MAX KRASHIN ET AL. V. NETTIE GRIZZARD ET AL., Appellants.
Division One
October 14, 1930
31 S. W. (2d) 984
The petition herein is lengthy, covering some twenty pages of the printed abstract of the record, and its very length precludes the setting forth of the petition in haec verba herein. In substance, and epitomized, the petition avers that the plaintiffs, Max Krashin and Dora Krashin, are, and have been since September 18, 1922, the joint owners of Lot 2, in Block 1, Victoria Addition, in Kansas City, Missouri, otherwise known and designated as numbers 1604-1606 East 12th Street; that, on December 24, 1923, the defendants herein, in order to cheat, wrong and defraud the plaintiffs herein, filed in the Circuit Court of Jackson County a suit in equity, numbered 203241, against the plaintiffs herein (as defendants in said suit), to set aside, cancel, and for naught hold, certain deeds and muniments of title under and by which the plaintiffs herein acquired and claim title and interest in and to the above described real estate, and to vest the title to said real estate in the defendants herein; that plaintiffs herein, in due and proper time, prepared and filed their motion to stay the proceedings in Cause No. 203241, and deposited said motion, and a copy thereof, at the regular place for filing said
The answer joined issue on the averments of the petition, and pleaded the integrity and finality of the judgment in cause. No. 203241, and specifically denies that plaintiffs herein have a meritorious defense to said Cause No. 203241.
Evidence was adduced on behalf of plaintiffs tending to prove that they had retained an attorney to represent them in defending against the Cause No. 203241 in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. The attorney testified on the trial of the instant cause that he had been retained by the plaintiffs herein “to take care of the case (No. 203241) on behalf of all the defendants therein;” that, in due time,
The witness, Haney, Deputy Clerk of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, testified that, on and prior to January 24, 1924, he had charge of the filing of pleadings in said court; that, some time in the fall of 1924, he was requested by counsel for defendants in Cause No. 203241 to make a search for all pleadings that had been filed in the circuit court on January 24, 1924; that he examined the record of filings made on January 24, 1924, so as to see what pleadings had been filed, and in what causes such pleadings had been filed, as disclosed by the record of the court on that day; that he then made a search of the files in all causes in which pleadings were shown by the record to have been filed on January 24, 1924, and found the motion to stay proceedings in Cause No. 203241, which motion, without having been stamped or marked “filed” with the usual filing stamp, was enclosed and enfolded within a pleading which had been filed on January 24, 1924, in another and different cause, numbered 203021; that it was the usage and custom of the office, whenever the filing clerks were busy, to permit pleadings filed on any single day to accumulate during the day, and, later in the day, to stamp “filed” on all of the pleadings so filed and accumulating during the day, and to send the various pleadings so stamped “filed” to the deputy clerks
On behalf of the defendants herein, the attorneys for the plaintiffs in Cause No. 203241 testified that they had no knowledge or information whatsoever of the purported filing of the motion to stay proceedings in said Cause No. 203241; that they never were served with a copy of said motion, and had never had any conversation with the attorney for the defendants in said Cause No. 203241, respecting the filing of said motion, or respecting the calling of said motion for hearing and disposal by the court; that they searched the record of the circuit court in Cause No. 203241, prior to the listing of said cause as a default case, and the record showed no motion to be pending in said cause, and showed no answer of the defendants to be on file therein; that, in view of the record in said Cause No. 203241, they listed the cause for trial and hearing by the court as a default case, and on May 29, 1924, the day the cause was set for hearing by the circuit court, the defendants therein having failed to appear and answer the petition, evidence was adduced by the plaintiffs in said cause in support of the averments of the petition, whereupon the court rendered a judgment by default in favor of the plaintiffs therein, in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
Upon the conclusion of the trial of the instant cause, the chancellor below announced his findings and conclusions, as follows:
“Well, gentlemen, I think this case might as well be disposed of now by the court. As I have said heretofore, it has been clear to the court, and I think you will all agree with me, there are two elements in this case, and one is whether or not the default (judgment) was taken through fraud or mistake, and, if so, secondly, whether or not there would be a meritorious defense to the Cause No. 203241, were it reinstated, or were the judgment set aside. It is evident to me that there is a very substantial defense to that cause. The witnesses are apparently very contradictory, and I think the issues should be heard, if the judgment be set aside, and certainly as to some of these plaintiffs, and probably as to all the plaintiffs, there is a meritorious defense to the case. Now, as to the other element, as to the default. There remains undisputed that
Thereupon, the trial court entered a decree and judgment, as follows:
“The court, being fully advised in the premises, finds from the evidence that the motion to stay proceedings, referred to in the
“The court further finds that, on the 24th day of January, 1924, upon which day said motion to stay proceedings was filed in said Cause No. 203241, by error, accident, or mistake on the part of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, at Kansas City, said motion to stay proceedings was not marked filed, but was by said clerk mislaid or misfiled, so that said motion was not made of record in said Cause No. 203241.
“The court further finds that there was no fraud practiced by either the plaintiffs, or their attorneys, in said Cause No. 203241, or attempt made to mislead either the court or the attorneys for the defendants in said Cause No. 203241, in the procurement of the said default decree therein on said 29th day of May, 1924, and that said cause was listed as a default case, by the attorneys for the plaintiffs therein, in good faith and in the honest belief that the same was in default.
“The court further finds that the plaintiffs in this cause, being the defendants in said Cause No. 203241, have, and at all times had, a prima-facie meritorious defense to said Cause No. 203241, and that said judgment or decree (complained of herein) in said Cause No. 203241 was the result of accident or mistake due to the error of the clerk of this court, as aforesaid, unmixed with the negligence of the plaintiffs in this cause, or of the defendants in Cause No. 203241, or their attorney.
