KOOTENAI COUNTY PROPERTY ASSOCIATION: Rеx Morehouse, Claude A. Stierwalt and Richard Morse, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. KOOTENAI COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent.
No. 17328
Supreme Court of Idaho
Feb. 8, 1989
769 P.2d 553
My understanding of the phrase “except work which qualifies under Davis-Bacon Act determinatiоn as being work for others” is that, within the meaning of the Davis-Bacon Act, work is required to be paid for at minimum wages set by the [Department of Labor], and if the bargaining unit wage rates do not comply with those rates, then the work could not be performed by them. The bargaining unit operations and maintenance employees who would have performed the work in the grievances filed ... are, on information and belief, being paid wage rates that meet applicable Davis-Bacon standards.
Affidavit of Gerald P. Oliver, ¶ 4, Supp.R. 50, 54. (Emphasis added.) This factual allegation was not refuted by EG & G.
In my view, the Union was entitled to arbitrate the questions raised by their grievances. In each of those grievances the Union asserted: “Work that has historically been рerformed and rightfully belongs to OCAW Local 2-652 has unilaterally been removed from same and been allowed to go to construction under the guise of the Davis-Bacon Act.” Exhibits A-D to Affidavit of Gerald P. Oliver, Supp.R. 66-71.
As the Supreme Court made clear almost three decades ago:
The courts ... have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in thе written instrument which will support the claim. The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those the court will deem meritorious. The processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which those who are not part of the plant environment may be quite unaware.
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 1346-47, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960).
When requested to enforce an arbitration clause оf a collective bargaining agreement, a court “should view with suspicion an attempt to persuade it to become entangled in the construction of the substantive provisions of a labor agreement, even through the back door of interpreting the arbitration clause, when the alternative is to utilize the services of an arbitrator.” Steelworker‘s v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1354, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960).
The decision of thе district court should be reversed and the case be remanded with directions that EG & G be required to carry out arbitration of the grievances filed by the Union. Reluctantly, I concur in the partial relief that is offered by the lead opinion.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs.
Lempesis, Anderson, Kroeger & Bennett, Post Falls, for plaintiffs-appellants. Roland D. Watson argued.
Lukins & Annis, Coeur d‘Alene, for defendant-respondent. Charles W. Hosack argued.
Kootenai County Property Association (the association) appeals a summary judgment in favor of Kootenai County (the county). The district court held that the county‘s $54 solid waste disposal charge on residential dwellings (1) does not unconstitutionally discriminate against property owners as opposed to actual users, and (2) is a reasonable “fee” for services as authorized by
Pursuant to
The association challenged the $54 residential dwelling charge in the district court on two grounds: first, the association asserted that the charge violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution because it unreasonably discriminates against property owners and is not assessed against actual users of the system; and second, the association asserted that the charge conflicts with Idaho Constitution, Article 7, §§ 4 and 5, because it is a general revenue raising tax measure which is not uniformly applied to all property of the same class. The association sought a court order rеquiring the county to cease collection of the $54 charge.
The county defended the $54 charge, arguing that
On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of the county. The district court concluded:
“[T]he $54 charge established by County is not a general revenue raising measure. Further, said charge does not discriminate against property owners as opposed to actual users.
“The fees collected for the solid waste dispоsal systems are related to the necessary and reasonable expenses of that system and are used for such purposes, as provided by statute.”
The association presents only two issues on appeal: (1) whether the county‘s solid waste disposal service must be requested by a prospective beneficiary before a service fee can be collected, and (2) whether the service fee assessed to provide a future benefit, landfill acquisition and preparation, is in reality a tax which does not meet the uniformity requirement. As set forth in our analysis below, we conclude that (1) the county‘s solid waste disposal service need not be specifically requested before a fee assessmеnt is authorized, and (2) the $54 fee authorized by
In 1970, the Idaho legislature enacted
To implement this public policy, the Idaho legislature granted county commissioners the authority “to acquire, establish, maintain and operate such solid waste disposal systems as are necessary and to provide reasonable and convenient access to such disposal systems by all thе citizens of the county.”
We now come to the association‘s first issue: whether a residence dweller can opt out by not requesting the service. The association argues that not all residential property owners use the system or benefit from it, and therefore the mandatory $54 charge on all habitable residences is unreasonable due to the use variance among residences.
Under the ordinance, none can opt out. When the commissioners imposed the $54 charge, they were treating owners of habitable residential dwellings as “users of the [system].”
