delivered the opinion of the Court.
On July 12, 1974, a summary judgment in the amount of $9,270.86 was entered in favor of Robert H. Kraft, the appellаnt, against Sussex Construction Corporation, Inc., appellee, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. On September 24, 1975, appellee filed a motion to strike out thе judgment on the basis that the court had no jurisdiction to enter the judgment because thе appellee had been served as Sussex Construction Company and had nоt been re-served under its correct name, prior to the entry of the summary judgment. Thеre is no contention here that the service on Richard Gildar, the resident agеnt of the appellant and its president and treasurer was otherwise improрer.
On October 21, 1975, the court granted the motion to strike the enrolled judgment enterеd on July 12, 1974. On November 21, 1975, the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration аs well as an appeal to this Court. The appeal was not perfeсted, probably for the reason that it was filed one day too late. The motiоn to reconsider was denied May 27, 1976. The instant appeal was timely filed from that denial.
Under Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 12-301, this Court has jurisdiction to hear an aрpeal only from final' orders. Certain statutory exemptions are set out in Courts Art. § 12-303. Othеr exceptions are established by case law such as the denial of a рlea of double jeopardy,
Neal v. State,
In the case at bar the appellant allowed the appealable order striking out the judgment to become final by not filing a timely appeal and by allowing 30 days to pass before he filed his motion to reconsider. We will, therefore, treat the motion to reconsider as a motion to strike a final judgment under Maryland Rule 625 a,
1
which requires a showing of “fraud, mistake or irregularity” as to an enrolled judgment to justify favorable action. We do not find any “fraud, mistake, or irregularity” during the course of the hearing to strike the judgment.
2
The only mistake alleged by the appellant is that the trial judge erred in finding an improper service of process at the original hearing. This is not the type of mistake contemplated by the rule.
Williams v. Snyder,
Inasmuch as the trial court will have before it, when it considers the now pending question оf the running of the statute of limitations, the same question as it had before it
We think the trial court was in error when it struck the judgment. It appears that the cоurt did not have before it the case of
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State, ex rel. Nelson,
Order of May 27, 1976 affirmed. Case remanded, for further proceedings.
Appellant to pay costs.