Krawiec v. KraftKrawiec v. Kraft
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Shapiro
This is an appeal by the defendants and a cross appeal by the plaintiffs from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas which disallowed certain costs which had been taxed by the clerk of that court. The appeal involves consideration of the provisions of three statutes concerning offers of judgment, § 4 52-193,
1
52-194
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and 52-195.
3
On Tuesday, January 12, 1971, at 10:27 a.m., after trial had been ordered, an offer of judgment in the amount of $3000 was filed by the defendants.
4
On Wednesday,
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January 13, 1971, the case was reached for trial and the selection of a jury began. On January 19, 1971, the jury returned a plaintiffs’ verdict in the amount of $2682.10, comprising the amount of $1800 for Dorothy Krawiec and $882.10 for John Krawiec. The plaintiffs filed their motion to set aside the verdict and sought an additur which the court denied and judgment on the verdict was ordered on February 25, 1971. The plaintiffs filed their bill for costs which had accrued before and after the filing of the offer of judgment. The defendants filed an objection to the taxation of those costs which the plaintiffs had accrued after the filing of the offer of judgment. Thereafter the defendants filed a bill for costs which they had incurred after the filing of the offer of judgment, to which the plaintiffs filed an objection. Pursuant to the provisions of
Pursuant to the provisions of
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The defendants have assigned error in the court’s overruling the clerk’s decision allowing them recovery of costs accruing after the filing of the offer of judgment. Error is also assigned in the court’s conclusion that the defendants did not comply with
¡Before .discussing the three applicable statutes we point to
In
Both the plaintiffs and the defendants assign error regarding the taxation of costs by the court. The defendants claim they are entitled to costs that accrued after the filing of the offer of judgment. The plaintiffs claim they are entitled to all of their costs. The court found that on Tuesday, January 12,1971, at 10:27 a.m., an offer of judgment in the amount of $3000 was filed by the defendants. It further found that the clerk of the court decided that the plaintiffs were entitled to costs accrued before the filing of the offer of judgment and that the defendants were entitled to costs accrued after the filing of the offer. The court upheld the clerk’s taxation of costs relative to proceedings before the filing of the offer. The clerk’s construction of the statutes, which is that advocated by the defendants, most closely approaches that which we deem to be correct.
There is no finding by the court nor any draft finding related to when, if at all, the defendants actually gave notice of filing the offer to the plaintiffs. The record as well as the briefs contain no reference to such notification. This court may, however, take judicial notice of all papers forming a part of the file in the case and use them for any proper purpose. Nichols v. Nichols, 126 Conn. 614, 621, 13 A.2d 591; McCleave v. John J. Flanagan Co., 115 Conn. 36, 38, 160 A. 305; see also State v. Lenihan, 151 Conn. 552, 554, 200 A.2d 476; Politzer v. Jeffrey, Inc., 133 Conn. 605, 606, 53 A.2d 201; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. §§ 312, 313. An examination of the court file discloses the plaintiffs’ “Memorandum on appeal from taxation of costs,” dated April 29, 1971, which recites in part: “On January 12, *452 1971 at 10:27 A.M. the Defendants’ attorney filed, a written offer of judgment in the amount of $3,000.00 and in open court handed the Plaintiffs’ attorney a copy.” The file also discloses the defendants’ offer of judgment, dated January 12, 1971, in the amount of $3000. This bears a certification by the defendants’ counsel stating that “on the 12th day of January, I served a copy thereof to [the plaintiffs’ counsel].”
It appears then that the filing of the notice of the offer and the notification thereof by the defendants to the plaintiffs occurred on the same day, one day before trial. We conclude then that the court was correct in awarding costs to the plaintiffs for the proceedings before the filing of the offer of judgment where that filing coincided with notification of the offer to the plaintiff. The court, however, committed error in refusing to allow costs accruing to the defendants after they gave notice to the plaintiffs of the filing of the offer of judgment. The defendants’ bill for those costs amounts to $661 and the ease is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas with direction to tax costs in favor of the defendants in the amount of $661.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
“[General Statutes] Sec. 52-193. offer of judgment. In any action on contract, or for the recovery of money only, the defendant may before trial file with the clerk of the court a written notice signed by him or his attorney, directed to the plaintiff or his attorney, offering to allow the plaintiff to take judgment for the sum named in such notice.”
“[General Statutes] See. 52-194. acceptance of offer of judgment. In any action the plaintiff may, within ten days after being notified by the defendant of the filing of such offer, file with the clerk of the court a written acceptance of such offer signed by himself or his attorney. Sueh written acceptance being filed, the court shall render judgment against the defendant as upon default for the sum so named and for the costs accrued at, the time of the defendant’s giving the plaintiff notice of such offer. No trial shall be postponed because the period within which the plaintiff may accept such offer has not expired, except at the discretion of sueh court.”
“[General Statutes] Sec. 52-195. offer not accepted, costs. If the plaintiff does not, within said time and before the commencement of the trial, file his notice of acceptance, such offer shall be deemed to be withdrawn and shall not be given in evidence; and the plaintiff, unless he recovers more than the sum named in such offer, with interest from its date, shall recover no costs accruing after he received notice of the filing of sueh offer, but shall pay the defendant’s costs accruing after said time. The provisions of this section shall not apply to eases in which nominal damages have been assessed upon a hearing after a default or after a demurrer has been overruled.”
We note the offer of judgment as having been made in a single lump sum of $3000 by the defendants to the two plaintiffs. As appears, however, from the record before us and as stated in argument, any claim as to any irregularity in sueh an offer was expressly abandoned. We express no opinion in this case regarding this practice as there is nothing in the record to show nor has any claim been made that the plaintiffs’ counsel failed to act in good faith by failing to make a full disclosure to both of his clients of the nature of the offer.