37 Wash. 544 | Wash. | 1905
For some time prior to the 18th day of April, 1902, the defendant was engaged in operating a street railway system in the city of Seattle and vicinity. In connection with its railway system, the defendant maintained a ear harn at the comer of Fifth avenue and Pine street, which was used for the purpose of housing, cleaning and repairing its cars during the night, when not in service. The middle or new harn, where the accident which gave rise to this controversy happened,, is sixty feet wide and one hundred eighty feet deep, facing on Fifth avenue. There were five tracks running from Fifth avenue into this barn, and extending substantially its entire length. For a distance of about eight feet from the side walk on Fifth avenue the floor of the barn was on a level with the sidewalk. From this point, about eight feet back of the street line, to a point 122 feet hack from the street line, the cement floor of the bam was constructed about four feet below the threshold of the bam and the street level. Trestles were constructed across this space, which supported the tracks, thus leaving open pits below, so that the running gear and dynamos of the cars might he inspected and repaired from beneath the cars. Between the tracks, extending through the harn, plank walks were laid, to
From fifteen to twenty-five cars were usually housed in tin's bam each night. These cars were shifted about from time to time during the night and in the early morning hours, for the purpose of repairs, and also for the purpose of placing in the front of the harn the cars first due to' leave in the morning. There was á “Ho admittance”
The first regular car to leave this barn in the morning was the car for Green Lake, which left the barn at 5:15 A. M. Tor some considerable time prior to the 18th day of April, 1902, a number of persons were in the habit of going to this barn, for the purpose of taking this first car to Green Lake and other points distant from the city. Trom the testimony it would seem that from four to six persons, on an average, took the first Green Lake ear every morning. A majority of these were police officers, who went off duty at 4:00 o’clock in the morning, and took this first car to reach their homes. The few civilians who took the car were usually persons employed on the city streets or elsewhere during the night, and took the car for the same purpose. These people would reach the car barn some time before the car was due to leave, and would enter the barn and take their seats in the car there to rest, read the paper, or sleep, as they saw fit. So far as the testimony discloses, no person, other than employees, was invited into the barn, and none of the above mentioned persons were forbidden to enter it. The employees of the company were about the bam in the discharge of their duties, cleaning, inspecting, and repairing the cars, and would sometimes, upon inquiry, direct persons entering the bam
The plaintiff in this action was employed on the city streets during the night of the Wth day of April, 1902, and for some time prior to that date. He quit work at 5:00 o’clock on the morning of the 18th, and went to this car barn, to take the first Green Lake car to his home at Fremont, as he had done perhaps a dozen times before. When he reached the car barn on the morning in question, the Green Lake car was standing on the track, almost ready to start, the front of the car being about even with the front of the barn,leaving the entrance at the front of the ear not to exceed from two to four feet distant from the barn door. When all was in readiness, the motorman and conductor gave the usual signals to start, the ear moved forward, the plaintiff attempted to enter through the front door or entrance of the car, and was caught and crushed between the car and the barn door. While there is some slight conflict in the testimony on minor points, and some testimony of a negative character inconsistent with the above statement, the foregoing facts are so clearly established by the testimony as to leave no question of fact for a jury to pass upon. The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages for the injuries thus received, and from a judgment in his favor this appeal is taken.
Two grounds of negligence are alleged in the complaint: First, negligence in the construction and maintenance of the car barn; and second, negligence in the operation of the car by which the respondent was injured. The answer is, in effect, a general denial, and a plea of contributory negligence.
Were the employees in charge of the car negligent in its operation, and was the respondent guilty of contributory negligence? Ordinarily these are questions of fact for a jury, but when honest minds cease to differ upon the facts
For this error, the judgment is reversed, with directions to dismiss the action.