Kochorimbus v. MaggosKochorimbus v. Maggos
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Heard
delivered the opinion of the court:
June 22, 1923, appellee, as complainant, filed his verified amended bill of complaint in the superior court of Cook county against appellant, as defendant, alleging that on May 1, 1921, complainant became interested as a prospective purchaser in lots 13, 14 and 15 in Millard’s re-subdivision of block 24 in Ashland’s Second addition to Chicago, together with the one-story brick building located thereon, known as Nos. 1814 to 1824 West Harrison street; that from then until May 1, 1922, he frequently viewed the premises, watched the growth of business and counted the number of people passing by and visiting the property; that he estimated the value of the property and determined to negotiate for the purchase of the same; that he spent $300 and $2000 worth of time in the investigation; that on May 1 he ascertained that he could purchase the property for about $40,000 and could secure a loan thereon for $22,000; that he informed defendant of his investigation and of the great profits to be derived from the purchase and operation of the property and that he was about to negotiate for the purchase thereof and get a loan thereon; that he told defendant that as they were friends and relatives and as complainant had confidence in defendant he would take defendant in
The answer of defendant neither admits nor denies that complainant became interested as prospective purchaser of the real estate in question on May 1, 1921; admits that defendant did execute a contract for the purchase of the real estate in question in his own name and that he did purchase the same, and alleges that complainant caused his name to be inserted in the contract in question as one of the purchasers thereof without the knowledge of defendant and for the sole purpose of making it appear that he was
The cause was referred to a master in chancery, who, after hearing the evidence, found the controverted questions of fact in favor of complainant and recommended that a decree be entered in accordance with the prayer of the amended bill of complaint. Objections were entered to the master’s report, which being overruled, an order was entered that they stand as exceptions to the report. The cause being heard by the court, a decree was entered in accordance with the master’s report, finding that defendant was a trustee for complainant and held the title to an undivided one-half of the premises in trust for him and decreeing that defendant execute a deed conveying the undivided one-half interest in the property to complainant, subject to the trust deed securing the sum of $20,000, and that such deed be delivered to complainant upon his paying the sum of $11,650 in cash, with interest at six per cent from June 12, 1922. From this decree an appeal has been perfected to this court.
Complainant testified in detail to all of the material facts set out in his bill of complaint, and he was corroborated as to the original agreement between himself and defendant by the two real estate men through whom they were negotiating the deed, and also by the fact that the original contract, when produced at the office of the attorney for the signatures of the contracting parties, contained the names of complainant and defendant as purchasers, and the plural word “purchasers” was used throughout the contract. The contract upon
It is contended by appellant that the decree in this case must be reversed on account of a variance between the evidence and the allegations of the bill as to the agreement between appellant and appellee and the relief granted by the decree. This is not a decree for the specific performance of a contract between appellee and appellant or a decree to enforce an express trust. The evidence shows that appellant obtained the legal title to the property in question by virtue of a confidential relation and influence under such circumstances that he ought not, according to the rules of equity and good conscience, to hold and enjoy the beneficial interests of the property to the exclusion of appellee, and the court, in order to administer complete justice between the parties, by its decree raised
It is contended by appellant that even if complainant’s version of the transaction were true, in view of the Statute of Frauds and the rule with reference to trusts no valid trust is shown by the evidence. The Statute of Frauds does not apply to resulting or constructive trusts, as such trusts are expressly excepted from the operation of the statute. A constructive trust is one that arises where a person clothed with some fiduciary character by fraud or otherwise gains something for himself. (Pope v. Dapray, 176 Ill. 478; Reed v. Reed, 135 id. 482.) “If a person obtains the legal title to property by such arts or acts or circumstances of circumvention, imposition or fraud, or if he obtains it by virtue of a confidential relation and influence under such circumstances that he ought not, according to the rules of equity and good conscience as administered in chancery, to hold and enjoy the beneficial interest of the property, courts of equity, in order to administer complete justice between the parties, will raise a trust, by construction, out of such circumstances or relations; and this trust they will fasten upon the conscience of the offending party and will convert him into a trustee of the legal title, and order him to hold it or execute the trust in such manner as to protect the rights of the defrauded party and promote the safety and interests of society.” (Perry on Trusts,—6th ed.—sec. 166; Kern v. Beatty, 267 Ill. 127; Allen v. Jackson, 122 id. 567.) Constructive trusts are raised by equity for the purpose of working out right and justice where there was no intention of the party to create such
The decree of the superior court of Cook county will therefore be affirmed.
n ¿r Decree affirmed.