The question in this case is whether Maryland courts should enforce a gambling contract, made in another state where the type of gambling engaged in is lawful and the contract is enforceable, when the type of gambling is illegal in Maryland.
I.
On October 29, 1981, while in Atlantic City, New Jersey, Richard E. Kramer wrote a check in the amount of $5,000, drawn upon the Maryland National Bank, and payable to Bally’s Park Place, Inc. The check was dishonored, and Bally’s sued in New Jersey to recover from Kramer. On March 9, 1984, the New Jersey Superior Court rendered a default judgment in favor of Bally and against Kramer for $6,350.
Thereafter, Bally’s filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County accompanied by a motion for summary judgment. The complaint set forth two alternative grounds for relief. First, Bally’s sought to enforce the New Jersey judgment against the defendant. Second, Bally’s sought to recover on the underlying contract and debt.
Kramer opposed the motion for summary judgment, maintaining that Bally’s claim depended upon the resolution of certain material facts. Specifically, Kramer stated in an affidavit that he “was not served with process in said New *389 Jersey action prior to entry of [the] default judgment against him.” If he had not been served, the New Jersey court would have lacked jurisdiction over Kramer and its judgment would be unenforceable. Kramer also asserted that the “consideration for the alleged obligation on which said New Jersey action is sought to be based, viz., alleged gambling debts, is not recognized as a legal or valid consideration in the State of Maryland.” Kramer argued that the court, in order to determine whether Bally would be entitled to judgment on the underlying contract, would have to resolve whether the obligation was a gambling debt. Kramer did not, however, dispute the existence of the debt itself; he asserted that “[a]ny alleged debt which the plaintiff, Bally’s Park Place, Inc., claims I owe it is a gambling debt.”
After a hearing, the circuit court granted Bally’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Bally for $6,350. Kramer appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Before the case was heard by the intermediate appellate court, this Court issued a writ of certiorari.
II.
Preliminarily, we note that because the trial court granted Bally’s motion for summary judgment, we view the facts, including all inferences, in the light most favorable to Kramer, the nonmoving party.
Natural Design, Inc. v. Rouse Co.,
*390 III.
When determining which law controls the enforceability and effect of a contract, this Court generally applies the principle of
lex loci contractus.
Under this principle, the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was made controls its validity and construction.
Bethlehem Steel v. G. C. Zarnas Co.,
Occasionally, however, the
lex loci contractus
principle will not be applied. Thus, under certain circumstances, Maryland courts will not enforce an out-of-state contract provision which is against Maryland public policy.
See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., supra,
*391
In
Bethlehem, Steel v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., supra,
we recently reviewed the public policy exception to the
lex loci contractus
principle. That case involved a construction contract, executed in Pennsylvania, in which the “promisor agreed to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee.”
“This is not a situation where Maryland law is simply different from the law of another jurisdiction. Here, the General Assembly of Maryland has specifically addressed clauses in construction contracts providing for indemnity against the results of one’s sole negligence, and has unequivocally told the Maryland judiciary that such a clause ‘is void and unenforceable.’ § 5-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Moreover, in the same sentence of the statute, the General Assembly expressly stated that such indemnity provision ‘is against public policy.’ Unless there is a contrary indication elsewhere, and absent constitutional considerations, the General Assembly’s explicit determination of public policy is sufficient in a case like this to override the lex loci contractus principle.”
Moreover, we noted in
Bethlehem Steel
that “the parties contracted in Pennsylvania to do something which Pennsylvania law merely tolerates. No Pennsylvania statute expressly creates a right of the parties to so contract. On the other hand, a Maryland statute specifically forbids, on public policy grounds, the enforcement of a contractual agreement such as that involved here.”
The parties in the present case have proceeded on the assumption that Maryland law would preclude enforcement of the contract or debt had it been entered into in Maryland. Assuming arguendo that this is correct, the question, then, is whether the New Jersey contract is so violative of Maryland public policy that a Maryland court should refuse to apply New Jersey law. 2
IV.
In order to determine whether Maryland public policy is so strong as to preclude application of New Jersey *393 law, we first review the pertinent Maryland law concerning enforcement of gambling contracts and debts. In our view, the relevant judicial opinions and statutes do not represent a public policy so strongly opposed to gambling or gambling debts that it overrides the lex loci contractus principle.
The current statutory provision relating to the enforcement of gambling debts or contracts is found in Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 243. With § 243, the General Assembly has provided a civil remedy that allows the gambler to recover any money lost but prohibits recovery of money won. 3
The early cases applying what is now § 243 all involved forms of gambling that were, at the time, illegal in Maryland. In these cases, this Court applied § 243 literally,
*394
voiding debts created through gambling. In
Emerson v. Townsend,
In
Bender v. Arundel Arena,
Bender
establishes that Maryland public policy concerning the enforceability of gambling debts and contracts largely depends on whether the type of gambling engaged in is legal or illegal.
4
When § 243 is considered in light of
*395
Bender,
it is clear that the statute differs significantly from the statute at issue in
Bethlehem Steel v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., supra.
The statute in
Bethlehem Steel,
§ 5-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, unequivocally told the Maryland judiciary that certain indemnification provisions were “void and unenforceable” and expressly stated that such provisions are “against public policy.”
Moreover, under
Bender,
many types of gambling debts are enforceable as a matter of Maryland law. This is because several forms of gambling are legal in Maryland. Currently statutes authorize bingo and other gambling games in numerous subdivisions of the State.
