161 F. 88 | 2d Cir. | 1908
The statute under which the indictment in this cause is framed provides that:
“Every person * * * who has or retains iu his control or possession, after a distinctive paper has been adopted! by the Secretary of the Treasury for the obligations and other securities of the United States, any similar paper adapted to the making of any such obligation or other security, except under the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, or some other proper officer of the United States, shall be punished,” etc.
The indictment follows the language of the statute in stating the offense charged. It alleges that the Secretary of the Treasury had
“When the statute says any similar paper adapted to the making of such obligations or other securities, contemplating the unauthorized making, the words ‘adapted to the making of such obligations’ would refer to being adapted to the purpose of making- an unlawful or counterfeit obligation.”
The charge was erroneous. It stated an offense not charged against the defendant. He was indicted for having in his possession paper adapted to the making of the obligations “aforesaid,” which were the obligations of the United States. He was not indicted for having paper adapted to the making of unlawful securities. Counterfeit money is not an obligation of the United States.
The charge also involved a wrong construction of the statute. The statute contemplates the adoption by the Secretary of the Treasury of a distinctive paper for government obligations, and provides that it shall be unlawful, without authority from the Secretary or other proper official, to possess any paper similar to the distinctive paper and likewise adapted to the making of government securities. A paper w-hich resembles the distinctive paper and also is of such character as to he suitable for the imprint of government obligations comes precisely within the terms of the statute.
We think, moreover, that the statute is broad enough to include the “distinctive paper” itself. In fact, it would seem that the primary object of the statute was to prevent persons from having in their possession, without authority, the distinctive government paper. It is of the same general nature and for the same purposes as the English statute (St. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, § 11), which provides that:
“Whosoever, without lawful authority or excuse * * * shall purchase or receive, or knowingly have in his custody or possession, any paper manufactured and provided by or under the direction of the * * * Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Treasury, for the purpose of being used,” etc., “shall be guilty,” etc.
The designated paper is manifestly adapted to the making of the obligations and securities of the United States. It is “similar” to itself within the primary meaning of that term given by Webster: “exactly alike.” And, even if the word were not given its ordinary meaning, we should prefer that result to the oue which would leave out of the operation of the statute the very paper which apparently it was primarily designated to protect. Any uncertainty in the language of the statute undoubtedly arises from the desire of Congress to prohibit in one provision both the unauthorized possession of government paper and of a similar paper which could be used for printing government securities. The words “adapted to the making of such obligations” clearly refer to the obligations of the United States just before mentioned in the statute. There is no room for reading anything else into the statute and no basis for doing so. Nothing
Judgment' reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial. •