This is a claim for death benefits under G. L. c. 152, § 31. A member of the Industrial Accident Board found that the employee sustained an injury “arising out of and in the course of his employment” which led .to his death and ordered payment of benefits. The reviewing board affirmed and adopted the findings and decision of the single member. On the insurer’s appeal to the Superior Court, the judge entered a decree dismissing the claim on the ground that “the evidence does not warrant a finding,that the employee’s injury and death arose out of and in the course of his. employment.” The case is before us on the claimant’s appeal from the decree of the Superior Court. 1
The findings of the reviewing board are final unless they are wholly lacking in evidential support or tainted by error of law.
Hachadourian’s Case,
The claimant’s reliance upon the “horseplay clause” of G. L. c. 152, § 26 (as amended by St. 1937, c. 370, § 1), is misplaced.
2
There was no finding, no evidence and no basis for an inference as to how the whiskey bottle came to be in Korsun’s desk. The question is, therefore, whether the death of an employee resulting from emotional stress induced by the sight of an empty whiskey bottle in his desk drawer when the employee was apprehensive of losing his job can be said to arise out of and in the course of his employment. (G. L. c. 152, § 26.) It must be shown that the injury arose from some risk with which the employment brought him in contact or from the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the job.
Bedore’s Case,
Certain cases involving injury to the circulatory system or the nervous system of an employee because of physical exertion or strain or because of emotional stress or strain, or because of a combination of both in circumstances which
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were held to arise out of his employment and therefore compensable, are relevant to the issue before us and are briefly mentioned:
3
Paralysis, caused solely by fright and terror when a bolt of lightning struck the roof of the plant, followed along sprinkler pipes, and blew out, with flash of light and noise, motors near the employee.
Charon’s Case,
In all of the above mentioned cases, the emotional stress or strain which caused or aggravated the condition which resulted in incapacity or death, arose in connection with the *128 work of the employee. In McMurray’s Case, it was said, “It is true that usually the emotional stress or strain .appears to have been accompanied by some physical exertion, in connection with the work of the employee, but we perceive no difference between a stress or strain brought about by physical exertion and that occasioned by distress, worry, fear, or anxiety [in connection with the work of the employee].” The court also said that “this case goes to the verge.” 331 Mass, at 32.
We think the case before us goes beyond the verge. In contemplation of the cases mentioned we hold as matter of law on the evidence before the board that Korsun’s emotional stress, although it may have resulted in his death, was not a “personal injury” which is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Apprehension over the prospect of' losing one’s job does not arise “out of the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment.” See
Caswell’s Case,
The decree dismissing the claim was right and is affirmed.
So ordered. .
Notes
In view of the disposition which we make of the case on the merits, we need not consider either the contention of the insurer that the report of the single member, adopted by the board, did not meet the requirements of G. L. c. 152, § 8, or the insurer’s exceptions, properly preserved, to the rulings made by the single member at the hearing. We likewise do not discuss the finding of causal relation which the single member reached by “adopting the opinions” of two doctors whose testimony on salient points appears to be irreconcilable.
“[I]f an employee while acting in the course of his employment . . .is injured by reason of the physical activities of fellow employees in which he does not participate, whether or not such activities are associated with the employment, such injury shall be conclusively presumed to have arisen out of the employment.”
Excluded from consideration because of irrelevancy to the issue are cases where the employment brought the employee in contact with a risk which in fact produced the injury. See, e.g.,
Caswell’s Case,
