved in this case. Had the legislature intended otherwise, the legislature would not have required an employer to provide notice under § 19.356(2)(a) to the employee that it was intending to release these types of records.
See Kalal,
¶ 34. For the reasons we have explained above, we reject Kroeplin's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d) as creating a blanket exemption for misconduct investigation and disciplinary records.
C. Wisconsin Stat. § 19.36(10)(d) Does Not Exempt Evaluative Judgments From Disclosure
¶ 35. We next turn to consider the DNR's arguments that Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d) excepts the information it redacted from the requested records from disclosure. 3 The DNR argues that Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d) should be read as creating a distinction *279 between factual information, which it asserts may be disclosed, and evaluative judgments, which it asserts are exempt from disclosure under the subsection. 4 We *280 reject this argument. The DNR fails to provide a workable framework in support of this theory. The DNR does not explain how this theory would apply in a case such as this. We note that in practice, the DNR itself does not appear to apply its own theory of statutory construction in making redactions to Kroeplin's records. For example, some evaluative comments are among those not redacted, whereby a voluminous number of facts have been redacted. In addition, nothing in the text of § 19.36(10)(d) supports this approach.
II. Public Interest Balancing Test
¶ 36. Once it is determined that no statutory or common law exception applies, a records custodian can overcome the strong presumption favoring openness by establishing that the public policy favoring disclosure is outweighed by an even stronger public interest favoring nondisclosure.
Hempel,
¶ 37. The balancing test is a two step analysis:
'First, we must decide if the trial court correctly assessed whether the custodian's denial of access was *281 made with the requisite specificity. Second, we determine whether the stated reasons are sufficient to permit withholding, itself a two-step analysis. Here, our inquiry is: (1) did the trial court make a factual determination supported by the record of whether the documents implicate the public interests in secrecy asserted by the custodians and, if so, (2) do the countervailing interests outweigh the public interest in release.'
Wisconsin Newspress, Inc.,
¶ 38. None of the parties argue that the DNR's reasons for denying access to Kroeplin's records were not " 'made with the requisite specificity.'"
Wisconsin Newspress, Inc.,
¶ 39. In a February 3, 2005 letter to the DNR, The Lakeland Times sought access to public records relating to the license plate check requested by Kroeplin to the *282 Minocqua Police Department, including the DNR's conclusions and findings and supporting documents of the investigation into the incident, as well as specific disciplinary measures taken against Kroeplin. The DNR responded in a letter dated February 22, 2005, written by Randy Stark, Director of the Bureau of Law Enforcement at the DNR, first stating generally:
To the extent that your request is for the disciplinary measures taken against Warden Kroeplin, we will initiate the procedures required by s. 19.356(2), Stats., and give Warden Kroeplin notice of our intent to release portions of the disciplinary letter he received and portions of an interdepartmental disciplinary recommendation letter. I am declining to provide you with the balance of the materials requested as doing so would adversely impact the privacy and reputational interests of Mr. Kroeplin.
Stark then provided more specific reasons for withholding redacted portions of the investigative and disciplinary records, including:
a compelling public interest in allowing management to engage in frank discussions of inappropriate job-related actions with agency employees and to protect the reputations of those employees, especially when the employee is a law enforcement officer.
The public policy expressed in section 230.13(l)(c), Wis. Stats., explicitly recognizes that the disciplinary records of individual state civil service employees may properly be withheld from public release. Other statutes expressing trepidation in the release of disciplinary information concerning specific employees include sections 19.36(10)(a) to (d) (employment-related exceptions to the public records statute), 19.85(l)(b) (exemption to the open meetings statute for consideration of public employee discipline) and 103.13 (insuring access *283 to employment records by an affected employee where access by others could legitimately be restricted). Section 19.36(10)(d), Stats., may even reflect an absolute exemption from the public records law as the materials you have requested will in all likelihood be noted in future performance evaluations.
The release of [] all records of public employees who have been subject to discipline would discourage public employers from imposing corrective disciplinary sanctions in the first place and would discourage employees who have been disciplined from acknowledging and correcting their behavior and continuing their public employment. The prospect of having disciplinary records released generally to the public would ultimately discourage competent, conscientious, well-motivated persons from seeking or continuing in public employment.... Mr. Kroeplin is employed as a law enforcement officer. Honoring your request could unduly damage his reputation as an officer and could have a chilling effect on his ability to enforce the law effectively....
