19 Haw. 585 | Haw. | 1909
OPINION OP THE' COURT BY
This is an appeal by plaintiffs from a decree dissolving an injunction issued upon the filing of their bill praying for an injunction to restrain the defendants Scott and wife from proceeding in an action of assumpsit against the Kona Development Co. to recover the sum of $74,194.97, with interest, for breach of a contract between Scott and defendant McStocker for furnishing money to Scott to pay rents and plant 200 acres of land with cane and cultivate the same together with cane he had planted on 300 acres, McStocker to form a corporation “which shall furnish adequate capital, sugar mill and facilities for transporting the said sugar cane, when harvested, and manufacturing the same into sugar,” Scott to have all over and above $40,000 of the net proceeds coming from the sugar. The declaration in the action sets out the contract and avers that McStocker, after having furnished Scott with $19,000
From this pleading, which is not in common law form, but in the prolix narrative form peculiar to the code system, it appears the damages laid are for the failure of the defendant to take off the cane at the place agreed upon or to furnish a mill adequate to extract the full amount of sugar available from the cane and for its nonpayment of the agreed price for purchase of standing cane.
The bill, after reciting the contract which is dated July 5, 1905, alleges that McStocker’s advances to Scott of $20,000 were made with the assistance of James B. Castle, one of the plaintiffs; that in carrying out the contract JVEcStocker, Castle and their associates formed the plaintiff corporations West Hawaii Railroad Company, Hawaiian Development Company and Kona Development Company to erect and maintain a sugar mill, construct and maintain a railroad to transport cane from the fields to the mill and to act as sugar factors marketing the product of the Kona Development Co. “and to raise and furnish means for carrying on said enterprise in Kona;” that Scott not being able to carry it out his agents, JVEcStocker and
Hr. and Hrs. Scott demurred to the bill for want of equity or showing to warrant equity in interfering with the execution of the trust, because plaintiffs have not done equity in taking the Whitmarsh fields and harvesting the crop thereon, that
Neither the declaration in the action nor the bill in equity presents any question which requires to be passed upon by a court of equity or which is not cognizable in a court of law. The plaintiffs’ claim to be entitled to an injunction on the ground that the action is in violation of the agreement to arbitrate of June 6, 1908, requires that the right reserved to bring an action in three months, if no settlement were reached by arbitration or otherwise, be restricted to a_ suit in equity.’ But the agreement reserves the right to bring any action or actions, suit or suits and leaves Scott at liberty to select whatever remedy is appropriate whether in law or equity.
We see no inadequacy of the legal remedy in consequence of its requiring a money judgment while notes are deposited with a trustee to satisfy such judgment if any is made, for it is to be presumed that they would be applied in payment of the judgment precluding an issue of execution. There is no trust which is shown to require regulation or enforcement or the violation of which is apprehended. A case is not shown “in which there are more than two parties having distinct rights or interests which cannot be justly and definitely decided and adjusted in one action at the common law” (Sec. 1834 R. L.), since in order to ascertain whether the Kona Development Co., the defendant in the action, is indebted as
The only reason why equity would be preferable is that the account may be of such nature “that it cannot be conveniently and properly adjusted and settled in an action at law.” Sec. 1834 R. L. As jurisdiction at law in matters of accounts is concurrent, however, with that of equity when there is no equitable feature or equitable relief required, the authority to enjoin the action rests upon the question whether it appears that the accounts cannot be conveniently and properly passed upon in the action.
In Kawananakoa v. Puahi, 14 Haw. 72, an action by an •agent against its principal to recover agent’s commissions was enjoined, but the bill showed fiduciary relations between defendant and plaintiff upon which ground the court held “the jurisdiction can clearly be supported,” there appearing to have been no discussion of the question of enjoining the action and the attention of the court being directed mainly to whether equity had jurisdiction of a suit for accounting.
The question whether the accounts in this case are too complicated for a jury trial does not appear to be controlled by any former decision and can hardly be dealt with by any general rule to be applied under all circumstances.
“It is not every count which will entitle a Court of equity to interfere: it must be such 'an account as cannot possibly be taken justly and fairly in a Court of law.” Freitas v. Dos Santos, 1 Y. & J., Ex. 576.
In King v. Rossett, 2 Y & J. Ex. 32, an injunction was sought against an action on accounts, but the court said that equity will not interfere unless “by showing an account which cannot fairly be investigated by a Court of Law. Unless Courts of Equity were to put that limit to their interference, no case
“The jurisdiction in matters of account is not exercised, as it is' in many other cases, to prevent injustice which would arise from the exorcise of a purely legal right, or to enforce justice in cases in which courts of law cannot afford it; but the jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the courts of law, and is adopted because, in certain cases, it has better means of ascertaining the rights of parties. It is, therefore, impossible with precision to lay down rules or establish definitions as to the cases in -which it may be proper for this court to exercise this jurisdiction. The infinitely varied transactions of mankind would be found continually to baffle such rules, and to escape from such definitions. It is therefore, necessary for this court to reserve to itself a large discretion, in the exercise of which duo regard must be had, not only to the nature of the case, but to the conduct of the parties.”
On the other hand, in Fenno v. Primrose, 116 Fed. 49, it was held that equity should enjoin if the account is such that “the most that a jury could award would be a lump sum, derived from general impressions remaining as the consequence of a trial covering” a long period of time “and involving a great multitude of items of all kinds.”
In this case it is to be observed that it is not only accounts which are to be settled, but the adequacy of the mill for taking off the crop involves ascertainment by evidence of facts peculiarly appropriate for a jury to find, upon which facts important legal rights of the parties depend. Moreover, “Actions for accounting are- within the concurrent jurisdiction of law and equity and the one first taking actual cognizance of any particular controversy ordinarily retains exclusive jurisdiction.” Kaleikini v. Waterhouse, 19 Haw. 359, 361.
But in view of the difficulty of saying whether the action involves the taking of accounts too intricate for a jury to pass upon we prefer to regard the injunction as properly dissolved on the ground that the bill does not contain averments requisite to sustain a bill for an accounting. It does not even pray for an accounting*, nor does it allege that on a taking of an account it would appear that a balance would be found to be owing by the defendants to the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs are ready and willing to pay whatever balance, if any, should be found upon the accounting to be owing by them to defendants.
Decree affirmed.