93 N.J.L. 279 | N.J. | 1919
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The action is to recover a reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of any person guilty of criminally receiving property belonging to the telephone company. The plaintiff, as a part of his ca,se, relied upon the conviction of a boy under the age of sixteen years. The prosecutor of the pleas, had alleged that the boy was a juvenile delinquent. At a Court for the Trial of Juvenile Offenders, as the record recites, the boy was found guilty in manner and form as charged in the accusation. The judgment was that he pay a fine of $25 and be placed in the custody of “probation officer (probation to pay).” It was proved, and not disputed, that the boy at the time of trial was not on probation; he had not been confined in any institution; we assume, in the absence of proof, because the fine had been paid. At the
The. question of the power of' the legislature to make evidence inadmissible is different from the question so frequently passed upon of the effect of proof of evidential facts as prima facie proof of facts in issue. We do not suppose that the legislature could under the guise or form of a rule of evidence or procedure deprive parties of substantial rights. On the other hand, the legislature certainly has the power to prescribe what proóf shall be essential, as, for instance, to comply with the statute of frauds; and it has also power to prescribe what contracts' shall be void as against public policy, as, for instance, contracts in restraint 'of trade; or immoral contracts or contracts contra bonos mores. We see no reason why the legislature may not prescribe rules of evidence; for example, rules regulating the competency of witnesses and excluding them for interest, as at common law, and as we still do in the case of transactions with á decedent, even though the effect may be to prevent enforcement of a legal contract. Clearly, the legislature, in creating a new tribunal, like the Court for the Trial of Juvenile Offenders, may prescribe what record it shall keep or whether it shall keep any record at all, and if
We may add that the offence in the present case took place after the passage of the act of 1916, and the question of impairing the obligation of contracts does .not arise.
Let the judgment be reversed and the record remitted for a new trial in the District Court.