[¶ 1] Martha Hankins appeals from a summary judgment entered in the District Court (Ellsworth, Dobson, J.) in favor of Kondaur Capital Corporation in a foreclosure action. She argues that (1) substitution of Kondaur as the named plaintiff was imрroper because the original plaintiff did not have standing to bring the action; and (2) entry of a summary judgment was error because the record does not establish the essential elements of a foreclosure action without dispute as to several material facts. We vacate the summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] The following facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Martha, the non-prevailing party, are established in the summary judgmеnt record.
N. Star Capital Acquisition, LLC v. Victor,
[¶ 3] In November 2005, Eric Hankins executed a promissory note for the principal amount of $151,300 to Option One Mortgage Corporation. Attached to the note is an allonge that bears the same date as the note. The allonge is indorsed by a secretary of Option One, and “Kondaur Capital Corporation” is entered as the payee.
[¶ 4] As security for the note, Eric and Martha Hankins, as “Borrowеr,” executed a mortgage on their residence in Surry, Maine, in favor of Option One, as “Lender.” One of the mortgage covenants provides, “[This document] may be modified or amended only by an agreement in writing signed by Borrower and Lender.” The note does not contain a modification provision.
[¶ 5] In October 2006, Option One assigned the “mortgage and the note and claim secured thereby to Deutsche Bank
[¶ 6] Liquidation Properties filed a complaint for foreclosure against the Han-kinses and other parties in interest in February 2009. Martha filed an answer.
[¶ 7] In June 2009, Deutsche Bank assigned to Liquidation Properties the
mortgage, securing the payment of a certain promissory note(s) for the sum listed below, together with all rights therein and thereto, all liens created or secured thereby, all obligations therein described, the money due and to become due thereon with interest, and all rights accrued or to accrue under such mortgage.
Liquidation Properties assigned the mortgage to Kondaur in February 2010 “together with the note or notes therein described.” In March 2010, Liquidation Properties moved pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 17(a) and 25(c) to substitute Kondaur as the named plaintiff in this case. Without objection from either Martha or Eric Han-kins, in May 2010, the court (Staples, J.) granted the motion.
[¶ 8] In June 2010, Kondaur moved for a summary judgment, alleging that the Hankinses owed $206,238.08 on the note and mortgage. The Hankinses did not respond to the summary judgment motion. The court (Dobson, J.) found that there was “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” and it entered summary judgment in favor of Kondaur. Marthа timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standing and Substitution of Parties
[¶ 9] Martha contends that because Liquidation Properties did not have standing when it filed its complaint, the summary judgment should be vacated and the case dismissed. She also argues that the court abused its discretion when it substituted Kondaur as the named party because the proper plaintiff was not difficult to determine, the filing of this complaint without standing was not an understandable mistake, and substitution of Kondaur altered the factual allegations in the action.
[¶ 10] We review the issue of a party’s standing de novo.
JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Harp,
[¶ 11] As reflected in the summary judgment record, when the complaint was filed in February 2009, Liquidation Properties did not hold the note or the mortgage. Liquidation Properties did not allege in its complaint or amended complaint that it held the note. Absent an interest in the note, Liquidatiоn Properties did not have standing to commence this foreclosure action.
See Saunders,
[¶ 12] We next consider whether substitution of Kondaur for Liquidation Properties was proper pursuant to M.R.
[¶ 13] In
Saunders,
a foreclosure action was commenced by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS), an entity that had limited rights to the mortgage as a nominee for the lender, but lacked standing to foreсlose because it did not have an interest in the note.
[¶ 14] This case is different. When Liquidation Properties commenced this foreclosure action in February 2009, it had no interest in either the note or the mortgage. Because it would not have been difficult for Liquidation Properties to determine, through the exercise of due diligence, that it did not have standing to foreclose, the premature filing of this action was not an understandable mistake that would justify substitution of parties pursuant to Rule 17(a). 1 The Rule was not intended to provide relief from careless errors regarding matters as fundamental as this. See 2 Charles Harvey, Maine Civil Practice § 17:1 at 522 (3d ed.2011); Fed. R.Civ.P. 17(a) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amend.; 6A Charles Allen Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1555 (2010) (“the rule should be applied only to cases in which substitution of the real party in interest is necessary to avoid injustice”); Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 Geo. L.J. 1204, 1238 (1966).
[¶ 15] Nevertheless, because the Hankinses did not challenge the motion to substitute in the trial court and Martha challenges the substitution for the first time on appeal, the issue is unpreserved and we conduct obvious error review for “a seriously prejudicial error tending to produce a manifest injustice.”
Dupuis v. Soucy,
B. Summary Judgment
[¶ 16] Martha also contends that the summary judgment record contains a number of defects that preclude the entry of a summary judgment. She challenges whether (1) the loan modification is valid;
[¶ 17] We review the entry of a summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence provided in the statement of material facts and the accompanying record references in the light most favorable to the nonprevailing party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
N. Star Capital Acquisition,
[¶ 18] Martha argues that Liquidation Properties did not have authority to enter into the Loan Modification Agreement affecting the mortgage because, at the time of the agreement, it was not the “Lender” as required by the terms of the mortgage.
[¶ 19] We review the meaning of a contract de novo and interpret an unambiguous provision according to the plain meaning of its terms.
Camden Nat’l Bank v. S.S. Navigation Co.,
[¶ 20] The language of the covenant governing modification of the mortgage is unambiguous. It requires any modification to be made by written agreement signed by the Borrower
and
the Lender. The Lender, Option One, assigned its interest in the mortgage to Deutsche Bank in October 2006. Therefore, when the Loan Modification Agreement was executed in April 2007, Deutsche Bank was the Lender with respect to the mortgage. At that time, pursuant to the terms of the mortgage, only the Hankinses and Deutsche Bank could have modified the mortgage. As a result, there are genuine issues of fact as to whether the Loan Modification Agreement is valid and, if not, how that invalidity affects the amounts due on the mortgage or, perhaps, whether that invalidity was cured by express or implied ratification of the parties, operation of es-toppel, or some other legal theory.
See Wilkins v. Waldo Lumber Co.,
[¶ 21] These issues of fact are material and preclude the entry of a summary judgment because, in a motion for summary judgment, a foreclosing plaintiff is required to provide evidеnce of “the existence of the mortgage” and “the amount due on the mortgage note.”
Chase Home Fin. LLC v. Higgins,
[¶ 22] We need not address Martha’s remaining arguments.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Furthermore, the signature of an attorney on a pleading represents a "belief [that] there is good ground to support it.” M.R. Civ. P. 11(a) (providing for sanctions against a party that signs a pleading "with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule”).