169 Ct. Cl. 6 | Ct. Cl. | 1965
Plaintiff, a non-veteran formerly employed by the Federal Aviation Agency, claims that she was unlawfully removed on December 29,1961, on a charge pf making
Plaintiff’s first contention is that she could not be disciplined .or removed on this charge unless the agency determined that the statements in her letters were in fact false. We reject this argument. The sending of anonymous letters of this type to superiors, to fellow employees, and certainly to the wife of a fellow employee, is, in itself, good cause for removal under the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, 5 U.S.C. § 652(a), regardless of whether the anonymous accusations, phrased as these were, have any element of truth. These were not ppen or responsible accusations of official misconduct, properly and temperately made to the cognizant persons, but were snide and intemperate name-calling attacks in unsigned letters — one of them to the wife .of a fellow employee plaintiff accused, in effect, of breaking his marriage vows. Such communications have no place, no sanction, and no privilege in federal employment. It promotes the efficiency of the government service to discipline employees using these methods. Cf. Houston v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl., 38, 297 F. 2d 838, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 815 (1962); Harrington v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 432 (1963). The Federal Aviation Agency’s Employee’s Handbook permitted removal as a consequence of “making false, vicious, or malicious statements concerning another officer or employee of the Government,” and we cannot say that the Agency abused its discretion in imposing that penalty on plaintiff.
The plaintiff’s second point is that her removal was pr,o-cedurally defective because the employing agency failed to follow the requirements of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act and of its own regulations. , She has no standing to make this c,on-
Plaintiff’s excuse for not seeking Commission review is that, even after her removal on December 29, 1961, she had pending an appeal from the Assistant Administrator to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency. The latter did not deny her appeal until April 9, 1962 — too late for an appeal to the Commission under its rules. However, there is no indication here, unlike the Morelli case, supra, that a
In any event, we find no merit in the charges of procedural irregularity, which focus on the Agency’s failure to inform plaintiff of all the materials considered by the Field Board of Grievance Appeals and the Assistant Administrator, and to confront her with any witnesses against her. The Lloyd-LaFollette Act and the Commission regulations did not give these rights to non-veterans. Culligan v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 222 (1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 848 (1947); Jordan v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl. 647, 158 F. Supp. 715 (1957); Meyers v. United States, this day decided ante , p. 1. As for the Agency’s own regulations, there was likewise no violation. They did not require that plaintiff be shown all the information bearing on her case or that other witnesses be heard in her presence and be subject to cross-examination. Nevertheless, she had adequate opportunity to present her side. She testified before the Field Board and her counsel saw the documentary evidence showing that she had typed the anonymous letters.
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and defendant’s cross-motion is granted. The petition is dismissed.
Tbe initial removal date of October 6, 1961, -was extended, in writing, until after tbe decision of tbe Assistant Administrator.
There do not appear to have been any live witnesses other than plaintiff.