14 F. Cas. 856 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania | 1850
The argument on behalf of the dissatisfied stockholders is very ingenious and plausible. Its defect lies in the assumption of facts, which do not exist in the case, viz., that the charter of the corporation which constitutes the law of .the partnership, permits any other inequality of liability between the stockholders than that arising from the number of shares held by each one: or that a change of this principle is to be presumed, from the practice of the corporation in the division of its profits.
The charter of incorporation contains the fundamental rules which shall govern the corporation, not only as between it and the public, but also as between the stockholders and corporators themselves. As these have been established by law, on grounds of public policy, they cannot be changed but by the consent of the same power, which created the corporation. Much less can it be presumed from any equivocal acts, in the management of the corporation, or the mode of dividing its profits from time to time, that any change has been made in its constitution. The charter of incorporation being the supreme law of the corporation, no usage of its officers in the transaction of their business can change or annul it
By the charter, the stock of this company was divided into C000 shares. Each one of these shares is a unit indivisible, representing a certain and equal portion of the whole. The charter might be obtained under a subscription of less than 6000 shares, and individuals might hold unequal numbers of shares, but a share still remained the same. Whether paid in part or in whole by the law of the corporation, which is the contract of partnership, it represented fifty dollars. The man who subscribed a share and paid but twenty dollars stood debtor to capital stock thirty dollars. That debt was as much a part of the capital stock, as the money lent to strangers who had given their notes for the same. Bach share of stock being a unit, there could be no inequality among the stockholders as to their liability for the debts of the corporation or their right to a dividend of profits, except in the inequality of the number of these shares held by each individual stockholder. And whether the stockholder stood debtor or creditor to the corporation for his stock subscribed, the directors had no power to change the fixed value of this unit, or to say that A.’s share of stock shall represent $20; B.’s 30; and C.’s 50.
They might well say, “You, A., have refused to pay up all the calls; we will not forfeit your stock as we might in strictness do for such neglect; but as you are unable to pay up, you may stand debtor to the corporation for your $30. Our dividends do not much exceed 6 per cent If we should lend you the money to' pay up at bank interest, (which is compound interest,) you would get your dividend on your whole $50; but if you retain the interest, or 6 per cent on your $30, perhaps you will have the best of the bargain. You can take your choice; pay your money and take dividend on $50, or retain $20 or $30, if you please, in your own hands, and credit us with dividends on that amount as set oflf to interest”
By this arrangement the stockholder who wants to lend money, by general agreement, pays in all his share, and gets about 6 per cent, for his dividend or the use of his money, and the stockholder who has no money to lend to others, retains his $20 or $30, and paying no interest; he of course having his dividend on that amount by way of retainer. If the bank paid 8 or 10 per cent, the stockholder would immediately find it his interest to borrow money of the bank, and pay up his stock, and thus share in the higher dividend. In the case of this bank, the dividends do not appear to have held out much encouragement to do this. The defaulting stockholders have had undoubtedly the best of the bargain by this arrangement, and if they had not, they had no reason to complain of the consequences of their own deliberate choice.
Now, in order fairly to distribute the assets of this partnership as between A., B., and O., you must first ascertain the amount of capital stock. That by the law of corporation is, say $150, divided into three shares between A., B., and O., equal partners. Of this capital C., we suppose, owes nothing; having paid his $50; but B. owes to capital stock $20, and A. $30. Now, if A. and B. actually pay up their debts to the firm, there are $50 to be paid to each. But if they retain the one $20 and the other $30, it is as plain, that they are the first paid by retainer, and that C. has a right to be made equal to B. before he gets anything more, and both to be made equal to A., who has paid himself $30 by retainer, before A. can take anything more from the heap. After that, if there is profit, they all divide it equally, and if loss, they all divide it equally, according to the fundamental law of the cor
If there had been a large amount of profits for this final division, and those who by consent were allowed to retain the $20 on each share, and also to retain their interest in lieu of temporary dividends on that amount, should tender a payment of their $20 with interest up to this time, they would undoubtedly have a right to an equal share of the whole. The agreement among themselves to permit this detention or loan of part of the capital, could not affect their right guaranteed by their charter or articles of partnerships, to wit, that each share should be equal, and the only unit on which to base a proper dividend of gains or losses.
So on the contrary, if the whole capital had been sunk, equity would have compelled the delinquent stockholders to pay up their balance, or if there be a partial loss, still the final distribution of the lessened capital, would and ought to be on the same principle of equality, by calculating such debt to stock as part of the capital to be divided, and if not brought in, as actually retained and received by such stockholders.
A part of the stockholders cannot change the fundamental principles of their charter or articles of partnership, either by their default in paying, or election to retain, a portion of the capital. Nor can a chancellor annul the charter or change thé stipulations of the parties, in search of a visionary equity.
Then as to another objection, that if the full paying stockholders had not paid in the money not required of them, the purchase of the United States Bank shares, by which the loss was caused, would not have occurred. It is to be remembered that the purchase was the act of the board, which is the bank. The stockholders, and all the stockholders, are represented by the board, and they neither are, nor can be heard to speak, or seen to act otherwise. How then is A. liable to loss rather than B. or C. ? unless it be on the principle that if I lend a man money which he loses by unwise speculation, he may set up as a plea against its payment, that if I had not lent it to him, he would not have lost it, and that as my own act was the primary cause of loss, therefore I should bear it myself. The plea would be demurrable in law, and is without precedent in a court of chancery.
The case in Louisiana is in point, and we are happy to have our own views supported by so well considered a judgment of a court necessarily familiar with the equitable principles of partnership law. This case, it is true, seems to have been overruled at a subsequent date; but as the learned judge who took chief part on the last decision, was the counsel who argued the first so ably, though unsuccessfully, it may be doubted whether the first case will not be considered, abroad, as the better authority.
Let the decree be that the directors distribute the sum now for distribution among the stockholders, paying to each respectively who may have paid in on the stock subscribed, or held by him more than other stockholders, the amount of such excess. And distribute the assets from time to time and as collected, among the stockholders, paying to each any sum he may have paid on each share of his stock more than any other stockholder on each share of his stock, and so toties quoties until the said stockholders are thus made equal in the amount paid in on their respective shares of stock, and pay from any balance or residue which may remain for distribution an equal dividend or proportion thereof on each share held by each ■ stockholder respectively, so that each stockholder shall receive an equal share or dividend of such residue on each share of stock held by him. Decree accordingly.