“The court further finds that said judgment or decree, complained of herein, rendered in said Cause No. 203241, should be cancelled, set aside and for naught held, and defendants herein (plaintiffs in said Cause No. 203241) should be perpetually enjoined from seeking to execute, in any manner whatsoever, or to avail themselves of, said judgment or decree rendered in said Cause No. 203241, and that the costs herein should be remitted to both parties.
“It is therefore adjudged and decreed that the judgment or decree taken by plaintiffs (defendants herein) in said Cause No. 203241 in this court be cancelled, set aside and for naught held, and that plaintiffs in said Cause No. 203241 (defendants herein) be perpetually enjoined from in any manner whatsoever availing, or
After an unsuccessful motion for a new trial, the defendants herein were allowed an appeal to this court. This court has jurisdiction of the appeal because the cause involves title to real estate.
The appellants, in their brief, present thirteen separate assignments of error. The several assignments of error, however, may properly be combined or grouped into two main assignments, namely: (1) that the petition does not state facts sufficient to invoke the powers and interposition of a court of equity; and (2) that the trial court erred in finding for the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and in entering a decree setting aside the default judgment rendered in Cause No. 203241 in the Circuit Court of Jackson County.
I. It is charged by appellants that the petition herein does not state facts sufficient to warrant, or to authorize, the interposition of a court of equity. The petition sets out, with great particularity, all of the facts and circumstances leading up to the rendition of the default judgment in the Circuit Court of Jackson County in Cause No. 203241, which facts and circumstances, if proven and found to be true, tend to establish fraud in the procurement of said default judgment, or that said default judgment was rendered by the Circuit Court of Jackson County because of accident or mistake on the part of the officers of that court in failing to make a record of the filing of the motion to stay proceedings in said Cause No. 203241. Fraud in the procurement or concoction of a judgment has uniformly been held by this court to be a sufficient and proper ground for the interposition of a court of equity, where the injured party timely invokes the aid of equity in setting aside such a judgment. [Davidson v. Real Estate & Inv. Co., 226 Mo. 1, 27; Smith v. Hauger, 150 Mo. 437, 444; Nelson v. Barnett, 123 Mo. 564, 570; McClanahan v. West, 100 Mo. 309, 320.] It is likewise well established in the jurisprudence of this State that a court of equity will interpose its aid when a wrong has been done to a litigant through accident or mistake as readily as when there has been fraud in the concoction or procurement of a judgment. [Smoot v. Judd, 161 Mo. 673, 687; Bresnehan v. Price, 57 Mo. 422, 424; Jackson v. Chestnut, 151 Mo. App. 275, 279; McElvain v. Maloney (Mo. App.), 186 S. W. 745, 749.] The petition herein states ample and sufficient facts to invoke the aid and powers of a court of equity in setting aside
II. Having ruled herein that the petition states sufficient facts to invoke the powers and interposition of a court of equity, we pass to the last assignment of error presented by the appellants, namely, that the trial court erred in finding for the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and in entering a decree setting aside the default judgment rendered and entered in Cause No. 203241 in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. Our ruling upon the latter assignment of error is dependent upon whether there is substantial and sufficient evidence herein to establish the equitable cause of action stated in the petition. Laying aside the consideration of the question whether there is sufficiently substantial evidence to establish the charge or allegation of fraud in the procurement of the default judgment entered in Cause No. 203241 in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, nevertheless we are convinced from our examination and study of the record herein that there is sufficiently substantial evidence to establish the fact that the default judgment in Cause No. 203241 was mistakenly made and entered by the Circuit Court of Jackson County by reason of the mistake of an officer (the clerk) of that court in failing to mark as filed (and in failing to enter the filing upon the record of the circuit court) a pleading which the evidence tends strongly, and almost conclusively, to show was actually filed by the defendants in said Cause No. 203241, and which, by reason of its having been actually filed in said cause, although not so marked by the clerk, or the filing entered upon the record of the court in said cause, prevented the said Cause No. 203241 from being at issue, and properly triable and submissible to the court as a default case. Such was the conclusion and finding of the learned trial court in the instant cause, and, having ourselves reached the same conclusion and finding from the record before us, we must leave the finding and conclusion of the trial court undisturbed.
As is said in 32 Corpus Juris, 96, 97: “In the exercise of its jurisdiction to protect against the consequences of accident or mistake, a court of equity will interfere (intervene) to restrain by injunction (or otherwise) the use of an advantage gained in a court of law, which must necessarily make that court an instrument of injustice, in cases where such advantage has been gained by accident or mistake.” The applicable principle thus stated has been uniformly followed and applied in our own jurisdiction. [McElvain v. Maloney (Mo. App.), 186 S. W. 745, 749; Smoot v. Judd, 161 Mo. 673, 687.]
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion by SEDDON, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All of the judges concur.
SEDDON, C.
NEWTON COUNTY FARMERS & FRUIT-GROWERS EXCHANGE, Appellant, V. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
Division One
October 14, 1930
31 S. W. (2d) 803
It is next contended that defendant was entitled to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The motion for new trial was filed on February 2, 1927, at which time defendant was granted ten days in which to file affidavits in support of the motion. On February 10, 1927, defendant filed the affidavit of Cleora Young. Plaintiffs thereafter filed counter affidavits. The motion for new trial does not set out the newly discovered evidence or the substance thereof. The statute provides that a motion for new trial shall be in writing and must set forth the grounds and causes therefor. [
We have concluded that the judgment should be affirmed as to defendant Phillip Levine, and reversed as to defendant Hasse Realty Company. It is so ordered. All concur.
