2 Whart. 398 | Pa. | 1837
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The question presented in this case is, was the interest of William Smick'in certain houses and a lot, leasehold or freehold ? or in other words, was it bound by a judgment? For there is no question, that, whether his interest was for years or for life, or in fee, or whether legal or equitable, it was transferable. That is admitted. The appellant says it was bound by the judgment in favour of J. Krause ; if it was a freehold, whether legal or equitable, this would have been the case.
Neither the act of parliament, which, in England, subjected lands, sub modo, to the payment of debts; nor our act of 1700 or 1705, which made them liable to be sold absolutely for payment of debts, expressly provided that a judgment should be a lien on lands. In both countries, however, it was held to bind the lands. Many and different reasons have been given for this. But as both there and here it is expressly assumed by the legislatures of the different countries ; and the time when the lien is to commence, and how long it shall continue, without any act of the plaintiff, and by what proceeding its lien may be prolonged, is expressly provided by different laws, familiar to every lawyer, and even to every man of business. We may content ourselves with saying, that a judgment is alien in Pennsylvania on real estate, by act of assembly; and the nature and extent of the lien is according to the provisions of these enactments.
in England, however, in the courts of law, only the legal estate in lands can be reached; if the right or interest of the debtor is equitable only, his interest can be reached in chancery, or some court having jurisdiction in the chancery forms. Herd such rights could not have been reached by a creditor, unless our courts had applied the forms of the common law to every estate, whether
It was settled in Fleetwood’s case, (8 Co. 171,) that a judgment did not bind the right of a tenant for years; but that after a judgment against a tenant for years, he might sell his interest, and the purchaser hold it, clear of dhe judgment; or rather, that was recognised as the long settled law ; and where the interest of the tenant is only for years, I am not aware that this has, before this case, been disputed. The case of Eli v. Beaumont, (5 Serg. & Rawle, 124,) has been cited. There the landlord gave a lease of a lot for forty-nine years, and it was agreed that the tenant should build on the lot, and at the end of the forty-nine years, the landlord should pay for the improvements; or, if he did not do so, he should convey the Jot in fee to the tenant, at a price to be fixed by referees. The tenant erected buildings worth $2000 ; and it was held, that having
Let it be observed, that the case did not turn on the clause by which the landlord was to pay for the improvements, but is fixed expressly on the latter clause, under, which the tenant might become owner in fee simple.
In the present case the lease is explicit. It is for the term of twelve months from the date, and so from year to year as long as both parties shall please; and after a covenant that the lessee should not assign, and that if he did, the lease should expire, and the lessor have a right to re-enter; it provides, that on the determination of the lease, by assignment, or otherwise by the will of either party, the tenant, or his heirs or executors, should be reimbursed and repaid all his or their reasonable expenses, in building, fencing apd improvements; one third-part immediately, and the remainder in. three yearly payments; not a word about any right ,of the tenant ■to purchase; on the contrary, the terms of the lease, and the admitted meaning and intention of the parties was that he never should become the owner of the fee. The Unitas Fratrum, commonly called the Moravian society, intended to keep the title and the right of possession in themselves. This lease only gave an estate for years; the judgment did not bind it. The decision is right.
Judgment affirmed.