Cross appeals from an order of the Supreme Court (Conway, J.), entered March 25, 1992 in Albany County, which, inter alia, ordered defendant to pay support for the parties’ child.
The parties to this divorce аction entered into an open-court stipulation which settled all issues relating to the divorce except for the issuе of child support. Supreme Court calculated child support for the parties’ one child under the Child Support Standards Aсt (see, Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b]) (hereinafter CSSA) and directed defendant, the noncustodial parent, to pay plaintiff child support in the amount of $159.17 per week. The order provided that defendant’s child support obligation was retroactive to January 15, 1992, which the court found to be the first time after the effective date of CSSA that the issue of child support came before the court. Plaintiff and defendant cross-appeal from the order.
Plaintiff contends that the child support award contained in Supreme Court’s order should have been made retroactive to the date of the first application for child support, which was in November 1988. We agree. Pursuant to statute, the child support provisions of an order entered in a divorce action "shall be effective as of the date of the application therefor” (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [7] [a]; § 240 [1]), and the courts have consistently applied this general rule (see, e.g., Lauria v Lauria,
Citing Chasin v Chasin (
On his appeal, defendant contends that because plaintiff’s parents have provided plaintiff and the child with free housing, the child support award calculated in accordаnce with the guidelines of CSSA was unjust or inappropriate (see, Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [f]). In Lenigan v Lenigan (
Although plaintiff’s parents have provided free housing in the past, there is no evidence in the record that they have obligated themselves to provide free housing in the future. Nor is there any evidence as to the valuе of the free housing.
We reject defendant’s final contention that Supreme Court erroneously included in its child support award $31.19 per week аs defendant’s share of the child care expenses incurred by plaintiff. The record establishes that plaintiff is working and that she incurs child care expenses as a result thereof. Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (c) (4), Supreme Court was, therefore, required to determine reasonable child care expenses, which are to be "prorated in the same propоrtion as each parent’s income is to the combined parental income”. Based upon the evidence in the record, we cannot say that Supreme Court erred in its determination of reasonable child care expenses.
Weiss, P. J., Lеvine, Crew III and Harvey, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, with costs to plaintiff, by deleting the decretal paragraph and substituting therefor the following: "Ordered that the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff child support in the amount of One hundred fifty-nine аnd 17/100 dollars ($159.17) per week retroactive to November 19, 1988, less child support payments actually made by defendant either by prior court order or voluntarily. The retroactive amount due shall be payable in fifty-two (52) equal weekly installments to be pаid along with the weekly child support payment beginning with the first child support payment due after entry of this order.”, and, as so modified, affirmed.
Notes
Plaintiffs application for child support is contained in an order to show cause dated November 8, 1988. The action, however, was not commenced until November 19, 1988 and, therefore, the award should not be made retroactive prior to that date (see, Wacholder v Wacholder, supra, at 136).
