Plaintiff-appellant Kumar Krishna appeals from an order entered July 15, 1992 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Charles S. Haight, Jr., Judge, that denied Krishna’s motion for summary judgment seeking to recover funds payable under an insurance policy on the life of decedent Brij L. Kapur (“Brij”), and granted summary judgment in favor of counterclaim defendant-appellee Rochelle S. Kapur (“Rochelle”) awarding the proceeds of the policy to Rochelle in her capacity as Administratrix CTA of the Estate of Brij L. Kapur. See Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., No. 90 Civ. 4116 (CSH),
We reverse and remand.
Background
This action arises out of conflicting claims to proceeds due under a group life insurance policy (the “Policy”) issued by The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States
The Policy provides that:
The beneficiary of the employee’s insurance for loss of life will be the person(s) named by the employee as shown on the records kept on this policy. An employee may change such beneficiary at any time by giving written notice to thе Equitable. Such change will take effect on entry in such records.
If there is a part of the insurance for loss of the employee’s life for which there is no named beneficiary living at the death of the employee, that part will be paid in a lump sum to the survivors in the first surviving class of those that follow: the employee’s (a) spouse; (b) children; (c) parents; or (d) brothers аnd sisters. If none survives, that part will be paid in a lump sum to the employee’s estate. .
Insurance records will be kept to show, as to each person insured, all the data the Equitable needs to administer this policy. Such records will be set up and kept by the Equitable; or, if the Policyholder and the Equitable so agree by the Policyholder.
At the time of his death, Brij was insured under the Pоlicy for $71,520.00.
On August 15, 1983, Brij made two separate beneficiary designations. In one, he designated Krishna, Brij’s cousin, as sole beneficiary; in the other, he designated both Krishna and Krishna’s wife as beneficiaries.
On March 25, 1989, Brij executed a codicil (the “Codicil”) to his previous will dated June 2, 1982. The Codicil stated:
In order to supersede my Will executed in favour of Kumar Krishna ... I, Brij Lai Kapur ... give and bequeath to my real younger brother Krishen Lai Kapur ... my cash accounts with Colgate Company, New York, N.Y., Provident Bank and two Savings Bank accounts with the Chemical Bank ... Teaneck, N.J. and any other amount both real and personal registered in my name.
The Codicil also bequeathed to Krishеn Lai Kapur “all the rest, residue and remainder of [Brij’s] property both real and personal, wheresoever and howsoever situate.”
Subsequently, in letters to Krishna and Chemical Bank dated September 7, 1989, Brij, through his attorney, revoked a power of attorney previously granted to Krishna and his wife in October 1987 over certain bank accounts maintained by Brij at Chemical Bank, and requested that Krishna return the power of attorney to Brij. The letter to Krishna further advised Krishna that the June 2, 1982 will naming Krishna and his wife as beneficiaries had been “superceded” by a “new will in which you are no longer named as beneficiaries,” and requested the return of the prior will, which had been in Krishna’s possession. Finally, the letter advised Krishna that Brij would not pursue a prior requеst for the return of a Persian carpet and a tiger skin that he had previously given to Krishna. On September 15, 1989, the Krishnas returned the power of attorney, the prior will, two keys to Brij’s home, and two keys to a bank safety deposit box to Brij’s attorney.
On December 21, 1989, Brij executed a new will which revoked all his prior wills and codicils. The new will, like the Codicil, made no specific reference to the Policy, but unlike the Codicil, did not mention “cash accounts with Colgate” or “any other amount ... registered in my name.” Rather, the will made ten specific pecuniary bequests to various relatives, and then stated in a residuary clause:
All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate both real and personal of whatsoever kind or nature and wheresoever situate, including any property subject to a power of appointment exercisable by me, I give, devise and bequeath to my sister-in-law, Roohelle S. Kapur, if she shall survive me, in appreciation for the care and comfort which she has provided to me during an illness.... If my said sister-in-law, Rochelle S. Kapur, does not survive me, I give my said residuary estate to my nephеw, Mukul D. Kapur.
Brij died on December 30, 1989. Thereafter, Krishna delivered proof of Brij’s death to Colgate and demanded payment of the insurance due under the Policy. On January 23, 1990, Rochelle was appointed administratrix CTA of Brij’s estate. Rochelle thereafter expressed to Colgate an interest in pursuing a claim to the Policy proceeds.
On or about May 29, 1990, Krishna commenced this action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, seeking recovery on the Policy. On June 18, 1990, Colgate and Equicor removed the case to federal court on the basis that Krishna’s claims arose under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 (1988) et seq. (“ERISA”), because Brij’s life insurance coverage was provided as pаrt of an employee welfare benefit plan maintained by Colgate. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor,
Krishna then moved for summary judgment. In a July 14, 1992 memorandum opinion and ordеr, the district court denied that motion, and, sua sponte, granted summary judgment in favor of Rochelle in her representative capacity as administratrix of Brij’s estate. See Krishna,
This appeal followed.
