152 Iowa 604 | Iowa | 1911
This is the second appeal in this case. The issues and facts are fully stated in the opinion on the first appeal, reported in 142 Iowa, 677, and need not be repeated. On the present trial the case was submitted to a jury and a verdict returned for the defendant.
The court gave the following instruction: “If you find from the evidence that there was a wrongful invasion of the privacy of plaintiff’s home, under the writ, and if the evidence fails to show any actual damages resulting therefrom, then the plaintiff would be entitled to recover nominal damages, which are damages of a small amount, such as one cent or one dollar. If only nominal damages are found, no amount can be allowed as exemplary damages.”
The common sense of mankind has never failed to see that the damage done by a wilful wrong to person or reputation, and, in some cases, to property, is not measured by the consequent loss of money. A person assaulted may not be disabled or even disturbed in his business, and may pot be put to any outlay in repairs or medical services. He may not be made poorer in money, directly or consequentially. He may incur no pecuniary damage whatever. . . . When the law gives an action for a wilful wrong, it does it on the ground that the injured person ought to receive pecuniary amends from 'the wrongdoer. It assumes that every such wrong brings damage upon the sufferer, and that the principal damage is mental, and not physical; and it assumes, further, that this is actual, and not meta-physical, damage, and deserves compensation.
See, also, Hawes v. Knowles, 114 Mass. 518 (19 Am. Rep. 383); 1 Sutherland on Damages, 72; 13 Cyc., 43, 44. Under the instruction quoted and others given, the plaintiff was required to fix, in dollars and cents, the damage to his feelings on account of the wrong and insult, and this, of course, he could not do.
The court seems to have submitted the case to the jury on the theory that the plaintiff could not recover exemplary damages, unless he proved personal hatred and ill will toward him on the part of the defendant. But that is not the rule. It was not necessary to prove express malice or ill will toward the plaintiff. It was sufficient to prove that the defendant’s act was wanton and reckless, and in disregard of the plaintiff’s rights. Jenkins v. Gilligan, 131 Iowa, 176.
Other alleged errors are argued, but we do not con
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION.
The petition for rehearing is overruled.