This case comes before us from an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County dismissing appеllant’s complaint in trespass. We reverse.
Appellant was employed by appellee as a freight handler in June of 1987 when the motorized jack he was operating was rammed from the rear by one David Raymond Christner, another employee of appellee’s who was аlso operating a jack, and whose dislike of appellant was allegedly the motivation for the attack. Appellant was injured in the incident, and, unable to work, he began receiving Worker’s Compensation from appellee. When, approximately one year later, appellee successfully petitioned for termination of the payments, appеllant filed the instant suit, alleging, inter alia, appellee’s negligence in failing to provide him with a place to work, safe from Christner’s attacks.
Appellee’s preliminary objections averred that thе court of common pleas was without jurisdiction to hear the case as the action was barred by appellant’s previous acceptance of compensation рayments, and by his failure to appeal the termination order. The trial court agreed, and this аppeal followed.
*190 Under the Worker’s Compensation Act, recompense is awardеd to those who receive injuries “in the course of [their] employment and related thereto.” 77 Pa.S.A. § 411(1). The Act made this remedy an exclusive one, “in place of all other liability to such employees.” 77 Pa.S.A. § 481(a). There is, however, an intentional tort exception to this rule: where the injury is “сaused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employe because of reasons personal to him, “77 Pa.S.A. § 411(1) the harm is not compensable as being “in the course of ... employment.”
The trial court, dismissed appellant’s complaint on the basis of the ruling made by the referеe of the Compensation Board before which appellee had brought its petition to terminate. Specifically, the referee found that appellant had sustained a work related injury, and had received compensation therefor. The trial court reasoned thаt because the harm had been ruled compensable, it could not, “by definition have arisen from ill-will. Conversely, if it arises from ill will it cannot be compensable.” (T.C.O. at 10). Appellant now argues that because there was no adjudication on the issue of whether the attack on him was or was not covered by the tort exception provision, his action against appellee is рroperly brought.
In support of his position, appellant refers us to
Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa,
We find appellant’s citation to
Mike
directly relevant to his own situation, since both the fact pattern, insofar as we know it, and the arguments in opposition are similar in many respects. In
Mike,
the employer claimed that recеipt of worker’s compensation payments barred suit in tort, as such payments provided his only аvenue of relief. However, in addressing that argument, we found that accept
*191
anee of рayments under the Act was not determinative, as any funds received could “be duly credited against аny recovery from the ... negligence action.”
Id.,
279 Pa.Superior Ct. at 393,
Whether appellant’s injury is subsumed under the rubriс “work-related,” whether it is the result of ill will borne him by Mr. Christner, or whether, indeed, it is even an injury at all was never dеmonstrated by evidence, judgment in this matter having been entered on pleadings alone. We therefore reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with our holding in Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa, supra.
Reversed and remanded. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
Notes
. Because of aрpellant’s claim that he is not covered by the Act, his failure to appeal the decision of the referee terminating payment is not fatal to his right to bring suit.