Defendant assigns as error that the- order is improvidently made and that the circuit court had no jurisr diction to make the same. So far as we have been able to discover, there seem to be no indicia of improvidence or abuse of discretion in granting the order if the cause of ae? tion survivеd the death of the wrongdoer.' Due and proper proceedings were had pursuant to seс. 2803, Stats. 1911, which provides that “In case of the death or other disability of a party, if the cause of action survives or continues, the court, on motion, at any time within one year thereafter or, afterwards, on a supplemental complaint, may allow or com
“In addition to the actions which survive at common law the following shall alsо survive: Actions for the recovery of personal property or the unlawful withholding or conversion thereof, for assault and battery, false imprisonment or other damage to the person, for all damage done to the property rights or interests of another, for goods taken and carried away, for damages done to real or personal estate, equitable actions to set aside conveyances of real estate, to compel a reconveyancе thereof, or to quiet the title thereto, and for a specific performance of contracts relating to real estate.”
Unless some statute can be found providing for survival, the action abates. Such was the rule of the common law. Milwaukee Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Sentinel Co.
It is claimed by plaintiff that the clause “for all damage done to the property rights or intеrests of another” provides for the survival of the action against the estate of the tort-feasor. Such clause was added to sec. 4253 by ch. 353, Laws of 1907, to make the survival statute, as was stated in Harris v. Welch,
The ground upon which it has been held that an action for wrongful death does not survive the death of the wrongdoer is that it does not accrue until the death of the injured 'party, and it is then not a devolution of any pre-existing сause of action, but is purely a statutory creation given not for any damage to the persоn or to the property rights or interests of the beneficiaries, but as a new and independent cause of ac
In Devine v. Healy,
In view of the origin of our statute and the сonstruction given similar statutes by New York and other courts, we deem it better to follow such constructions than to examine the question from an original point of view. This is in conformity with the ruling in Sutherland v. Drolet,
By the Court. — Order reversed, and cause remanded with directions to dismiss the, complaint.