¶ 40. The DNR first argues that the redacted information The Lakeland Times seeks to obtain is the type of information the court determined may be properly withheld in
State ex rel. Journal/Sentinel v. Arreola, 207
Wis. 2d 496, 514,
¶ 41. The DNR acknowledges that Arreola addressed an open records request of an ongoing investigation, and then asserts that the reasons for nondisclo *284 sure expressed in Arreola apply with equal force to this case. The DNR fails to explain why we should extend the court's reasoning in Arreola to the circumstances presented here, where the investigation has been completed. In addition, we emphasized in Arreola that our ruling was limited to the facts of that case. See id. at 513. The issue presented in Arreola, whether records of ongoing investigations into possible police mishandling of firearms should be held confidential, is not present in this case. Thus, Arreola does not help us resolve the question before us.
¶ 42. The DNR next argues that the public's interest in a fair employee disciplinary process and in promoting open communication between a supervisor and an employee outweigh the public's interest in disclosure. As we have noted, Stark stated in his denial letter to The Lakeland Times that there is "a compelling public interest in allowing management to engage in frank discussions of inappropriate job-related actions with agency employees" and that release of this information "would discourage employees who have been disciplined from acknowledging and correcting their behavior and continuing their public employment."
¶ 43. However, as The Lakeland Times points out, the DNR's above reason for denying public access to the requested documents is not specific to the particular documents in this case. Rather, the proferred reason appears to apply generally to all disciplinary records, not just Kroeplin's. The DNR misses the mark. The question is whether excepting Kroeplin's disciplinary records would discourage him or others similarly situated from engaging in open communication with their supervisors, and whether the interest in promoting *285 such open communication outweighs the public's interest in knowing about allegations of wrongdoing by law enforcement officers.
¶ 44. There is no debate that Kroeplin, as a warden with the DNR, assumes a quasi-law enforcement role and therefore is subject to scrutiny because he is in a position of trust.
Local 2489,
¶ 45. We also reject the DNR's argument that releasing "raw investigative data and unsubstantiated references to ^different but incomplete investigation by another agency" would unduly damage Kroeplin's reputation. The DNR argues that the disclosure of
*286
certain records containing speculative, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated information about a "separate, apparently ongoing investigation by another agency" would be highly damaging to Kroeplin's reputational interest. Those records involve an investigation into possible criminal misconduct of Kroeplin's nephew. We note that the DNR made no reference to these records in its denial letter to The Lakeland Times and at oral argument the DNR conceded that it did not specify this as one of the reasons for denying the newspaper's request.
See Wisconsin Newspress, Inc.,
¶ 46. Kroeplin makes two other arguments. He first contends that the public's interest in protecting his reputation and privacy outweighs the public's interest in disclosing the requested records. We disagree. As we have discussed, law enforcement officers "necessarily relinquish certain privacy [and reputational] rights [by virtue of the amount of trust society places in them] and must be subject to public scrutiny."
Arreola,
¶ 47. As for Kroeplin's reputation, we observe that this case is similar to
Kailin,
where we dismissed a similar reputation argument as not compelling enough to outweigh the public interest in disclosure because the information the record subject sought to withhold was already in the public domain.
Kailin,
Bilder is not an ordinary citizen. He is a public official subject to close public scrutiny. The documents in issue apparently contain information relating directly to Bilder's professional conduct as police chief. By accepting his public position Bilder has, to a large extent, relinquished his right to keep confidential activities directly relating to his employment as a public law *288 enforcement official. The police chief cannot thwart the public's interest in his official conduct by claiming that he expects the same kind of protection of reputation accorded an ordinary citizen. Even if Bilder could explain why his reputation interest should be protected, he does not explain how opening the documents in issue here will have an incremental effect on his reputation when the public must already know, even by virtue of proceedings he pursues in this court, that he has been suspended as police chief and that he has been charged with misconduct or questionable conduct.
Bilder,
¶ 48. Kroeplin attempts to distinguish his situation from that of a public employee in a high profile position, who, in his view of the law, "should have a much lower expectation of privacy regarding his or her employment records" than a "low-ranking" law enforcement officer. He also argues that the work rule violation at issue in this case is less compelling than the public's interest in the discharge of firearms by law enforcement officers, which was the subject of the open records request in Arreola. We are not persuaded.