No one suggests that each and every residence generates the same amount of solid waste. Presumably, the precise annual cubic yardage of solid waste from each residence could be painstakingly monitored and determined for each residence by county employees. However, all users would have to pay substantially more to cover the additional salaries of trash monitors. A solid waste disposal system is comparable to a sewer system. Charging a flat residential sewage fee is reasonable even though the actual use (outflоw volume) varies somewhat from house to house. See Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48, 256 P.2d 515 (1953). The legislature has not imposed exacting rate requirements upon localities for measuring actual residential solid waste disposal or sewage
The association presents no evidence showing that a $54 charge is not reasonably related to the annual benefit which the dwellings derive from the sоlid waste sys-tem. In fact, the commissioners have set lower rates for the poor and elderly based upon studies which demonstrate that these groups generate less solid waste. No charge is assessed on unoccupied buildings.
It is true that the commissioners chose to set the commercial unit charge according to actual use, $3.50 per cubic yard of waste. This choice, however, does not negate the reasonableness of not also using this approach for residential dwellings. While the amount of solid waste generated in residences may vary from house to house, the variation is substantially less significant than it is among businesses. For instance, the multi-storied Coeur d‘Alene Hotel would undoubtedly produce significantly more waste than a small roadside diner. It is not irrational for the county to legislate a fixed fee for residences, which have a much less significant variance in waste output, and a cubic yard fee for commercial establishments which vary significantly in the amount of waste produced.2
We now move to the association‘s second issue on appeal: that the $54 chаrge is a “tax” since it would not provide an immediate benefit, but rather would only provide a future benefit, i.e., acquisition and preparation of new landfill sites. We disagree with this premise. We begin our analysis by noting that it is the commissioners’ statutory duty “to acquire sites.”
The association further argues that when the benefit derived is a benefit to the general public, fees to provide the benefit must be considered a tax. A fee, according to the association, is voluntarily paid for specific services while a tax is involuntarily obtained for the general public benefit. However, the legislature, under its police powers, may mandate that citizens must accept certain services, and then require a fee for the receipt of those services. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, supra (ordinance requiring mandatory sewer hookup and requiring рayment of reasonable fee, approved); City of Glendale v. Trondsen, supra (ordinance establishing rubbish collection service and requiring payment for service regardless of whether building occupants use the service, approved);
The association‘s distinctions between present and future benefits, specific and general benefits and voluntary and involuntary payments are all unpersuasive. As discussed above, the legislature specifically
Our decision today is distinguishable from our recent decision in Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988), in which we held that
“[N]owhere does it authorize a municipality to impose a tax upon users or abuttеrs of public streets. While art. 7, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution permits municipal corporations to impose their own taxes such power is limited by the taxing power authorized by the legislature. Sun Valley Co. v. City of Sun Valley, [109 Idaho 424, 708 P.2d 147 (1985)].” Id. at 503-04, 768 P.2d at 766-67.
The basis upon which the ordinance in Brewster was overturned—that it lacked specific legislative authorization—is not present here. As pointed out above, under
We conclude that the $54 solid waste disposal “fee” for residential dwellings is reasonably related to the services rendered by the county in acquiring, establishing, maintaining and operating its solid waste disposal system. The fee is authorized by
SHEPARD, C.J., HUNTLEY, J., and TOWLES, J. Pro Tem., concur.
JOHNSON, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent from the decision of the majority.
- (1) Levy a tax of not to exceed two (2) mills on the assessed value of property within the county, provided that property located within the corporate limits of any city that is operating and maintaining a solid waste disposal site shall not be levied against for the purposes of the county solid waste disposal system; or,
- (2) Collect fees from the users of the solid waste disposal facilities; or,
- (3) Finаnce the solid waste disposal facilities from current revenues; or,
- (4) Receive and expend moneys from any other source;
- (5) Establish solid waste collection systems where necessary or desirable and provide a method for collection of service fees, among which shall be certification of a special assessment on the property served;
- (6) Use any combination of subsections (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) of this seсtion.
The county chose to fund its solid waste disposal system by imposing “an annual solid waste disposal fee.” Arguably, this fee might be characterized as a fee from users of the solid waste disposal facilities under
I am unable to accept the characterization of the annual solid waste disposal fee as a fee from “users” under
I am also unable to accept the characterizаtion of the annual solid waste disposal fee as a “service fee” under
This case is distinguishable from Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48, 256 P.2d 515 (1953). In Schmidt this Court upheld an ordinance that required owners, tenants or occupants of any property located in the city to conneсt with the city‘s sewer system and to cease the use of other means of disposal. Here, not only did the county‘s ordinance not require use of the county‘s solid waste disposal system, but also there was no requirement that solid waste could not be disposed of through other means.
My view that the annual solid waste disposal fee is not really a fee, either for users or for service, as authorized under
I would reverse the decision of the district court.
BAKES
JUSTICE