See, e.g.,
Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol., 1987 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, §§ 255A through 261D. Some of the statutes are written in broad terms authorizing, under certain conditions, many types of gambling activities, including bingo, raffles, chance books, “paddle wheels,” “wheels of fortune,” “card parties,” and games of skill. Section 255 of Art. 27 also broadly authorizes various gambling activities in numerous counties by volunteer fire companies or by fraternal, civic, war veterans’, religious or charitable institutions.
See American Legion v. State,
Also, in 1972, the Maryland Constitution was amended to allow “a lottery to be operated by and for the benefit of the State.” Art. Ill, § 36. Since that time, the State has been extensively involved in the management and operation of various types of lotteries.
See, e.g.,
Code (1984, 1987 Cum. Supp.), § 9-101 through 9-125 of the State Government Article. Additionally, the State has long authorized betting upon licensed horse racing. The State Racing Commission was established in 1920, Ch. 273 of the Acts of 1920.
See also
Code (1957,1980 Repl. Vol., 1987 Cum.Supp.), Art. 78B;
James & Gamble v. State,
In light of the Bender holding, and the extent of legal gambling in Maryland, we cannot conclude that there is a sufficiently strong Maryland public policy against gambling debts that would justify disregarding the lex loci contractus principle.
Additionally we note that other states that have addressed this issue have reached a similar conclusion. For example, in
Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden,
“Public policy is not determinable by mere reference to the laws of the forum alone. Strong public policy is *397 found in prevailing social and moral attitudes of the community. In this sophisticated season the enforcement of the rights of the plaintiff in view of the weight of authority would not be considered repugnant to the ‘public policy of this State.’ ... The legalization of parimutuel betting and the operation of bingo games, as well as a strong movement for legalized off-track betting, indicate that the New York public does not consider authorized gambling a violation of ‘some prevalent conception of good morals [or], some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.’ ” ...
“The trend in New York State demonstrates an acceptance of licensed gambling transactions as a morally acceptable activity, not objectionable under the prevailing standards of lawful and approved social conduct in the community---- Informed public sentiment is only against unlicensed gambling, which is unsupervised, unregulated by law and which affords no protection to customers and no assurance of fairness or honesty of the operation of the gambling devices.”
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in
Caribe Hilton Hotel v. Toland,
*398 We therefore hold that Maryland courts will enforce a gambling debt incurred in another state where the gambling is legal and the debt enforceable. Consequently, the circuit court properly granted Bally’s motion for summary judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
Notes
. Kramer does not challenge the validity of the gambling debt under New Jersey law. In
Bethlehem Steel,
. While we make this assumption about Maryland law for purposes of this decision, it is not at all clear that a contract entered into in Maryland, to engage in a form of gambling which is lawful in the area in which it is to be performed, but which would be illegal gambling if performed in Maryland, would be unenforceable under Maryland law. The Maryland cases refusing to enforce contracts of this type have all involved gambling activities that were illegal in Maryland where the gambling took place.
See, e.g., Emerson v. Townsend,
If Maryland law would not preclude enforcement of the contract under these circumstances, there really is no conflict between Maryland láw and New Jersey law. Thus, the question of whether Maryland’s public policy is so strong as to preclude application of New Jersey law would not logically arise. We need not rule on this matter in this case. Rather, as pointed out above, we will assume that Maryland public policy would preclude enforcement of the contract in the present case had it been entered into in Maryland although the gambling was to take place in New Jersey.
. Section 243 provides,
"Any person who may lose money at a gaming table may recover back the same as if it were a common debt, and shall be a competent witness to prove the sum he lost; but no person shall recover any money or other thing which he may have won by betting at any game or by betting in any manner whatsoever.” Section 243 incorporates the provisions of the Statute of Anne, 9 Anne, c. 14 (1710),
reprinted in
2 Alexander’s British Statutes 932 (Coe’s Edition 1912). 9 Anne, c. 14 is a part of Maryland common law.
Gough v. Pratt,
Gambling activities were virtually unrestricted in Maryland until the enactment of the Statute of Charles, 16 Charles 2, c. 7 (1664), reprinted in 2 Alexander, British Statutes, supra, 643. The Statute of Charles did not, however, outlaw gambling. Rather, it merely attempted to prohibit excessive gambling. A person could lose any amount of "ready money” and up to one hundred pounds in credit. For losses (other than in ready money) “above said Sum of one hundred Pounds, [the person] shall not in that Case be bound ... to pay or make good the same.” The statute also provided that persons winning amounts in credit of over 100 pounds “shall forfeit ... treble the Value of such ... Sums of Money.”
9 Anne, c. 14 took a more prohibitory approach toward gambling while still not outlawing it. This statute declared "utterly void” all gambling debts where any part of the consideration was for money "won by gaming or playing at Cards, Dice, Tables, Tennis, Bowls or Other Game or Games.” In addition the statute provided that persons losing money from gambling activities in excess of ten pounds “shall be at Liberty, within three months then next to sue for and recover the Money or Goods so lost.”
. In this respect, Maryland law relating to the enforceability of gambling debts differs from the approach'taken by some other state courts
*395
that have held that public policy even precludes enforcement of contracts relating to legal gambling.
See Sandler v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Court, Etc.,
. For information concerning the prevalence and type of gambling on horse races in colonial Maryland, see Robertson, The History of Thoroughbred Racing in America, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey (1964); Scharf, History of Maryland, Vol. II, Tradition Press, Hatkova, Pennsylvania (1967); Culvel, Blooded Horses of Colonial Days, Baltimore, Maryland (1922); Land, Colonial Maryland, KTO Press, Millwood, New York (1981).
. We recognize that a number of courts have refused to enforce out-of-state gambling contracts, holding that to do so would violate the public policy of the forum.
See, e.g., Condado Aruba Caribbean Hotel v. Tickel,