Krell v. Codman, 154 Mass. 454

Krell v. Codman

154 Mass. 454 | Mass. | 1891

Holmes, J.

This is an action on a voluntary covenant in an indenture under seal, executed by the defendant’s testatrix in England, that her executors, within six months after her death, should pay to the plaintiffs, upon certain trusts, the sum of ¿62,500, with interest at four per cent from the day of her death.

It is agreed that by the law of England such a covenant constitutes a debt of the covenantor legally chargeable upon his or her estate, ranking after debts for value, but before legacies. But it is contended by the defendant that a similar instrument executed here would be void. The testatrix died domiciled in Massachusetts, and the only question is whether the covenant can be enforced here. If a similar covenant made here would be enforced in our courts, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, and in the view which we take on that question it is needless to examine with nicety how far the case is to be governed by the English law as to domestic covenants, and how far by that of Massachusetts.

In our opinion, such a covenant as the present is not contrary to the policy of our laws, and could be enforced here if made in this State. If it were a contract upon valuable consideration, there is no doubt it would be binding. Parker v. Coburn, 10 Allen, 82. We presume that, in the absence of fraud, oppression, or unconscionableness, the courts would not inquire into the amount of such consideration. Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick. 198, 207. This being so, consideration is as much a form as a seal. It would be anomalous to say that a covenant in all other respects unquestionably valid and binding ( Comstock v. Son, ante, 389, and Mather v. Corliss, 103 Mass. 568, 571) was void as contravening the policy of our statute of wills, but that a paroi contract to do the same thing in consideration of a bushel of wheat was good. So, again, until lately an oral contract founded on *457a sufficient consideration to make a certain provision by will for a particular person was valid. Wellington v. Apthorp, 145 Mass. 69. Now, by statute, no agreement of that sort shall be binding unless such agreement is in writing, signed by the party whose executor is sought to be charged, or by an authorized agent. St. 1888, c. 372. Again, it would be going a good way to say by construction that a covenant did not satisfy this statute.

The truth is, that the policy of the law requiring three witnesses to a will has little application to a contract. A will is an ambulatory instrument, the contents of which are not necessarily communicated to any one before the testator’s death. It is this fact which makes witnesses peculiarly necessary to establish that the document offered for probate was executed by the testator as a final disposition of his' property. But a contract which is put into the hands of the adverse party, and from which the contractor cannot withdraw, stands differently. See Perry v. Cross, 132 Mass. 454, 456, 457. The moment it is admitted that some contracts which are to be performed after the testator’s death are valid without three witnesses, a distinction based on the presence or absence of a valuable consideration becomes impossible with reference to the objection which we are considering. A formal instrument like the present, drawn up by lawyers and executed in the most solemn form known to the law, is less likely to be a vehicle for fraud than a paroi contract based on a technical detriment to the promisee. Of course, we are not now speaking of the rank of such contracts inter sese. Stone v. Gerrish, 1 Allen, 175, cited by the defendant, contains some ambiguous expressions, but was decided on the ground that the instrument did not purport to be and was not a contract. Cover v. Stem, 67 Md. 449, was to like effect. The present instrument indisputably is a contract. It was drawn in English form by English lawyers, and must be construed by English law. So construed, it created a debt on a contingency from the covenantor herself, which if she had gone into bankruptcy would have been provable against her. Ex parte Tindal, 8 Bing. 402; S. C. 1 D. & Ch. 291, and Mont. 375, 462. Robson, Bankruptcy, (5th ed.) 274. The cases of Parish v. Stone, 14 Pick. 198, and Warren v. Durfee, 126 Mass. 338, were actions on promissory notes, *458and were decided on the ground of a total or partial want of consideration.

There is no question here of any attempt to evade or defeat rights of third persons, which would have been paramount had the covenantor left the sum in question as a legacy by will. There is no ground for suggesting an intent to evade the provisions of our law regulating the execution of last wills, — if such intent could be material when an otherwise binding contract was made. See Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray, 227, 232, 233. There was simply an intent to make a more binding and irrevocable provision than a legacy could be, and we see no reason why it should not succeed.

Judgment for the plaintiffs.