28 Mich. 496 | Mich. | 1874
The defendant in error is the wife of Matthew Nichols, and brought suit in the court below to recover of Kreiter the damages sustained by her in being injured in her means of support through the intoxication of her husband, induced by liquors which she alleged Kreiter had furnished him. The suit was brought under an amendment of the prohibitory liquor law, so-called, which was adopted April 18, 1871 [Laws 1871,- Vol. 1, p. 363], and which expressly provides that “every wife, child, parent, guardian, husband or other person, who shall be injured in person, property, means of support or otherwise, by any intoxicated person, or by reason of the intoxication of any person, shall have a right of action in his or her own name against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving away any intoxicating liquor or otherwise, have caused or contributed to the intoxication of such person or persons; and. in any such action the plaintiff shall have a right to recover actual'and exemplary damages.” The jury awarded the plaintiff five hundred and twenty-five dollars, which we infer was intended to include, not only the actual damages proved, but exemplary damages also.
The evidence tended to show, however, that the intoxicating drinks were not furnished to Nichols by the defendant in person, — at least, as a general thing, — and he called witnesses to prove that he refused to let Nichols have such drinks, and instructed his servants to do the same, which they did. It appeared, however, that defendant kept a grocery store, at which liquors were sold, and that he was also a brewer of lager beer; and it was not disputed that Nichols procured liquor at the store and beer at the brewery on some occasions.
The circuit judge charged the jury that if Nichols drank beer at the brewery without the knowledge or consent of defendant, this would not be such, a selling by defendant as would render him liable under the statute.
The proposition that one engaged in the sale of intoxicating drinks shall be held responsible for the acts of his servants in that business, even though in the particular transaction they disobeyed his instructions, is in strict accord with the general rules governing the relation of master and servant, and was correctly applied in the present ease. No man can be excused from responding for the negligent conduct of his servant because of having instructed him to be careful, or for his frauds because of having told him to be honest. While he is not liable for wrongs which the servant may step aside from his employment to commit, he is fully responsible for the manner in which his business is conducted, and if he gives proper directions he must take upon himself the risk of their being obeyed. But we do not perceive that any such principle can be applied to the case of a person who goes without the permission of any one and drinks another’s beer, nor how the fact of the owner demanding and receiving pay for the property can make such owner a wrong-doer in the original trespass on his rights.
By the statute law of this state, as well as the common law, beer is recognized as property, and the brewing of beer,is a lawful business. The law protects this property precisely as it protects any other lawful product. If one steals it from the owner, he is punished for it; if he converts it to his own use in any form, a civil action will lie to recover from him the value. And this civil action would not depend in any degree upon the method or purpose of the conversion. Whether destroyed from a belief in its deleterious effects, or
Any one who happened for any justifiable reason to have intoxicating drinks in his possession which another appropriated without his consent, might thus demand payment for it without being either legally or morally responsible for the injuries which had resulted from the trespasser making use of it. The trespass being against his will, the wrong to him cannot be converted into a public wrong on his part by his compelling the trespasser to make s.uch redress as the law would compel were it appealed to. On this point we think the court was in error.
We also think the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that exemplary damages should not be awarded, unless the act of giving or selling intoxicating drinks ,to the husband of the plaintiff was willful. The term exemplary damages, or as it is sometimes phrased, punitory or vindictive damages, is often very loosely employed in the books, and the controversy over the doctrine which permits the allowance of such damages has been very able and very persistent. But those who go farthest in support of such damages base the right to award them expressly on the willful or wanton conduct of the defendant, — the .moral turpitude or atrocity of the act, which renders it proper that damages by way of punishment should be inflicted beyond what could be measured by way of compensation. Thus Mr. Sedgwick says: “The general principle that in
In this case the parties went to the jury on the evidence with opposing views of what was established by it. The plaintiff claimed to have established a gross ease of disregard of her rights on the part of the defendant in person, by the sale to her husband of intoxicating drinks with full knowledge of the probable consequences. The defendant on the other hand insisted, that Nichols procured the liquors either secretly or from servants who in permitting him to have it disobeyed orders. If the plaintiff’s view was con
Very numerous exceptions were taken on the trial, the most of which we think require no attention at our hands.
We think the court was quite right in allowing the latitude he did in inquiring into the facts, and in holding the law to be valid.
Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered.