16 Colo. App. 274 | Colo. Ct. App. | 1901
This suit was brought to recover damages on account of the death of a minor child of the plaintiffs, alleged to have been caused through the negligence of the defendant company. A demurrer was interposed to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and this being sustained, the plaintiffs stood upon their complaint, and brought the case here for review.
The defendant making no appearance, we have not been favored by its counsel with their views as to the particular defects in the complaint which in their opinion render it insufficient. Whether they claim it to have appeared upon the face of the complaint that the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action, or that it failed to state some matter neces
If it be said that the complaint itself shows that the piping was upon private premises, that the children were trespassers, and that they were not upon the land by invitation or consent of defendant, it may be answered, as it was by Chief Justice Cooley in Powers v. Harlow, supra, and approved by all of the authorities that we have cited, “ Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childish instincts and impulses, and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution towards them must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them, and which they in their immature judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken.” Or as was tersely and pithily expressed in the Minnesota case, “ What an express invitation would be to an adult, the temptation of an attractive plaything is to a child of tender years.” Or as was forcibly said by the Kansas supreme court in Price v. Water Co., 58 Kan. 551, “ To maintain upon one’s property enticements to the ignorant or unwary is tantamount to an invitation to visit, and to inspect and enjoy; and in such cases the obligation to endeavor to protect from the dangers of the seductive instrument or place follows as justly as though the invitation had been express.”
If an owner sees fit to keep on his premises something that is an attraction and allurement to the natural instincts of childhood, the law, it is well settled, imposes upon him the corresponding duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent the intrusion of children, or to protect from personal injury such as may be attracted thereby.
The case of Schmidt v. Cook, supra, was very similar to this. In that, the child was injured by the falling of a flagstone, which was leaning against a fence, and with and about which she was playing. It was contended that, the com
Contributory negligence sufficient to defeat a recovery does not appear from the facts stated in the complaint. It might, it is true, be made to appear by the evidence at the trial, it being shown that the child was possessed of sufficient judgment and discretion to have realized the danger of playing with tire piping in the manner in which it did, but that question is not presented here.
In-applying the rule that he who seeks to recover damages for a personal injury suffered from the negligence of another, must not himself be guilty of negligence that substantially contributed to the result, the law discriminates between children and adults, the feeble and the strong, and only requires of each the exercise of that degree of care to be reasonably expected in view of his age and condition. Reynolds v. Railroad, 58 N. Y. 218; Railway Co. v. McDonald, supra. It is not the contributory act merely, but the contributory negligence of a plaintiff that will prevent his recovery, and the care and caution required of a child being according to its maturity and capacity only, this must be dependent upon and be determined by the circumstances of each particular case. Schmidt v. Cook, supra; Railroad Co. v. Stout, supra.
Another leading case cited approvingly by the United States supreme court upon the question as to liability for injuries suffered by a child, even when it was a trespasser, is Lynch v. Nurdin, 41 Eng. Com. L. R. 422.
We think that we have said all that is necessary to express our views plainly and in such a manner that they may be easily understood, upon the only question presented. The principles upon which we base them have been most elaborately discussed in the authorities which we have cited. For the reasons given, the judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded, with leave to the defendant to further plead, as-it may be advised.
Reversed.