¶ 49. Kroeplin ignores other cases involving "lower profile employees" such as school teachers disciplined based on allegations of improper sexual contact with students,
Linzmeyer,
¶ 50. The second argument Kroeplin makes is that the public's interest in the need to conduct thorough investigations by law enforcement officers outweighs the public's interest in disclosure. He asserts that investigators of public employee misconduct and individuals reviewing employee performance "would be less than candid if they feared that their appraisals might be available for public inspection." He argues that public employers would abdicate their duty to create full and complete records of investigations into employee misconduct. Kroeplin looks to Arreola and Cohen for support. This argument lacks merit.
¶ 51. Kroeplin fails to point to any evidence that disclosing records created in the course of investigating employee misconduct and of the subsequent disciplinary action taken would have or has the effect he predicts. In addition, it is unlikely that a supervisor intent on changing the behavior of a subordinate would be anything less than candid. It is a supervisor's job to ensure that his or her employer's interests are adequately protected and that the goals of that employer are reached. We are not persuaded that a conscientious and motivated supervisor would act in any way other than in the employer's best interest, even if that supervisor was aware that information gathered from investigating possible employee misconduct and regarding the disciplinary action taken would be subject to public disclosure. 5
*290
¶ 52. In sum, "[t]he public has a particularly strong interest in being informed about public officials who have been 'derelict in [their] duty.'"
Wisconsin Newspress, Inc.,
CONCLUSION
¶ 53. We conclude that there is no statutory or common law exception barring the disclosure of the records requested by The Lakeland Times. We also conclude, after applying the common law balancing test, that the public's strong interest in accessing these records is not outweighed in any way by any of the reasons offered by the DNR for preventing disclosure.
By the Court. — Judgments and orders affirmed.
Notes
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise noted.
See Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier,
The DNR makes two other arguments, both of which are without merit. The DNR argues that the language of Wis. Stat. *279 § 19.36(10)(d) suggests that the information used for staff management purposes must be used "within a finite temporal period." There is no indication that the legislature intended a construction of § 19.36(10)(d) that turns, in part or in whole, on a distinction of whether the information related to staff management planning was used in the past, is being used now, or will he used in the foreseeable or unforeseeable future. The DNR also argues that because § 19.36(10) (d) excepts "information" rather than a "record" from disclosure, a records custodian must analyze a record to determine which parts are disclosable to the public and to redact the information that is not disclosable. We recognize that an authority releasing a record in response to an open records request is required under § 19.36(6) to sort the nondisclosable information from the disclosable information and redact the information accordingly. However, the DNR does not tell us why this obligation to redact nondis-closable information from records matters in how we construe and apply § 19.36(10)(d), and we see none.
We also observe that the DNR provided several reasons in its denial letter for rejecting The Lakeland Times' open records request that it does not argue on appeal: the public policy in Wis. Stat. § 230.13(l)(c) explicitly recognizes that the disciplinary records of individual state employees may properly be withheld from the public; there are other statutes expressing "trepidation" in the release of disciplinary information concerning public employees, such as Wis. Stat. § 19.85(l)(b) and Wis. Stat. § 103.13; the prospect of releasing disciplinary records to the public would discourage certain persons from seeking or continuing in public employment; and releasing the documents would have a chilling effect on Kroeplin's ability to enforce the law effectively. We deem these reasons abandoned and we therefore consider them no further.
The DNR relies on
Arreola
in formulating its construction of Wis. Stat. § 19.36(10)(d). While it is true that
in Arreola
we found the disclosure of information to be benign where it was
*280
purely factual in nature, unlike this case, it did not involve disclosure of records pertaining to misconduct information.
Arreola,
Kroeplin appears to include a third argument. He acknowledges that the public has a strong interest in accessing *290 records relating to employee discipline where the employee is charged with a crime or with a serious work rule violation. However, he asserts, because he was not charged with a crime or because, at least in his view, the DNR did not accuse him of serious misconduct, the public's interest in the disclosure of his documents is slight. We reject this argument. We recognize that Kroeplin has not been charged with a crime, at least at the time this opinion was written. However, it is not up to Kroeplin to determine whether a particular work rule violation is serious. Here, we view it as serious that Kroeplin was alleged to have violated an important work rule detailing the circumstances under which a law enforcement officer could obtain what is otherwise confidential information by requesting a license plate check.