Discussion
The comprehensive provisions of ERISA regulаte “employee benefit plan[s],” 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1988), defined to include “employee welfare benefit plants]” and “employee pension benefit plan[s],” or both. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1988). The statute further defines the term “employee welfare benefit plan” to mean:
any plan, fund or program ... established or maintained by an employer ... to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, ... medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment....
Id. § 1002(1) (1988) (emphasis added). In this case, the parties do not dispute that Brij’s life insurance coverage is provided as part of an ERISA employee welfare benefit plan maintained by Colgate for the benefit of its employees, although a copy of Colgate’s plan is not included in the record on appeal.
Section 514(a) of ERISA provides that the statute “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or here
[E]ven when it is appropriate for a federal court to create federal common law, it may use state common law as the basis of the federal common law only if the state law is consistent with the policies underlying the federal statute in question; federal courts may not use state common law to re-write a federal statute.
The district court applied New York law in ruling for Rochelle, stating: “ERISA is silent on the matter of which party shall be deemed beneficiary among disputing claimants. Therefore, I may look to New York law.” Krishna,
Since the formal beneficiary dеsignation requirements are designed to protect the insurance company, where the insurer removes itself from the proceedings and pays the proceeds into the court, there are no public policy reasons to require formal notice of change of beneficiary, and the will of the beneficiary [sic] may control.
As previously stated, the court then concluded that Brij’s intention to disinherit Krishna and favor Rochelle was clear, and rendered summary judgment in favor of Rochelle.
We are not persuaded that New York law should be applied here. Although ERISA is indeed “silent on the matter of which party shall be deemed beneficiary among disputing claimants,” Krishna,
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Hanslip,
The basic preemption provision of ERISA is deliberately expansive. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
A law “relates to” an employеe benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan. Under this “broad common sense meaning,” a state law may “relate to” a benefit plan, and thereby be preempted, even if the law is not specifically designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only indirect.Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, [ 498 U.S. 133 , 139],111 S.Ct. 478 , 483,112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990) (citations omitted). Because the dеsignation of beneficiaries to this life insurance policy “relates to” the ERISA plan, the preemption provision applies. See Carland v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,935 F.2d 1114 , 1118-19 (10th Cir.1991) (designated beneficiary’s claim for wrongful denial of insurance proceeds is related to the plan); McMillan v. Parrott,913 F.2d 310 , 311 (6th Cir.1990) (“The designation of beneficiaries plainly relates to these ERISA plans, and we sеe no reason to apply state law on this issue.”).
The Eleventh Circuit ruled similarly in Brown v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.,
In McMillan v. Parrott,
MacLean v. Ford Motor Co.,
We cited MacLean as an example of appropriate ERISA preemption in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Borges,
Another ... example is MacLean v. Ford Motor Co.,831 F.2d 723 (7th Cir.1987), which held that ERISA preempts state testamentary law to the extent that such law would require an ERISA plan to pay accumulated benefits to a testator’s legatee, rather than to the beneficiary designated under the plan. The Seventh Circuit said, “When, as here, the terms of an employee pension plan under ERISA provide a valid method for determining the beneficiary, that mechanism cannot be displaced by the provisions of a will.” Id. at 728 (emphasis added).
Only in Tesch was state law invoked to provide a supplementary rule for the designatiоn of an ERISA beneficiary. The state law provision in that case provided in sub
Considerations of public policy reinforce the precedents that would bar the use of New York law to settle the issue presented by this appeal. There is a strong interest in uniform, uncomplicated administration of ERISA plans, many of which function in a number of states. See PM Group Life Ins. Co. v. Western Growers Assurance Trust,
Of course, the New York rule invoked by the district court in this ease applies only when a plan administrator interpleads contending claimants and becomes a stakeholder. See In re Estate of Jaccoma,
On the record presented on this appeal, we would be disposed to reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment for Krishna. In the interests of caution, however, we will refrain from an explicit instruction to enter judgment to allow the parties to make further factual submissions in light of this opinion. We note, for example, that the record on this appeal contains only limited quotations from, rather than the full text of, the Policy, and does not include the underlying Colgate benefit plan.
We add, finally, that if we reached the issue posed by New York law, i.e., a more generalized investigation of Brij’s intent on the question of the Policy beneficiary as a result of the Colgate/E quicor interpleader, we would nonetheless reverse and remand. “ ‘Summary judgment is notoriously inappropriate for determination of claims in which issues of intent, good faith and other subjective feelings play dominant roles.’ ” Leberman v. John Blair & Co.,
Conclusion
The order of the district court granting summary judgment to Rochelle is reversed;
Notes
. The complaint in this action apparently mis-7 Fed 3d — 3 named the Equitable defendant as the Equitable
. Krishna’s wife, Dr. Valerie Krishna, is not a party to the current action. According to Colgate and Equicor, she has agreed to release any claim she may have under the Policy. She has not been interpleaded by Colgate or Equicor.
. Section 514(b) states a number of exceptions to the general preemption rule of i 514(a); none of the exceptions apply in this case. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).