170 Ind. 408 | Ind. | 1908
Lead Opinion
An act of the legislature, approved February 21, 1899, is involved in this appeal (Acts 1899, p. 73, §5903 Bums 1908). The act in question is entitled: “An act concerning the construction of court-houses in counties having a popnlation of more than 25,000 as shown by the last preceding United States census, and declaring an emergency.” Section one, omitting the enacting clause, is as follows: ‘ ‘ That it shall be unlawful for the board of county commissioners of any county having a population of more than 25,000, as shown by the last preceding United States census, to order or contract for the construction of any courthouse in such county unless a petition therefor be filed by at least 500 reputable resident freeholders of said eomfi^. Any order or contract made in violation of the provisions of this act, shall be null and void: Provided, that the provisions of this act shall not apply to the relocation and erection of court-houses pursuant to the provisions of an act passed
On August 9, 1905, a petition praying for the construction of a court-house on the public square in the city of Peru, the county-seat of Miami county, was presented to the board of commissioners of said county. This petition upon its face purported to be signed by 573 reputable resident freeholders of said county. The following are some of the reasons assigned therein to show the necessity for building a courthouse: “(1) The present court-house is fast falling into a condition of decay, and is now almost untenantable. There is a constant danger of some part of it giving away, and its condition constitutes a menace to the safety of all who are required to occupy it or resort to it for the transaction of business. To repair it would'cost a large sum of money, and it would still be an old court-house, antiquated in design, incommodious in its arrangement, and utterly insufficient in size for present needs. (2) The present court-house has not room to accommodate with offices more than one-half the county officers who are required to keep an office. The county sheriff, county assessor, county surveyor, county superintendent and county coroner are all without offices in the court-house. Nor is there any room for the county commissioners, for library, for witnesses, for consultation nor rooms for the judge in connection with the court room, and the only jury rooms are the mansard roof, from which a jury could not hope to escape in case of fire below. No alterations or remodeling of the present structure could remedy these defects or provide the additional rooms necessary for the proper transaction of the county business. ’ ’
After this petition had been considered by the board of commissioners, the board entered of record its finding as follows: “Having duly considered said petition, do find that there is in said Miami county a population of more than 25,000, as shown by the last preceding United States census of 1900; that said petition is duly signed by more than 500
Appellees successfully demurred to this answer, and appellant refused to plead further, but elected to abide by his answer. Thereupon judgment was rendered against him on the demurrer.
From this judgment he prosecutes this appeal, and assigns as error the ruling of the Cass Circuit Court in sustaining the demurrer to his answer.
The theory of appellant, as advanced by his counsel, is that inasmuch as it appears that Miami county has a population of over 25,000, as shown by the census of 1900, the act of 1899, supra, is applicable thereto; that, in the absence of the petition required by said act, the order made by the board of commissioners of said county for the construction of the court-house in question is absolutely void; that the board had no authority to enter upon the construction of a court-house or make any contracts in respect thereto; that, therefore, the contract made between the board and appellees is void and no claim for services thereunder is valid or enforceable against the county. Counsel assert that because appellant alleged in his answer that no such petition as the one required by the act in question was presented to the
In Town of Longview v. City of Crawfordsville, supra;
In Lodi Tp. v. State (1889), 51 N. J. L. 402, 18 Atl. 749, 6 L. R. A. 56, the court said: “The rule is, that in any classification for the purpose of a general law, all must be included and made subject to it and none omitted that stands upon the same footing regarding the subject of legislation. To omit one so circumstanced is as fatal a defect as to include but one of a number.”
In State, ex rel., v. Parsons (1878), 40 N. J. L. 1, in considering special lawSj the court said: ‘ ‘ Interdicted local and special laws are all those that rest on a false or deficient classification; their vice is that they do not embrace all the class to which they are naturally related; they create preferences and establish inequalities; they apply to persons, things or places possessed of certain qualities or situations, and exclude from their effect other persons, things or places
Judgment affirmed.
Rehearing
On Petition for Rehearing.
Appellant in this case and also appellant in the appeal of Macy v. Board, etc. (1908), post, 707, have both petitioned for a rehearing in the respective cases. They unite in a joint presentation of the reasons and arguments for a rehearing, hence the questions as the same are herein determined upon the petition now under consideration will control in Macy v. Board, etc., supra.
Appellant expressly waives the reconsideration of the constitutional validity of the act of 1899 (Acts 1899, p. 73, §5903 Burns 1908) “concerning the construction■ of courthouses,” and predicates his right to a rehearing (1) upon the ground that we erred in sustaining the petition of appellees to transfer the cause from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court under the second subdivision of §1394 Burns 1908, Acts 1901, p. 565, §10; (2) on the omission or failure of the court to decide certain propositions at the former hearing. We take up these questions in their order.
The two questions which counsel for appellant assert were passed at the former hearing, without being given consider
The insistence of counsel for appellant is that the contract between the county and appellees, entered into on December 18, 1905, at the meeting of the board of commissioners held on that day, was void, for the reasons, .(1) that “the board of commissioners having adjourned on December 8, 1905, ‘until court in course,’ was without power to reconvene for any purpose whatever until the first Monday in January, 1906, unless convoked by the auditor; (2) that the order of the board on December 8, 1905, that it meet in special session December 15, 1905, was inoperative and void;
It was for this purpose that the board exercised the power of ordering the nunc pro tunc entry as it did. As a general rule, where a record has been entered nunc pro tunc, it must be accepted and regarded to the same extent as though it had been entered at the proper time. Leonard v. Broughton (1889), 120 Ind. 536, 16 Am. St. 347; Mayer v. Haggerty (1894), 138 Ind. 628; City of New Albany v. Endres (1896), 143 Ind. 192, and authorities cited.
Such an adjourned meeting operates as a continuation of the former meeting of the board at which the order of adjournment is made, and any business transacted at such adjourned meeting is as legal as though it had been transacted at the meeting or session of which it is a continuation. Stockton v. Powell (1892), 29 Fla. 1, 10 South. 688, 15 L. R. A. 42, 52; Butterfield v. Treichler (1901), 113 Iowa 328, 85 N. W. 19; Town of Waterville v. County Commissioners, etc. (1871), 59 Me. 80; 11 Cyc. Law and Proc., 396.
It follows under the facts and the law applicable thereto
It follows, therefore, that the attempt of the council to repeal by resolution the appropriation of $7,000 was, for the
We are satisfied upon the consideration of all of the material points involved in this cause that appellant has failed to maintain his appeal. Petition for rehearing is overruled.