172 N.E. 809 | Ill. | 1930
At the annual election held in the village of Stickney, in Cook county, on April 16, 1929, Anton Rench, Edward C. Kabella and John Denemark were the candidates for the office of president of the village. The local canvassing board found that Rench had received the highest number of votes and he was declared elected to the office. Shortly thereafter, Agnes Kohout, a resident and qualified elector of the village, by authority of section 112 of the *471 general Election law, filed in the county court of Cook county, a petition for a re-count of the ballots cast at the election. Rench challenged the jurisdiction of the county court to hear and determine the contest. The court decided that question in the affirmative, re-counted the ballots, found that Kabella had received the highest number of the votes cast and declared him elected. From that judgment Rench prosecutes this appeal.
The sole question presented for determination on this appeal is whether the county court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the present contest. The appellant contends that jurisdiction of the subject matter of the proceeding was vested exclusively in the circuit or superior court of Cook county, and hence that the judgment rendered by the county court is void.
The right to contest an election exists only by virtue of constitutional or statutory provision and when conferred, the proceeding must be conducted in or before the body or court which is designated. (Linegar v. Rittenhouse,
"Sec. 97. The circuit courts of the respective counties shall hear and determine contests of the election of the judges of the county court of their counties, and in regard to the removal of county seats, and in regard to any other subject which may by law be submitted to the vote of the people of the county."
"Sec. 98. The county court shall hear and determine contests of election of all other county, township and precinct officers, and all other officers for the contesting of whose election no provision is made."
The foregoing statutes were applied in Winter v. Thistlewood,
Section 8 of article 11 of the Cities and Villages act, as originally enacted (Laws of 1871-1872, p. 262), provided that there should be elected in each village organized under the act, by the qualified electors therein, six trustees who should hold their office for one year and until their successors were elected and qualified, and who should choose one of their own number president. By an amendment approved May 28, 1879, effective July 1, 1879, (Laws of 1879, p. 67), the term of office of village trustee was made two years, and three, or one-half of the whole number of trustees, were to be elected annually. An act approved June 9, 1887, in force July 1, 1887, (Laws of 1887, p. 116), provided: "That in addition to the trustees and officers required by law, a president of each and every village and incorporated town shall hereafter be elected annually by the voters of such village or town, at the regular election of such village or town, commencing with the election of such village or town held in the year A.D. 1888, and such president of any village or incorporated town shall hold his office for the term of one year and until his successor is elected and qualified. The president of any village or incorporated town shall be president of the board of trustees thereof, and shall preside at all meetings of said board, and shall have the same powers and perform the same duties as are or may be given by law to the president of boards of trustees in villages, but he shall not vote except in case of a tie, when he shall give the casting vote."
This act was amended by an act effective April 17, 1903, (Laws of 1903, p. 117), in two respects, first, by making the term of the president of a village or an incorporated town two years, and second, by substituting for the clause "and shall have the same powers and perform the same duties as are or may be given by law to the president of boards *474 of trustees in villages," the clause "and shall have the same power and perform the same duties as are or may be given by law to the mayor in cities or that have heretofore been given to the president of the board of trustees in villages." After the creation of the office of village president, by the act effective July 1, 1887, that officer became the president of the board of trustees of a village organized under the general Cities and Villages act; and by section 10 of article 4 of that act, which adopted section 98 of the general Election law, jurisdiction of contests of the election of presidents of villages so organized was vested in the county courts.
Section 97 of the general Election law was amended by an act approved June 17, 1895, effective July 1, 1895, (Laws of 1895, p. 170) to read: "The circuit courts in the respective counties, and in Cook county the superior court also may hear and determine contests of the election of judges of the county court, mayors of cities, presidents of county boards, presidents of villages, in reference to the removal of county seats and in reference to any other subject which may be submitted to the vote of the people of the county, and concurrent jurisdiction with the county court in all cases mentioned in section ninety-eight (98)."
No change was made in section 98, but it remains in force as originally enacted in 1872. The contention of the appellant, however, is that section 97 as amended specifically confers jurisdiction of contests of the election of presidents of villages, among other officers, upon the circuit courts in the respective counties and in Cook county upon the superior court also, and hence that the county courts have no such jurisdiction. To sustain this contention, King v. Jordan,
The jurisdiction of the county courts to hear and determine contests of the election of mayors and presidents respectively of cities and villages, organized under the general Cities and Villages act remains unaffected by the amendment of section 97 of the general Election law. That there has been no deprivation of such jurisdiction is shown by Zeman v. Dolan,
The county court had jurisdiction to hear the present contest, and the judgment of that court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed. *477