аfter stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is contended for the plaintiffs in error, that the statutes of 1851 and 1869 created a contract by which the stockholders of the Shelby Railroad Company were those persons who had becomе so by subscribing for stock or by the payment of taxes, and the right to vote upon stock subscribed for by counties or other municipal subdivisions was in taxpayers only; and that the statutes of 1870 and 1873 first granted to thе Shelby^Railroad District of Shelby County the fight to vote as a stockholder in the railroad compаny, and thereby impaired the obligation of the contract created by the earlier statutеs.
But the insuperable difficulty in the way of sustaining these writs of error is, that it does not appear that thе Court of Appeals of Kentucky gave effect to the statutes of 1870 and 1873 as making any changе in that contract.
The statutes of Kentucky require written opinions to be delivered by the Court of Aрpeals in all cases, and to be recorded by its clerk. Code of Civil Procedure, § 765; Gen. Stat. с. 28, art. 2, § 10; c. 16, art. 1, § 1. By the settled course of decision under the existing judiciary acts of the United States, this сourt may examine opinions so delivered and recorded, to ascertain the ground of the judgment of the State court.
Murdock
v.
Memphis,
20 Wall 590, 633;
McManus
v.
O'Sullivan,
In the cases now before us, the opinions delivered in writing by the Court of Appeals of Kеntucky, recorded by its clerk, and sent up with the transcript, consist of an elaborate opiniоn upon the original hearing, and a shorter one upon a petition for á rehearing.
The original opinion makes no mention of . the acts of 1870 and 1873, but, proceeding wholly upon the construсtion of the charter of 1851, as amended by the act of 1869,'holds,, for reasons stated at length, that by thе legal effect of the act of 1869, defining by boundaries a district in Shelby County, authorizing it to determine by pоpular vote of its inhabitants to subscribe for stock in the railroad company, and requiring bonds to be executed in its name by the county judge to the railroad company for the amount so subscribеd for, the district was made a' corporation, and entitled to all the rights and privileges of other stockholders in the railroad company, and had the right to vote and to receive dividends uрon the stock • thus subscribed for, except so far as owners of property within the district, having paid taxes assessed upon them towards paying the principal sum so subscribed, had received сertificates' of stock for the sums so paid by them; and that the- right of the district to vote and to reсeive dividends upon so much of its stock as'had not been so paid for was not displaced or affected by the issue of certificates of stock to taxpayers for sums paid by them to mеet the accruing, interest on the sum subscribed by the district, because the stock so issued for interest wаs, by the express provisions of the charter constituting the contract between the stockhоlders, to be in increase of the original capital stock.
The opinion delivered on'оverruling the petition for a rehearing reaffirms the positions of the .former opinion, and declares *46 that, while the provisions of the act of 1869, amending the original act of incorporation, were indefinite as to the manner in which stock held by the district should be voted on, the acts of 1870 аnd 1873 did no more than make that certain which was before uncertain, ■ or had been omitted from the original act of incorporation, by giving the district a distinct name and authorizing it to be represеnted by the county judge and justices of the county, and providing a remedy by which the rights of the corpоration might be asserted and its liabilities enforced; but that there had been no change of contract.
■ It thus appears that the State court, upon full consideration,' decided that the аcts of 1870 and 1873 conferred no new rights, but only defined more clearly the manner in which the rights conferrеd by the earlier statutes should be exercised ; and that it based its judgments entirely upon the construction and effect of the earlier, statutes, and upon grounds which would have been equally contrоlling if the later acts had. not been passed. The necessary conclusion is that this court has no jurisdiction to review those judgments.
Bank of West Tennessee
v.
Citizens’ Bank of Louisiana,
Writs of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction.